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1 Treaty 3 Medallion signed on October 3, 1873 between the Saulteaux, Ojibway Nations and the 
Crown depicting Kihci-Asotamâtowin, The Treaty Sovereigns’ Sacred Undertakings to each other 
with the enduring symbolism of the sun shining, the grass growing and the river flowing.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the Crown’s  Constitutional duty of consultation and 
its application on the holders of Treaty rights. Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders 
are the underpinning of the consensual Treaties. They were negotiated by sovereign 
nations through mutual consent and established a distinct Constitutional authority 
establishing rights, responsibilities and rules of coexistence. Their implementation is a 
Crown Constitutional obligation. This thesis argues that the duty to consult jurisprudence 
reveals systemic colonial problems in the common law Treaty rights paradigm by 
colonial interpretation, unilateral abridgement and justified infringement of the 
consensual Treaty. Further, judicial and politically created doctrines of the honour of the 
Crown and reconciliation are rendered meaningless when used as part of the ongoing 
colonial paradigm and abridgement of Treaties. This thesis argues that Canada must enter 
a post-colonial era by giving content to Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders by 
implementing Treaty through Treaty Constitutionalism. This requires Canada to 
undertake a Constitutional paradigm shift to accord the sacred and inviolable Treaties 
their proper place as foundational instruments in the building of Canada. This means, as 
well, that the only forum for proper consultation on the numbered Treaties is through 
Constitutional conferences with full and equal participation of Treaty First Nations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indigenous legal and constitutional orders provide the authority for the Treaty First 
Nations to enter into Treaty and create Kihci-Asotamâtowin, the sacred agreements made 
to one another. The Treaty order, entered into between two foreign, yet sovereign nations, 
created a distinct federalism where each maintained their respective sovereignty, 
nationhood and way of living. Indigenous Legal and Constitutional orders are the 
underpinning of the consensual Treaties. They were negotiated by sovereign nations 
through mutual consent and established a distinct Constitutional authority establishing 
rights, responsibilities and rules of coexistence. The implementation of treaty is a Crown 
Constitutional obligation.  
 
However, instead of fulfilling the spirit and intent of the Treaty, unilateral 
Canadian laws were created and enforced to prevent Treaty First Nation people from 
asserting rights over their territories and to make their governance systems and laws 
illegitimate. Today, Indigenous people find themselves in a fierce struggle to protect their 
rights and lands which is nothing short of a struggle to survive as nations. First Nation 
Governments regularly face a lack of process and inclusion before land and resources 
deals are struck that effect traditional territories and economies. The policy of denying 
Indigenous legal orders, rights and interests largely persists as the Crown continues to 
issue interests in Indigenous lands and resources. Canada and commercial sectors have 
become wealthy from the resources harvested while Treaty First Nations live in utter 
poverty through the dispossession of their land and the lack of full recognition and 
implementation of Indigenous and Treaty Rights.  
 
In 1985 the Supreme Court of Canada began to flesh out a requirement on 
Government to consult with Aboriginal people of Canada when impacting their 
constitutional rights.2 Then in 2005, the Supreme Court released three decisions 
delineating a clear legal duty of consultation and accommodation on Governments in 
                                                 
2 Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 [Guerin]. The SCC found that the INAC failed to 
consult with the Musqueam before accepting a lease with unfavourable terms with a third party. 
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Haida3, Taku River Tlingit 4 and Mikisew5. These court decisions resonated across the 
country propelling both government and industry out of their apathy as First Nation 
litigation threatened large resource development projects. Government and industry 
hastened to educate themselves about the existence of Aboriginal title, Treaty and 
Aboriginal rights and how the legal duty to consult implicates them. The duty to consult 
has demanded a formal recognition of Indigenous interests and the impact governmental 
decisions have on those rights.  
 
This thesis examines the sacred and inviolable treaties and the application of the 
legal duty to consult to holders of Treaty rights. Judicial and politically created doctrines 
such as the honour of the Crown and reconciliation, as part of the duty to consult are 
rendered meaningless when used as part of the ongoing colonial paradigm and 
abridgement of Treaties. This thesis argues that Canada must enter a post colonial era by 
giving content to Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders by implementing Treaty 
through Treaty Constitutionalism and Bi-lateral Federalism. This requires Canada to 
undertake a Constitutional paradigm shift to accord the sacred and inviolable Treaties 
their proper place as foundational instruments in the building of Canada. This means, as 
well, that the only forum for proper consultation on the numbered Treaties is through 
Constitutional conferences with full and equal participation of Treaty First Nations. This 
thesis contains five chapters.  
 
Chapter One sets our foundation and establishes the inherent foundation of Indigenous 
legal and Constitutional orders. Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders are the 
underpinning of Indigenous nationhood and sovereignty and provided the authority for 
negotiations of Treaty with the Crown. Treaty is considered by Indigenous Treaty 
beneficiaries as both sacred and inviolable. The Treaty negotiations created a exclusive 
relationship between two foreign, yet sovereign nations exchanging solemn promises. 
                                                 
3 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 
[Haida],. 
4 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 
74, [2004] 3 SCR 550 [Taku]. 
5 Mikisew Cree First Nation v British Columbia, 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388 [Mikisew]. 
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The understandings between the parties concerned fundamental aspects of the 
relationship, such as, war and peace, annuities, the promise of a continuation of way of 
life, and other multiple aspects of coexistence. The imperial Crown entered into Treaty as 
instruments of royal prerogative which bind the Crown and create enforceable obligations 
based on the mutual consent of the sovereign parties. The consensual Treaty represents 
the original Constitution order in Canada.  
 
Chapter Two explains Indigenous treaty nations are independent nations, freely 
associated states and distinct from European settlers or colonists. Indigenous nations did 
not surrender either their autonomy nor their legal and Constitutional orders when they 
entered the Treaty agreements. In fact, the premise of the Treaties was the guarantee of 
the continued sovereignties right of self-governance, which was never surrendered. The 
authority of Indigenous nations derives directly from the consent of their citizens. 
Entering into Treaty placed Treaty First Nations under the protections of the Crown. As 
protected nations, Treaty First Nation citizens were never subject to the authority of the 
imperial Parliament and remained as foreign jurisdictions under the imperial Crown. The 
sacred and inviolable treaties have generated both international and Constitutional 
obligations   for   their   implementation   on   the   Crown.   This   chapter   frames   the   Crown’s  
Constitutional obligation for implementation including the current common law paradigm 
on Treaty rights which presents a paradox of the Crown being both a protector and an 
opponent of Treaty nations.  
 
Chapter Three examines the judicial doctrine of the honour of the Crown. First, the 
origins of the doctrine are examined to understand its colonial foundation. Then its 
judicial evolution from a fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to its current 
manifestation where the honour of the Crown is a surrogate where Indigenous claims are, 
at common law, purported to be insufficiently specific to mandate a fiduciary standard. 
The separation of these doctrines has resulted in an arguably lesser standard of protection 
as the honour of the Crown has been thought of as imposing a moral and virtuous 
obligation on a Government who has anything but toward Treaty First Nation people. 
Inherent difficulties arguably arise in calling upon the Crown’s   honour   through   its  
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internal tension of self-preservation in the face of competing Indigenous rights claims. In 
order for the Honour of the Crown to have true legitimacy, it requires full and immediate 
Treaty implementation. 
 
Chapter Four examines the historical neglect of the Crown's Constitutional duty to 
consult and accommodate holders of Treaty rights. It is here that the full extent of the 
historical neglect by the Crown of Treaty rights is abundantly clear. It’s   a   history   that  
demonstrates that Canadian governments are accustomed to making unfettered decisions 
about legislation, and the exercise of rights without consideration of the inherent and 
Constitutional rights of treaty people. Unilateral and colonial legislation such as the 
Indian Act and the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement in the Constitution Act, 1930 
are examples in the plethora of instruments used in the abridgement of the treaty and 
dispossession of Treaty First Nation people from their lands and resources. An 
examination of the jurisprudence on the duty to consult reveals a colonial course aimed at 
the dispossession of Treaty First Nation land and resources. It is also here, however, that 
the courts have curtailed that power by fleshing out the legal, Constitutional and 
enforceable duty upon the Crown through Mikisew.  
 
Chapter Five argues that the accurate interpretation of Canada's Constitution begins with 
a recognition of Indigenous Constitutional orders by placing them within the shared rule 
in Canadian federalism. The idea of a shared rule or tri-partite federation has been 
described as Treaty federalism or treaty Constitutionalism. Treaty federalism restores the 
original position of Indigenous people possessing their own legal and Constitutional 
orders existing side by side with the Canadian Constitution. Treaties constitute the 
original Constitutional order and are the foundation laws of Canada and created shared 
responsibilities while preserving Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders. Canada 
possesses the framework for a shared Constitution through the Constitution Act, 1982. 
The framework can re-create the tri-partite federation envisioned by Treaty through the 
inclusion of Treaty Constitutionalism. The Crown will then, be able to engage in proper 
and just consultation on Treaty rights through Constitutional conferences. Also examined 
in this chapter is the court’s corresponding precept of reconciliation and treaty 
 5 
reconciliation. Much like the honour of the Crown, the theory of reconciliation has been 
used by the courts and governments to describe the relationship between Indigenous 
people and the Crown. The Supreme Court has indicated that reconciliation is the 
underlying purpose behind s. 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. However the court has 
used the concept of reconciliation as a guise to further the colonial agenda by 
undermining Indigenous sovereignty and broadening of legislative infringements of 
Treaty rights. Both the court and Crown's concept of reconciliation does not go far 
enough to effectively bring a true reconciliation to address the ills of centuries of 
colonialism and denial of Treaty rights and Treaty First Nation legal orders. True 
reconciliation will only occur through a complete paradigm shift through the inclusion of 
Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders. 
 
There   is   truth   that   “the   answer   to   a   question   can   often   depend   on   who   is   doing   the  
asking,”6 and as member of the Cree tribe of George Gordon First Nation, signatory to 
Treaty 4, the lens in which I view the jurisprudence around Treaty rights derives from 
realities of my people and the promise made in Treaty. This fact is particularly evident in 
teaching my daughter Darian about the history of Treaty people and our difficultly in 
reconciling that promised future with the stark reality of the state of our communities. 
The damage of colonization, residential schools, the Indian Act, poverty, the continued 
dispossession of the land and resources by the failure to honour Treaty cannot be 
understated. The  court’s  decisions  on  the  Crown’s Constitutional obligations to holders of 
Treaty rights gives me a pause for hope, but only a pause. Canada and its institutions 
must be willing to recast the entire relationship through decolonization and reconciliation 
premised on the full and absolute recognition of Indigenous legal and Constitutional 
orders with immediate implementation of Treaty and the restoration of Treaty First 
Nations as part of a Tri-partite Federation. 
                                                 
6 Zina  O’Leary,  The Essential Guide to Doing Research (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2004) 
at 45. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INDIGENOUS LEGAL ORDERS AND KIHCI-ASOTAMÂTOWIN –THE TREATY 
SOVEREIGNS’ SACRED AGREEMENT  
 
“Okimâw Miyo-wîcihitowiyêcikêwin, Wîtaskê-osihcikêwin – An Agreement between the 
Sovereign Leaders to establish good relations  and  to  live  together  in  Peace”7 
        ~Elder Norman Sunchild 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Pre-colonial, Indigenous people stood equal to any nation in sovereignty and 
nationhood, possessing sophisticated laws, and legal and social systems. These legal 
orders are part of a larger Indigenous Constitutional order which defines Indigenous 
governments, jurisdictions, and rights of citizens.8 Indigenous Constitutional and legal 
orders are the underpinning to the authority, as sovereign nations, to negotiate the sacred 
and inviolable treaties. In negotiating Treaty, an exclusive relationship between two 
sovereign nations exchanging solemn promises was created and is expressed in the Cree 
language as Kihci-asotamâtowin, meaning the treaty sovereigns’ sacred undertakings. 
The understandings between the parties concerned fundamental aspects of the 
relationship, war and peace, trade, land use, the promise of a continuation of way of life, 
                                                 
7 Cardinal, Harold and Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan (Calgary: University 
of Calgary Press, 2000) [Cardinal, Treaty Elders] at 33. 
8 Kiera L. Ladner, "Indigenous Governance: Questioning the Status and the Possibilities for 
Reconciliation with Canada's Commitment to Aboriginal and Treaty Rights," The National 
Centre for First Nation Governance, Research paper, (Sept., 2006 at 4, states, "Interesting – 
because most non-Indigenous people do not think of Indigenous peoples as having had 
constitutions prior to colonization. In fact, most would be likely to suggest that the only 
constitution Indigenous peoples have (or ever had) is the Canadian Constitution. But Indigenous 
peoples were not sitting around waiting for colonists to provide them with government. Nor were 
they waiting for settlers to provide or assist in creating constitutions which define and confine a 
system of government, the rights and/or responsibilities of government officials, matters of 
jurisdiction, or the rights and/or responsibilities of citizens. Still, we tend not to think in terms of 
Indigenous constitutions or of Indigenous peoples having had constitutional orders historically. 
Yet, these constitutional orders provided the  teachings,  ‘supreme  law’,  political  philosophies and 
jurisdictions that were operationalized within the political system." See for a sample constitution, 
The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, "The First Nation Indian Government and The 
Canadian  Confederation,"  at  83  [Ladner,  “Indigenous  Governance”].  
http://fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/kiera_ladner.pdf 
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with other multiple facets of a shared, yet separate coexistence. The Treaty relationship is 
based upon sacred Indigenous laws that translated into Treaty law and doctrines.  
 
The Treaty order and corresponding rights and responsibilities possess a distinct 
Constitutional authority that established rules of coexistence between Indigenous nations 
and the Crown. The Treaty jurisprudence, in itself, created a consensual nation-to-nation 
Constitutional commitment of consultation in the highest order, exclusively by the 
signatories. The Treaty Indigenous nations entered into Treaty based on inherent and 
sacred laws and are bound by those laws. The Imperial king ?Queen entered into Treaty 
as an exercise of Royal Privilege. As such, Treaties bind the king and queen and create 
enforceable obligations based wholly and only on the mutual consent of the sovereign 
parties.9 This chapter examines Indigenous legal and Treaty orders in their original status 
possessing a distinct Constitutional order that converged with the British Constitutional 
order at the signing of the numbered treaties and creating a sacred jurisprudence. 
Canada's Constitutional order has legitimacy because of Treaty through and by the 
consent of the Indigenous people. 
 
1.1 INDIGENOUS LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
 
Indigenous laws flow from sources that lie outside of common and civil law 
traditions. The imposition of colonialism and common law did not alter Indigenous legal 
orders and law. Indigenous legal orders are comprehensive, holistic orders that developed 
independent of British legal traditions and extended through the Treaties with other legal 
orders. Adjudicative traditions of legal positivism are not sufficient to realize the 
inheritance of Indigenous rights implicit in Indigenous legal orders. Indigenous peoples 
developed spiritual, political and social customs and conventions to guide their 
relationships and these became the foundation for many complex systems of law. Each 
                                                 
9 R v Badger [1996] 1 SCR 771 at 812 para.76 [Badger], Ontario (AG) v Bear Island Foundation, 
[1991] 2 SCR 570 [Bear Island]; Ontario v Dominion of Canada and Quebec; In Re: Indian 
Claims at 504-05, 511-12 [Re Indian Claims]; R. v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 at 497, para 50 
[Marshall]; Campbell v British Columbia (AG) at 355, para 84 [Campbell]; B. Slattery, "Making 
Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 209 [Slattery,  “Making  Sense”]. 
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Indigenous nation has its own unique ceremonies and formalities to renew, celebrate, 
transfer or abandon its legal relationships. Furthermore, each Indigenous nation has its 
own particular stories which categorize its legal relationships to the different orders of 
creation,   and   each   group’s   stories   differ   according   to   its   own   history,   material   needs,  
spiritual alignment or social structure.10 Indigenous teachings, traditions, and customs, 
oral history, practices, and perspectives establish sui generis 11 Indigenous law and orders 
that can be known, studied and applied.12 Indigenous knowledge is concerned with the 
study of Indigenous teachings; its principles are best translated as Indigenous 
jurisprudences.13 Indigenous jurisprudence is based on ecological understanding and 
Indigenous language, unlike Eurocentric law, which is created by the artificial man state 
and is derived from theology and morals.14 The Cree say that jurisprudence sets 
relationships into order.15  
 
Indigenous rights find their source, not in Canadian law but in Indigenous 
jurisprudences. Indigenous customs and relationships give meaning to the content of 
Indigenous rights. The Indigenous inherent rights theory derives explicitly from 
Indigenous legal orders and jurisprudences. Indigenous sovereignty, inherent Indigenous 
rights and Indigenous legal orders remain outside the purview of Canadian law. 
 
Indigenous languages are key to understanding Indigenous legal orders and 
jurisprudences. The histories of Indigenous people are told through oral histories and 
teachings that are expressed in terms of animate and inanimate parts as opposed to 
gendered relations. When things such as rocks, rivers, etc, are identified as living, this 
                                                 
10 John Borrows,  “With  or  Without  You:  First  Nations  Law  (in  Canada)”  (1996)  41  McGill  LJ  
629 [Borrows,  “With  or  Without  You”]. 
11 Sui generis is derived from the Latin language; su (of its own) and generis, genitive of genus 
(kind) meaning self generating being the only example of its kind. 
12 James  (Sa’ke’j)  Youngblood  Henderson,  Aboriginal Jurisprudence and Rights, in Kerry 
Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims, Visions/Strategies/Directions, (Saskatoon: Purich 
Publishing Ltd., 2004 [Henderson, Aboriginal Jurisprudence]. See, for a more comprehensive 
view,  Marie  Battiste  and  James  (Sa’ke’j)  Youngblood  Henderson,  Protecting Indigenous 
Knowledge and Heritage (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 2000) [Battiste, Protecting 
Indigenous Knowledge]. 
13 Ibid at 71-73. 
14 Ibid. 
15Ibid. 
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imports different legal obligations. Relationships and obligations that the environment, 
the animals and the people have in living together are reflected in the language. 
Indigenous languages contain the values of the society and Indigenous worldviews are 
inherent in its structure. The Indigenous perspective of rights and title flow from 
relationship with and responsibilities for the territories. Rather than Aboriginal title, the 
view is better understood as 'original title'. It encompasses a sacred relationship with the 
land, self-determination, responsibility and jurisdiction to protect, access and use the 
lands, waters and resources for the benefit of Indigenous people.16  
 
Indigenous Constitutional orders underpin Indigenous political systems, systems 
as sophisticated as the society they were a part of. The Indigenous Constitutional orders 
were shaped by the realities of an Indigenous territory and provided opportunities to 
make, interpret, and enforce laws in a manner that was consensual and inclusive.17 In 
constructing their political systems, each nation created unique and complex systems of 
government. Indigenous political systems were created and are maintained by a 
Constitutional order.18 The Indigenous Constitutional order is a system of government 
which provides the ability to make, interpret and enforce laws within a territory and set 
forth the rules of and the roles and responsibilities of all members of the nation.19 Unlike 
the written Canadian Constitution, Indigenous Constitutional orders were oral documents 
consisting of songs, stories, ceremony, orations and bundles.20 These Constitutional 
orders provide for Indigenous political systems and their ability to make, interpret and 
enforce law within a given territory. Indigenous Constitutional orders are not subject to 
the authority of another nation or another government, but they were subject to the people 
                                                 
16 Ibid at 73. 
17 Ladner,  “Indigenous  Governance”,  supra note 2 at 3. 
18 Ibid Ladner provides examples of Indigenous constitutions, which include the Haudenosaunee 
Great Law of  Peace,  the  Mi’kmaq  teachings  of  the  seven  districts  that  comprise  the  Grand  
Council and the rights and responsibilities of individuals, families, clans and leadership within 
each district and the Adaak and Kungax of the Gitxan and Wet'suwet'en nations which lay out the 
laws (rights and responsibilities) of each of the houses and the each of the nations. See also, John 
Borrows, Canada’s  Indigenous  Constitution, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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of the nation and the manner in which they decided to live within and relate to their 
territory (and other beings in their territory).21  
 
Understanding that Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders and Canadian 
jurisprudence derive from different and distinct knowledge systems and worldviews is 
necessary for a just understanding of Treaty. Indigenous legal orders are independent 
legal interests, inherent orders of legislation, not delegated nor a result of colonial 
recognition or royal proclamations. Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders were 
uninterrupted and unaltered by the reception of common law for the colonialist settlers. 
There is a continuity of Indigenous nations’ legal relationships in the land they 
traditionally occupied prior to European colonization that both predated and survived 
European claims to sovereignty.22 Indigenous legal orders are, in every sense, part of the 
ancient Constitutional law of the land.23  
 
1.2 INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD 
 
Pre-colonial, Indigenous nations were independent nations with autonomous and 
sovereign legal orders. As nations, Indigenous people engaged in diplomacy and foreign 
affairs as evidenced through the treaty making process. Treaty and inter-governmental 
relations and diplomacy were used in negotiation of peaceful relations, economic 
reciprocity and coexistence within the same territory. Prior to the arrival of Europeans, 
the Treaty process was a powerful means of nation-to-nation relationships. The advent of 
Europeans arrival necessitated agreements for trading and military alliances. The early 
period held a semblance of mutual respect of the social, cultural and political differences. 
Both the Indigenous nations and European settlers were considered as distinct and 
autonomous each possessing an internal Constitutional order.  
 
Early British policy and practice was based on the recognition of Indigenous 
nationhood and the existence of nation-to-nation relationships. Early colonial judicial 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Guerin, supra note 2 at 336. 
23 Henderson, Aboriginal Jurisprudence, supra note 12 at 7. 
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cases in the common law tradition recognized the nation-to-nation legal relationship. In 
1705, in Mohegan Indians v Connecticut 24 a Royal Commission found the Mohegan 
First Nation to be  a  "sovereign  nation,  which  was  not  subservient  to  the  colony.”25 In that 
case, the Connecticut legislative assembly claimed jurisdiction through a royal charter 
over the Mohegan's and their lands in spite of a pre-existing treaty. The Royal 
Commission in its jurisdiction decision in 1743 upheld the terms of the Treaty and the 
separation of the Indian Nations from the colonies where it held: 
 
The Indians, though living amongst the king's subjects in these countries, are a 
separate and distinct people from them, they are treated with as such, they have a 
polity of their own, they make peace and war with any nation of Indians when 
they think fit, without control from the English. It is apparent the crown looks 
upon them not as subjects, but as a distinct people, for they are mentioned as such 
throughout Queen Anne's and his present Majesty's commission by which we now 
sit. And it is as plain, in my conception, that the crown looks upon the Indians as 
having the property of the soil of these countries; and that their lands are not, by 
His Majesty's grant of particular limits of them for a colony, thereby impropriated 
in his subjects till they have made fair and honest purchases of the natives.26 
[emphasis added] 
 
Then in 1867, the Superior Court of Quebec in Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), recognized 
Aboriginal peoples as “autonomous nations living under the protection of the Crown, 
retaining their territorial rights, political organizations and common laws." 27 Thus, in 
establishing nation-to-nation relationships and in recognizing Indigenous nations, the 
European  kings  respected  Indigenous  nation’s  legal  orders. Most importantly, the settlers 
were prohibited by the Royal Proclamation 1763 and Imperial law to interfere with 
Indigenous nationhood and sovereignty.  
 
                                                 
24 James  (Sa’ke’j)  Youngblood  Henderson,  “Empowering  Treaty  Federalism” (1994) 58 Sask L 
Rev 241 at  252  [Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”]  citing  Mohegan Indian v Connecticut in J.H. 
Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council From the American Plantation (New York: Octagon Books, 
1965) at 425. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 252. Henderson notes that ironically the First 
Nations of North America have not been elevated to statehood nor formally annexed to Canada 
but yet are still administered as colonies by the Provinces of Canada. 
27 Connolly v Woolrich and Johnson et al (1867), 17 RJRQ 75 also reported 11 L C Jur 197 
Quebec Superior Court, Monk J., 9 July 1867. 
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Indigenous Nations possessed their own legal and Constitutional authority and 
entered into the treaty relationship with the British Crown on that basis. They possessed 
authority over their people and the territory. Treaties were a confirmation of the 
autonomous authority Indigenous people held. Treaties and the rights and obligations 
therein were to be protected under the Treaty by the British Crown. Henderson  in  “Treaty  
Federalism,”  explains: 
 
Thus, treaty federalism transformed inherent rights of an Aboriginal order into 
vested rights in the constitutional law of Great Britain, then the United Kingdom 
and then Canada. Although the treaties could not affect First Nations' 
international status, autonomy, identity or customary law, often the terms of the 
treaties consensually altered their relationship to other nations. The treaties united 
the First Nations as freely associated states of the United Kingdom, not as part of 
any colony, province or dominion. Consequently, treaty federalism united 
independent First Nations under one Crown, but not under one law. 28[emphasis 
added] 
 
As well, in 1990, Justice Lamer in R. v. Sioui, held that the 1760 Treaty of the Crown 
with the Hurons confirmed the independence of Treaty First Nations by stating:  
 
... from the historical documents that both Great Britain and France felt that the 
Indian nations had sufficient independence and played a large enough role in 
North America for it to be good policy to maintain relations with them very close 
to those maintained between sovereign nations. The mother countries did 
everything in their power to secure the alliance of each Indian nation and to 
encourage nations allied with the enemy to change sides. When these efforts met 
with success, they were incorporated in treaties of alliance or neutrality. This 
clearly indicates that the Indian nations were regarded in their relations with the 
European nations which occupied North America as independent nations.29 
 
1.3 THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION 1763 
Following the conclusion of the seven year war the first Constitutional 
prerogative act was issued by King George III, the Royal Proclamation of 1763.30 The 
                                                 
28 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 252. 
29 R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1052-53 [Sioui]. 
30 Royal Proclamation 1763 (U.K.), re-printed RSC 1985, App II, No 1 [Royal Proclamation]. 
See also: The Crown's Fiduciary Relationship with Aboriginal peoples at online: Library of 
Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0009-e.pdf> 
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British were experiencing growing conflict with the Indigenous nations and tribes as 
increased settlement threatened Indigenous territories. They also desired to maintain the 
Indians as allies as they still possessed military and economic power. Initially, the British 
did not follow the standard set by the French in reciprocity toward the Indians including 
the adherence to Aboriginal protocols and gift giving for diplomacy between the 
nations.31 The absence of the diplomacy had precipitated Chief Pontiac's war in 1763 and 
the requirement of King George III to issue the Royal Proclamation.32 It states,  
 
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our interest, and the 
security of our colonies, the several nations or tribes of Indians with whom we are 
connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed 
in the possession of such parts of our Dominions and territories as, not having 
been ceded to or purchased by us, are reserved to them, or any of them as their 
hunting grounds.33 
 
As Imperial policy, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 confirmed the exclusivity of the 
relationship between the Crown and the Indigenous Nations and reflected the Crown’s 
policy toward Indians and their lands. The Proclamation prohibited private purchase of 
Aboriginal title and provided only the King could purchase Indigenous  Nations’   lands. 
The Royal Proclamation also influenced the Treaty of Niagara in 1764,34 accounts of 
which are described as a very large assembly where the Proclamation was read out to the 
Indians in attendance. The Proclamation set out Imperial control over Indian lands and 
                                                 
31 The French relied greatly on the Indians as allies in war and economic venture. See Gillis 
Harvard, The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth 
Century (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 2001). 
32 Richard White, "The Middle ground: Indian, empires and republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650", Chapter 6 & 7, The Clash of the Empires and Pontiac and the Restoration of the Middle 
Ground (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
33 Royal Proclamation, supra note 30. 
34 John Borrows, "Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and 
Self-Government”  in  Editor  Michael Asch Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on 
Law, Equity and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 155-72. [Burrows, 
Wampum at Niagara] The Covenant chain promised peace and justice and prosperity to the 
Indians, The Twenty Four Nations belt illustrated the prosperity to have followed the alliance. 
The proclamation did not have the desired effect and in early 1764, Sir William Johnson 
convened the Congress on the Niagara with the Confederacy Chiefs in the region. Two wampum 
belts, the "Covenant Chain" and the "Twenty Four Nations" belt represented the new alliance 
with the British known as the Treaty of Niagara. 
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prohibited private purchase by any third party.35 For the British, the Royal Proclamation 
set out the legal framework for making treaties with Indigenous nations and established 
strict procedures for British territorial expansion in North America.  
Under the pretext of imperial protection, the Royal Proclamation has been 
described as the Indian Bill of Rights36 and having the force of the Magna Carta 
throughout the Empire by recognizing Indigenous people as nations. But by stipulating 
that only the British king could acquire their lands, the king prevented purchases by 
private individuals or companies of Indigenous lands. From early in its colonizing period, 
the British Crown pursued a policy set out in the Royal Proclamation, which purported to 
establish Britain's vast new North American empire and delineated relations with the 
Indigenous peoples of Canada. In effect, the Crown recognized Indigenous land 
ownership and authority as continuing under the asserted British sovereignty.37 A 
significant provision of the Royal Proclamation was that only the king could acquire land 
from Indigenous Nations, and only by nation-to-nation treaty. The Proclamation is an 
imperial Constitutional document recognizing Indigenous title and has full force as an 
imperial act, being referred to in the Sec. 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982.38 The Royal 
                                                 
35 Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada, (2000) 51 OR (3d) 641 (ONCA) at 53-56. 
36 St.  Catherine’s  Milling  &  Lumber  Co.  v  The  Queen [1887], 13 SCR 313 at 652 [St. Catherine] 
Gwynne J., in dissent described the Royal Proclamation as the "Indian Bill of Rights". In Calder 
v The Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313 at 395, Hall J., in dissent, drew an 
analogy to the Magna Carta. 
37 The Royal Proclamation directed at the colonial authority. Critically assessed, it was used 
simultaneously as a protective instrument with the objective of land acquisition and the denial of 
Indigenous legal and constitutional orders by undercutting Indigenous sovereignty. It contained 
highly contradictory terms which violated the spirit and intent of the Treaties and the normative 
relationship. Although it acknowledged pre-existing rights, at the same time, it usurped the most 
fundamental   of   those   rights,   Indigenous   sovereignty.  The  British  wanted   to   dispel   the   Indians’ 
discontent over increased settlement by leading them to believe their interests would be protected. 
However, the inclusion of the words "dominion", and "sovereignty" over the Indigenous Nation 
territories was the antithesis of the Indigenous Nations’ autonomous position. The Proclamation 
recognized  the  Indian’s  right  to  their  lands  by  forbidding  survey  and settlement and at the same 
time developed a mechanism for their removal through purchase only by the Crown. The 
discrepancies were never resolved as the British privileged its understanding of how Indigenous 
people could use their land and their ability to freely determine their own land use. In addition to 
the protective features, the Royal Proclamation represents a shift in the power away from the 
Indigenous nations and began an enduring paradox and contradictory relationship by the Crown 
toward Indigenous nations. 
38 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Sec. 25 
states,  “The  guarantee  in  this  Charter  of  certain  rights  and  freedoms  shall  not  be  construed  so  as  
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Proclamation also established Constitutional consultation in imperial law through the 
nation-to-nation treaty arrangements and implementation. The Royal Proclamation 
confirmed the existence of Indigenous title to land, although Indigenous title existed 
independent of it39 and was not created by it. The Royal Proclamation, together with 
Rupert’s   Land   And  North  Western   Territory  Order,40 protected the Indigenous nations 
against intrusions by the British colonists and settlers. The Treaties created a consensual 
relationship where none had existed before. 
 
1.4 THE SACRED AND INVIOLABLE TREATIES 
 
Early contact of Indigenous nations with the European sovereigns, French or 
British, occurred in negotiations, consultations, and war.41 The European sovereigns 
recognized they could not gain access to the land without treating with the Indigenous 
people through agreements and obtaining their full and informed consent. The origins of 
European consultations with Indigenous people can be traced back to the 1500’s when 
European fur traders struck commercial-type agreements with Indigenous Nations for 
furs and provisions.42 In the following century treaties were negotiated between the 
European sovereigns and the Iroquois Confederacy. In 1701, a Great Peace agreement 
occurred when 1,300 representatives of 40 Indigenous Nations gathered in Montreal to 
make a treaty with France that ended a century of war between the confederacy and New 
France.43 Later there were peace and friendship treaties between Indigenous Nations and 
                                                                                                                                                 
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the 
aboriginal peoples in  Canada  including…(a)  any  rights  or  freedoms  that  have  been  recognized  by  
the Royal Proclamation of  October  7,  1763.” 
39 R v Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 114 [Delgamuukw]. 
40 Rupert’s  Land  And  North-Western Territory Order, (UK)(23 June 1870), reprinted in RSC 
1985, App II No 9. 
41 Peace and Friendship Treaties were entered into from 1685 until 1779. 
42 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Report on the Royal Commission of Aboriginal 
Peoples. Vol. I, Looking Forward, Looking Back. (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 
1996). [RCAP Final Report Vol 1]. 
43 Arnot, David, "The Honour of First Nations - The Honour of the Crown, The Unique 
Relationship of First Nations with the Crown" ,Unpublished paper presented at The Crown in 
Canada: Present Realities and Future Options (June 9, 2003) 
<http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/conf/Arch/2010/ConferenceOnTheCrown/CrownConferencePapers/
The_Crown_and_the_First_Nations.pdf>. 
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the British king that allowed limited British settlement on land purchased from the 
Indigenous nations.44 Over the following century, after the creation of Canada by the 
Constitution Act, 1867,45 negotiations were undertaken across Indigenous territory by the 
numbered treaties.46  
 
Treaty rights are a post-contact derivative of the legal relationship entered into 
between the British king and the Indigenous nations. As negotiated rights, treaty rights 
are comprised of responsibilities and rights mutually agreed to between the parties. 
Treaty rights affirm Indigenous rights and legal orders,47 which continue in full form and 
content. Treaty rights, as imperial law, reaffirmed facets of Indigenous rights and also 
include rights and responsibilities that did not previously exist such as the establishment 
of reserves set aside, annuity payments, blankets, horses, shelter (housing), schooling 
(education), medicine chest (medicare), agriculture and other implements.  
 
1.4.1 Wiyȏhtâwîmâw  –Itêyimikoswiyêcikêwina – Treaty Arrangements ordained by 
the Creator 
Indigenous legal orders are based upon a theoretical foundation of creation and 
the relationship to the Creator as the center of Indigenous nation laws, such as Cree, Dene 
or other Indigenous nations. The spiritual connection to the Creator and to creation is a 
communal doctrine among Indigenous tribes and confederacies. This relationship enabled 
Indigenous people to meet their physical and spiritual needs in a complete and whole 
                                                 
44 Ibid at 3. 
45 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK.), 30 & 31 Vict c 3 (formerly The British North America Act, 
1867) [Constitution Act, 1867]. 
46 Arnot, "The Honour of the Crown" supra note 43 at 4-5, explains that 68 Pre and Post 
confederation Treaties were signed in Canada being Treaties 1 and 2, 1871, southern Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan, Ojibway and Cree, Treaty 3, 1873, Lake of the Woods region of Ontario, 
Saulteaux  (Ojibway),  Treaty  4,  1874,  southern  Saskatchewan  (Qu’Appelle  region),  Cree  and  
Saulteaux (Ojibway), Treaty 5, 1875, central and northern Manitoba, Saulteaux (Ojibway) and 
Swampy Cree, Treaty 6, 1876, central Saskatchewan and Alberta, mostly Plains and Woodlands 
Cree, Treaty 7, 1877, southern Alberta, Blackfoot and others, Treaty 8, 1899, northern Alberta 
and northeast corner of B.C., Cree, Dene, Dogrib and others, Treaty 9, 1905, northern Ontario 
(James Bay region), Ojibway, Cree and others, Treaty 10, 1906, northern Saskatchewan (Peace 
River region), primarily Dene and Métis, Treaty 11, 1921, western part of Northwest Territories, 
primarily Dene and Métis of the Mackenzie region. 
47 R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at 229 [Van der Peet]. 
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union. Treaty First Nation Elders explain treaties from a theoretical perspective governed 
by the spiritual foundations and processes upon which the Indigenous Nations negotiated 
the treaties. It is a description of spiritual principles, traditions, protocols, and ceremonies 
used by the Indigenous Nations.48 The law originates with the understanding that the 
Creator placed Indigenous people on Earth and specifically, North America, (described as 
iyiniwi-ministik,   meaning   the   peoples’   island). The sacredness of the Earth is 
foundational in Indigenous laws which included iyiniw sawêyihtâkosiwin, which is the 
people’s  gifts  such  as   the   land,  animals,  ecology  and   the   laws  and  principles   that  guide  
their conduct.49 
 
In Indigenous legal orders there is a right to maintain, as peoples, the Indigenous 
Nations’ relationship with the Creator through the laws given to them by the Creator. 
From a sacred law perspective, the relationship with the Creator is the starting point of 
the discussions on Treaties. Indigenous laws, values and principles were the framework 
upon which they created relationships with the arriving European nations. Cree Elders 
use the following phrase to describe the treaties establishing First Nations relationships 
with European nations, “itêyimikoswiyêcikêwina” which means arrangements ordained 
or inspired by the Creator. 
 
In Treaty Law, both the Treaty nations and the British Crown solemnly promised 
the Creator that they would conduct their relationships with each other in accordance 
with the laws, values, and principles given to each of them by the Creator. The Treaty 
vows were formally made to the Creator (wiyȏhtâwîmâw) through ceremonies conducted 
in accordance with the laws governing them. The promises, agreements, and vows made 
to one another and the Creator are considered irrevocable and inviolable in sacred 
Indigenous and Treaty law.50 
 
This principle was affirmed by the Indigenous ceremonies during the treaty 
negotiations. Pipe ceremonies were at the heart of these agreements. The pipe, more than 
                                                 
48 Cardinal, Treaty Elders, supra note 7 at 7. 
49 Ibid at 10. 
50 Ibid. 
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symbolic, made the agreement sacred and binding between the parties and the Creator. 
From the perspective of Indigenous law, it is the most significant relationship that can be 
entered into. Similarly, the wampum belts, in the eastern nations, recorded the mutual, 
sacred and agreed upon principles of equality and independence of the Indigenous 
people.51 The British nation also adhered to the spiritual nature and the Treaty 
Commissioners travelled with clergy men, who often vouched for the fidelity of the 
covenants being made to the Indians. Elders say that the treaties were meant to initiate an 
ongoing relationship between Indigenous Nations and the Queen for as long as the "sun 
shines, the waters flow and the grass grows," "as long as the sun and moon shall endure," 
"as the sun goes round, and the water flows, "as long as the sun rises over our head", and 
"as long as the water runs."52 Those statements reflected a consistent understanding of the 
perpetuity of Treaty. European subjects were thus able to settle peacefully through most 
parts of the country by entering this sacred and consensual legal relationship and through 
the taking up clauses in the treaties.. At a fundamental level, the relationship between the 
parties included values and principles of Manâtisiwin (respect), Yȏspâtisiwin 
(gentleness), Kisêwâtisiwin (kindness), Kwayaskâtisiwin (honesty and fairness) and 
Kanâtisiwin (cleanliness). 
 
At the time of the signing of each Treaty, a sacred convergence occurred between 
the Indigenous nations and British Crown. The original and sacred convergence affirmed 
the legal and Constitutional orders of Indigenous nations as the legitimate and rightful 
nations whom possessed original interests in their territories. At the same time, the 
convergence affirmed the same respective rights and powers of the British Crown. The 
                                                 
51 Borrows,  “Wampum  at  Niagara”, supra note 34 at 155. The Two Row Wampum was created 
by beads made from the Quahog shells which shells that are purple and white in colour. It is a 
white belt with two equal lines down the center. The white symbolizes the river of life and the 
two lines represent the Mohawk Nation and the European Nation (Dutch). Today the official 
colour of the Mohawk Nation is purple based on the importance of the wampum. The two-row 
wampum embodies the legal principles the Mohawk Nation and other First Nations would use as 
a template with their discussions and negotiations to make treaty. The wampum is a 
representation of the two nations which nations that travel side by side but do not interfere with 
each other. Their boats and canoe contain all of their laws, culture, governing institutions and 
religion. The wampum is a representation that both parties are independent but travel together in 
the same direction. 
52 James  Sa’ke’j  Henderson,  Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Thompson 
Carswell, 2007) at 22-23 [Henderson, Treaty Rights]. 
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convergence meant a delegation of responsibilities, through Treaty, to the Crown. Those 
responsibilities that were not delegated remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Indigenous nation and their legal and Constitutional orders.  
 
1.4.2 Miyo-wîcêhtowin – The Doctrine of Good Relations 
Implicit in the Treaty relationship was the principle of miyo-wîcêhtowin, the 
principle of having or possessing good relations as a core doctrine of the Cree Nation.53 It 
requires the Indigenous (Cree) peoples to conduct themselves in a manner where good 
relations are created, both individually and as a collective. This doctrine originates in the 
laws and relationships that their nation has with the Creator. As well, the Indigenous 
(Cree) doctrine of wâhkȏtowin, the laws concerning good relations, guided the 
Indigenous nations’ affairs. These sacred laws or doctrines constitute indispensable 
components of the treaties. Wâhkȏtowin and Miyo-wîcêhtowin together, are essential 
elements and core values, which Treaty First Nations continue to stress in understanding 
the undertakings and relationship of the Treaty parties54. 
   
This positive undertaking of the parties to nurture and root their Treaty 
relationship in the principles of good, healthy, respectful relationships (miyo-wîcêhtowin) 
is symbolized by the laws governing relationships between family. The relationship with 
the Crown was expressed in terms of a perpetual familial relationship based on familial 
concepts defined by the First Nations principles of wâhkȏhtowin (good relationships). 
These relationships were to be conducted and regulated by the principles and laws 
governing familial relationships (wîtisânîhtowin).55 With the same force as common law 
judicial pronouncements, oral statements provided by Saskatchewan Treaty Elders 
evidence the Treaty doctrine in the following ways, Elder Simon Kytwayhat has stated, 
“When   our   cousins,   the   White   man,   first   came   to   peacefully   live   on   these   lands   (e-
wîtaskemâcik) with the Indigenous people. As far as I can remember, Elders have 
referred   to   them  as  “kiciwâminawak: (our first cousins). I have heard [from my Elders] 
that  the  Queen  came  to  offer  a  traditional  adoption  of  us  as  our  mother.  “You  will  be  my  
                                                 
53 Cardinal, Treaty Elders, supra note 7 at 14. 
54 Ibid at 14-16. 
55 Ibid at 33. 
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children,”  she  said.”56 Elder Peter Waskahat  said,  “And  when  this  Commissioner  Morris  
came here [in 1876], my Elder used to tell me … he came here to offer himself to be our 
first cousin, like Cree – niciwâm.”57 Elder  Danny  Musqua  has   stated,   “The  Queen  has  
adopted  [First  Nations]  as  children…a  joint relationship will come out of that. And so we 
have  a  joint  relationship  with  the  Crown  because  the  Queen  is  our  new  mother.”58 Elder 
Jimmy  Myo  confirmed,  “They  said,  we  came  here  as  your  relatives,  They  said,  the  Queen  
sent us here, the Queen wants to adopt  you  Indians…as  her  own  children.”59 Elder Alma 
Kytwayhat  recalls  that  she  was  taught.  “It  was  the  [Queen]  who  offered  to  be  our  mother  
and  us  to  be  her  children  and  to  love  us  in  the  way  we  want  to  live.”  60 The use of these 
familial terms to describe the treaty relationship between the Queen and Indigenous 
Nations meant that the relationship would follow the Indigenous rules and laws 
governing  “wâhkȏhtowin”  (good  relationships). This doctrine and law of relationships is 
similar in the various Treaty First Nations. 
 
1.4.3 Kihci-asotamâtowin –The Treaty Sovereigns’ Sacred Undertakings to one 
Another 
Expressed throughout this chapter are the core tenets of the Treaty order that 
establish the sacred nature of the Treaty agreements entered into by two sovereign 
nations. Both of these nations were foreign to each other and through ceremonies and 
negotiations, made solemn undertakings. The undertakings are made part of the Treaty 
doctrines through oral evidence of the Treaty Elders. The undertakings between the 
sovereigns are considered scared and inviolable. The sacred and inviolable nature of the 
Treaties has been unequivocal by Treaty First Nations expressed in Treaty orders and 
doctrines. Both sovereign nations understood the sacred and inviolable nature. British law 
has also recognized the sacred and inviolable nature of treaties. The court in Campbell v. 
Hall, 61 held, "The articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered and the 
articles of peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable according to their true 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid at 34. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Campbell v Hall, (1774) Lofft 655 1 Cowp. 204 (Eng. K B) [Campbell v Hall]. 
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intent and meaning."62 Canadian jurisprudence has also recognized that sacredness of 
Treaty, "It must be remembered that a treaty is a solemn agreement between the Crown 
and the Indians an agreement the nature of which is sacred;"63 "… a treaty represents an 
exchange of solemn promises between the Crown and the various Indian nations, it is an 
agreement whose nature is sacred."64  
 
The sacred undertakings provided a delegation of responsibilities, obligations and 
in some cases, specific delegation of Treaty authority by each Treaty First Nation to the 
Crown. The authority delegated was specific and limited with the Treaty First Nations 
retaining and maintaining their legal and Constitutional orders. The British nation was 
permitted onto the land under certain conditions contained in Treaty; however, their 
authority was strictly limited to the scope of the taking up clauses in the Treaty. If no 
authority or power is delegated by the Treaty First Nations to the Crown, this power must 
be construed as reserved to Treaty First Nations. As such, these reserved powers are 
protected by imperial prerogative rights and the common law since neither sovereign can 
extinguish a foreign legal system.65 As the treaties varied according to the time and 
geographic areas, some were strictly a political alliance for trade and made no assignment 
of Crown administration.66 Others explicitly provided for some degree of Crown 
administration and Canadian jurisdiction in the shared territory. For example, treaties 
made after confederation provided limited and narrow law-making authority to the 
Crown.67 The Treaty First Nations authorized Crown control over alcohol but retained 
their continued authority over the harvesting of natural resources in the ceded territory.68 
In some cases, they delegated limited authority over protecting game by regulation to 
either the federal dominion or the government of the country.69 The Treaty First Nations 
                                                 
62 Ibid at 208. 
63 Sioui, supra note 29 at para 41. 
64 Badger, supra note 9 at para 52. 
65 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 268, Indigenous and British Nations were 
foreign nations and upon entering Treaty retained their autonomy and laws. Chapter 2 of this 
thesis addresses that issue.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Treaties 2, 4, and 6. 
69 Ibid. 
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understood and agreed to honour, as intrinsic to the treaty, to maintain peace and good 
order but did not delegate the ability of the British Queen to legislate over them. Different 
degrees of British authority, as part of good relations, and living together harmoniously, 
were authorized. However, as autonomous nations, they agreed to only specific authority 
and retained all inherent legal authority to the territory. The scope of the sacred 
undertakings has become an extremely contentious issue due to the failure of the 
implementation of the undertakings and the desecration of the basic foundation of the 
relationship. 
 
1.4.4 Wîtaskêwin – The Doctrine of Living Together on the Land 
The Treaty order brought together foreign nations that entered into agreements to 
live on the land together. The Indigenous nations allowed for the peaceful taking up of 
foreign British subjects by the consultation and consent of the Indigenous Nations. The 
Treaty principles of mutual sharing are rooted in the inherent laws of the Treaty First 
Nations of certain Treaty delegations that expressed limited sharing of the land and 
ensured the Indigenous Nations continued survival. In Indigenous law, the sharing 
arrangement required the consultation and consent of the parties but also the sanction of 
the Creator. Treaty law provides the contextual framework for the Treaty First Nations’ 
understanding of the collective and individual relationships created by Treaty. These 
Treaty Nations’ conceptual foundations speak to the ideals, norms, values, and principles 
that informed and guided the conduct of the Treaty Nations at the time the treaties were 
negotiated. Non-interference, peaceful co-existence and limited delegations of mutual 
right are implicit in the doctrine of wîtaskêwin. The sacred and inviolable treaties were 
not meant to be land sales or purchases but a structure for creating political, economic 
and social associations between Indigenous and European sovereigns.70 They represent a 
Indigenous conceptual framework for understanding First Nations’ notions of inter-nation 
relationships, their civic duties and responsibilities.71 They were also the Imperial law, a 
Magna Carta of the Treaty Nation. 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid at 38. 
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The numbered treaties contained the ambiguous text "cede, release, surrender, and 
yield up to the Government of the Dominion of Canada, for Her Majesty the Queen, and 
Her successors forever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to the lands." 
Other treaties use the words "we transfer, surrender and relinquish" to her Majesty the 
Queen for the use of the Government of the Dominion. These treaties of cession are not 
purchases of Aboriginal land tenures by the Imperial Crown under the terms of the Royal 
Proclamation, 1763. Oral evidence by Treaty First Nations people has been very clear 
that the words evidenced a transfer of Aboriginal tenure to the protection of the Crown 
consistent with the idea of shared territorial jurisdiction. In fact, the sale of land is against 
the legal orders of Indigenous people, as the land was not theirs to sell as it belonged to 
all living things, birds, animals and trees.72 The sacred Treaties provided for a division of 
authority between the Treaty signatories and reinforced their intent that any cession was 
of a protective, not proprietary, nature. The Indigenous nations did not transfer all the 
interests in the land. In actuality, the transfer is similar to placing the land in an imperial 
escrow account.73 
                                                 
72 See  Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism,”  supra note 24 at 262-265, where Professor Henderson 
points out that there are five other conditions in the treaties that lend support to an argument for a 
continuing Aboriginal self-determination over the land and against its sale and purchase. He 
states,  “First, there were no words of consideration or purchase price in the document. Second, 
these treaty cessions were not absolute since they were conditional. The validity of a cession 
depended on full compliance with the promises, obligations and with the rendering of services. 
Third, as part of the continuing Aboriginal governmental authority in the ceded territory, the 
Chiefs agreed not to molest the person or property of any inhabitant of the ceded territory or any 
property of Her Majesty. This condition assures the quiet enjoyment of settlers and against a 
blanket purchase of the land by the Crown. It also demonstrates that any proprietary interest of 
the inhabitants and the Crown were under Aboriginal tenure and political jurisdiction. The quiet 
enjoyment of the settlers is related to the explicit purposes of settlement and trade as described in 
the treaties, not to absolute Crown authority. Fourth, under their jurisdiction the Chiefs and 
Headmen agreed not to interfere with or trouble any person passing or travelling through the 
ceded territory. These provisions illustrate the Aboriginal peoples' right to control the ceded 
territory after the treaties and also protect minority interests within the ceded land. Fifth, the 
Crown agreed that the Chiefs and Headmen would continue to maintain "peace and good order" 
in the ceded land among all inhabitants. This allocation of authority created a distinction between 
title and government in the ceded land that defeats any purchase theory. The Crown may have 
had a protective title, but the Chiefs and Headmen had jurisdiction over the ceded land.”  
73 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 265 notes that the assignment of land from 
the Treaty First Nation is analogous to the Crown's creation of derivative estates out of its 
original tenure in England. In English law, the King reserved some of the land for his estates 
while allowing others to use the land in exchange for certain services and taxes. In the treaties, 
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Henderson  notes,  “Under a treaty of cession, an Imperial Crown may have had an 
international and ultimate pre-emptive interest in ceded territory under the take-up clause, 
as against other European nations and peoples, but this future interest had no effect on 
Indigenous dominion.”74 By accepting any transfer of jurisdiction or territory from a 
Treaty First Nation, the Crown also accepted of a sui generis or Imperial fiduciary 
obligation to fully comply with the terms of the Treaties.75 Treaty First Nation people 
agreed to allow peaceful coexistence by honouring the Treaty rights of the British 
subjects, but by virtue of their continuing sovereignty, continuing legal and 
Constitutional order and right to self-govern, Treaty First Nations peoples could live as 
such in both the reserved and ceded Territories. The British Crown and their subjects, on 
the other hand, could not do anything they were not authorized to do under Treaty. The 
Treaties guaranteed non-interference with the Treaty First Nations’ continued ability to 
hunt, fish, gather, trade and to live as they have always lived.76 Further, the Crown 
promised annual distributions, in perpetuity of food, clothing, ammunition, tools, 
education, health care, and a sharing of resource revenue.77 
 
1.4.5 Pimâcihowin – The Doctrine of Making a Living 
Indigenous legal orders reflect a fundamental connection to the land that contain 
elements of spiritual, physical, and economic imperatives. This connection is rooted in 
the Cree concept and doctrines related to pimâtisiwin (life). It is a concept that 
encompasses pimâcihowin, (the ability to make a living). Regarding pimâcihowin, the 
Treaties guarantee the continuing rights of Indigenous Nations’ livelihoods, and the 
continuing right of Treaty First Nations to maintain a continuing relationship to the land 
and its resources. The land (askiy) is an important source of life and provides for the 
physical, material, and economic survival of people. Pimâcihowin is a holistic concept 
that includes a spiritual, physical and economic dimension. It is an integral component of 
                                                                                                                                                 
the First Nations reserved land for themselves and their guests, and they delegated other lands to 
the Crown to generate taxes and revenues to finance the treaty obligations of the Crown. 
74 Ibid at 263. 
75 Ibid at 263. 
76 Treaties 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. 
77 Ibid. 
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Indigenous doctrines, laws, principles, values, and teachings regarding the sources of life, 
the responsibilities associated with them, including those elements seen as necessary for 
enhancing the spiritual components of life and those associated with making a living.78 
 
The Treaty order continued the harmonious, yet limited sharing of an immense 
and abundant territory. Indigenous nations were guaranteed the right to continue of their 
way of life and the right to sustain themselves either in their hunter-gatherer economy or 
by adopting aspects   of   the   settlers’   economy   by   receiving   the   necessary   training   and  
implements. The court has found that the treaties were agreements of reconciliation and 
mutual advantage"79 and agreements to share the land under certain conditions. The 
sharing of the land and the precept of living together on the land includes the right of 
managing the uses of the land. As independent and sovereign Indigenous nations, there is 
an implicit right to determine and manage the land and the natural resources within their 
territory. As an international precept, Indigenous nations have a right to their natural 
resources and a right not be deprived of their own means of subsistence.80 Since time 
immemorial Indigenous nations have always been the stewards and keepers of the land. 
The court in Sioui recognized  continued  Treaty  ownership  over  the  lands  and  held,  “The  
British Crown recognized that the Indians had certain ownership rights over their land ... 
[and] allowed them autonomy in their internal affairs, intervening in this area as little as 
possible.”81 
 
1.4.6 Tâipymȏnwin  :  Mutual  Consent  in  the  Treaty  Order 
The Treaty relationship created a new normative order of exclusivity between the 
sovereign and consenting parties. Treaties were consensual acts established by mutual 
                                                 
78 Cardinal, “Treaty Elders”, supra note 7 at 43. 
79 Marshall, supra note 9 at para 3. 
80 Article 1(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted by the General 
Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  19  December  1966,  states,  “All  peoples  may,  for  their  own  ends,  
freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising 
out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international  law.  In  no  case  may  a  people  be  deprived  of  its  own  means  of  subsistence.”  
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/ volume-999-I-14668-
English.pdf>, See also, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA 
Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 Sept 2007) (2007) 46 ILM 1013. 
81 Sioui, supra note 29 at 1055. 
 26 
agreements. As autonomous sovereigns, the Treaty parties worked out a Constitutional 
relationship in Imperial law that retained their respective autonomy. Thus, the Imperial 
Crown and Treaty First Nations through the Treaties created public, international and 
imperial Constitutional rights by mutual consent.82 Treaty created consensual obligations 
under their respective authority as nations. It created a responsibility for the Treaty 
partners   to   act   in   each   other’s   best   interest.83 The relationship between the Indigenous 
Treaty nations and the Crown was premised on mutual consent between sovereigns. Cree 
laws refer to this mutual consent as Tâipymȏwin. Consent of a party to any agreement is a 
fundamental doctrine in the Treaty Order. Consent is implicit in the consensual 
agreements made and the relationship between two sovereign nations that was sanctioned 
by the Creator as the higher power. Treaty Elders are steadfast, throughout the 
generations, that consent of the parties to the Treaty agreement is a mandatory 
requirement and a basic tenet of natural justice. Mutual consent is also a tenet in 
International law. International Law and the law of nations adhered to the principal of 
compliance and fidelity to Treaties that are derived by fundamental principles of mutual 
consent. Henderson  in  “Treaty  Rights  in  the  Constitution  of  Canada”  notes  that  Article  26  
of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has   held:   “   Every   treaty   in   force   is  
binding  upon  the  parties  to  it  and  must  be  performed  by  them  in  good  faith.” 84 As well, 
in Campbell v. Hall, “The articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered, 
and the articles of peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable according to their 
true  intent  and  meaning.”85 
 
During Treaty negotiations, Treaty Commissioners assured the Indians that the 
Queen,  “Is  always  just  and  true,  what  she  promises  never  changes”86;;  “The  Queen  always  
keeps  her  word,  always  protects  her  red  men”87; I have told you before and I will tell you 
                                                 
82 Henderson,  “Treaty  Rights”  supra note 52 at 3. 
83 Ibid at 151. 
84 Ibid at 849, citing The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UN Doc. A/CONF. 
39/27 at 289, codifies the law and obligations of agreements made between states. 
85 Campbell, supra note 61. 
86 Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North West 
Territories, (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke and Co.,1880, reprint Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 
1991) at 94 [Morris, Treaties of Canada]. 
87 Ibid at 95. 
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again  that  the  Queen  cannot  and  will  not  undo  what  she  has  done”88; “Every promise will 
be solemnly fulfilled as certainly as the sun now shines down upon us from the 
heavens.”89 Indeed, the fidelity of the spoken word in the presence of Creator induced 
and led the Treaty First Nations to understand the Treaty promises as legally binding 
agreements,  “As  long  as  the  sun  and  moon  shall  endure,  as  long  as  the  Earth  on  which  I  
dwell shall exist in the same State, you this day see it, so long will I be your friend and 
ally”90; “And in taking your hand, I hold fast all the promises you have made, and I hope 
they  will   last   as   long  as   the  sun  goes  around  and   the  water   flows,  as   you  have  said”91; 
“For  as  long  as  the  sun  shines  and  the  river  runs”92; the treaties were to be honoured as 
long as the land is here, as long as the grass grows, as long as the river flows, as long as 
the  sun  rises  in  the  east  and  sets  in  the  west.”93 Centuries later, in 1973, Queen Elizabeth 
II  stated,  “You  may  be  assured  that  my  Government  of  Canada  recognizes  the  importance  
of full compliance with the spirit and terms  of  your  Treaties.”94 
 
1.5  INDIGENOUS CONSULTATION THROUGH TRADITIONAL LEGAL 
AND  CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
 
The concept of consultation may seem like a new and emerging responsibility in 
Canadian Constitutional law, but in Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders it is a 
fundamental structure supporting Indigenous societies and the treaty negotiations. 
Indigenous worldviews include a concept of the inter-connectedness of life that is meant 
to endure for generations. As part of Indigenous legal orders, Indigenous people have 
developed ways to ensure that the lands, waters and resources that have sustained past 
                                                 
88 Ibid at 105. 
89 Ibid at 275. 
90 Treaty of 1761, NSA, Vol 1 at 699-700. 
91 Morris, Treaties of Canada, supra note 86 at 16 and 51. 
92 Ibid at 234-235. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Statement of Queen Elizabeth II, July 5th,  1973,  Calgary  Alta.,  cited  by  Henderson,  “Treaty  
Rights”  supra note 52 at 852. In 1963, she made a similar statement to the Maori in New Zealand, 
“  Whatever  may  have  happened in the past and whatever the future may bring it remains the 
sacred duty of the Crown today as in 1840 to stand by the Treaty of Waitangi, to ensure that the 
trust  of  the  Maori  people  is  never  betrayed.” 
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and present generations are passed on to future generations. These include ceremonies, 
songs and dances and stories that explain and reaffirm deep and abiding relationships 
with the lands, animals, waters, ancestral and spiritual worlds."95 Indigenous nations 
incorporate the views and knowledge of individuals into collective decisions which 
ensure that lands, waters, resources and eco-systems are sustained for future 
generations.96  
 
Indigenous legal and constitutional conventions ensure that the individual voices, 
observations and concerns are added to the collective body of knowledge for the 
preservation and protection of all. Consultation within Indigenous orders can include: 
 
x Ceremonies such as Potlatches requiring members of communities and nations 
and neighbouring nations, to bear witness to the rights, privileges, and accuracy of 
interpretation and implementation of Indigenous peoples laws; 
x Council fires and public forums that identify and resolve disputes, and provide a 
forum for the sharing and transmission of the values, beliefs, and laws of 
Indigenous people; 
x Advice of elders, or community members with specific knowledge of territories or 
resources that allows Indigenous peoples to collectively ensure the protection of 
our living world; 
x Diverse people with knowledge or responsibilities for specific areas or resources 
working with others within Indigenous nations and communities to ensure that 
territories are capable of sustaining all life, now and of being passed to future 
generations.97 
 
Indigenous legal orders and systems operated through consensus and consultation among 
community members through traditional systems. These traditions incorporate the 
                                                 
95 Environmental-Aboriginal Guardianship through Law and Education (EAGLE), Nation to 
Nation, The Law of Consultation and Accommodation, Semiahmoo Reserve, Surrey B.C. Chapter 
1at 1-2. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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individual voice, observations and concerns into a collective body of knowledge for 
preservation and protection of all. Indigenous legal orders ensure environmental 
conservation and protection to meet short term needs with the long term view of 
preserving the integrity of lands, waters, resources and ecosystems.98 As Indigenous 
territories are held communally, Indigenous legal orders allow for the consideration of 
both individual and community concerns to maintain the ecosystem which supports our 
collective survival.99 
 
1. 6 CONCLUSION 
 
Indigenous nations are sovereign nations possessing legal and Constitutional 
orders which define their sovereignty, nationhood, laws, legal, social systems, 
jurisdictions and rights of citizens. Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders are the 
foundations of the authority, as sovereign nations, to negotiate the sacred and inviolable 
treaties.   The   British   Queen’s   authority   in   foreign   affairs   recognized   Indigenous   legal  
orders and the nationhood as had the Indigenous nations recognized the British 
sovereignty. Entering into Treaty created an exclusive relationship whose basis was 
mutual consent.  
 
The Treaty order is consensual nation-to-nation legal agreements where the 
Indigenous nations delegated certain responsibilities to the Queen. Under these reciprocal 
arrangements concerning a shared territory, the Queen promised assistance and 
protection. The relationship was of mutual and peaceful coexistence in a shared territory. 
Treaty Nations’ law includes a close spiritual aspect, which included the Creator as a 
witness to the agreements.100 The Indigenous nations understood that the Treaty parties 
would  continue  to  be  bound  by  the  Creator’s  laws  and  the  sacred  undertakings  made  by  
the sovereigns. The Treaties represent a sacred status infused with political and legal 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Cardinal,  “Treaty  Elders” supra note 7 at 1, "The elders made it clear that, in their view, those 
who seek to understand Indian Treaties must become aware of the significance of First Nations 
spiritual traditions, beliefs and ceremonies underlying the treaty making process." 
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aspects that is enduring for generations.101 Treaty principles include the joint 
acknowledgment by the Treaty makers of the supremacy of the Creator; the maintenance 
of peace between the parties; the parties entering into a relationship based upon 
wahkohtowin,  good   relations;;   the  guarantee  of   each  other’s   survival  and  stability  based  
on mutual sharing and the Indigenous Nations’ continued right to livelihood.102 The 
relationship was not an agreement to relinquish sovereignty, the land, nor was it an assent 
to domination. Instead, the Indigenous nations entered into a nation-to-nation, federal 
like, arrangement with the Queen, whereby the jurisdictions and responsibilities of the 
signatories were established, with sovereignty and jurisdiction of Treaty First Nations 
maintained. The Royal Proclamation, 1763, affirmed that relationship. Treaties were 
based solely on consultations and a consensual alliance and the consensual will of 
Indigenous nations. Based on these legal doctrines, they cannot be unilaterally changed or 
altered without the consultation and consent of both parties with the same deference with 
which they were signed. 
                                                 
101 Initially, the Treaty parties did not view the Treaty as legal rights to be enforced by the courts, 
instead it was an agreement that flowed from the relationship. 
102 Cardinal,  “Treaty  Elders”,  supra note 7 at 38. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
KIHCI-ASOTAMÂTOWIN AND  THE  CROWN’S  CONSTITUTIONAL  DUTY  TO  
IMPLEMENT THE SACRED AGREEMENTS 
 
 
“You  may  be  assured  that  my  Government  of  Canada  recognizes  the  importance  of  full  
compliance  with  the  spirit  and  terms  of  your  Treaties.” 
Queen Elizabeth II103 
 
2.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Indigenous Treaty nations are independent nations, freely associated states and 
distinct from European nations, settlers or colonists. Indigenous nations did not surrender 
either their autonomy or their legal and Constitutional orders when they entered the 
Treaty agreements. In fact, the mutual premise of the Treaties was the guarantee of the 
continued right of sovereignty, which was never surrendered. The authority of Indigenous 
nations derives directly from the consent of their citizens. Entering into Treaty placed 
Treaty First Nations under the protections of the Queen. As protected nations, Treaty 
First Nation’s   were never subject to the authority of the imperial Parliament and 
remained as foreign jurisdictions under the Crown.104 The sacred and inviolable treaties 
have generated both international and Constitutional obligations for their implementation 
on the Crown. This chapter frames the Crown’s Constitutional obligation to implement 
the treaties.  
 
2.1 TREATY FIRST NATIONS AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS UNDER THE 
PROTECTION OF THE CROWN 
 
As autonomous nations exclusively occupying North America when the European 
nations arrived, they were foreign nations to the European nations. Treaty First Nations 
                                                 
103 Statement of Queen Elizabeth II, supra note 94. 
104 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism,”  supra note 24 at 257. 
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were protected nations under the British Queen but also remained foreign jurisdictions.105 
As explained in Chapter 1, the Treaties transferred Treaty implementation obligations to 
the Crown but were not grants of legislative power over the Indians. They remained 
autonomous yet protected nations. In 1870, the British Crown guaranteed the transfer of 
Rupert’s   Land   to   Canada   protected   the   Indian   Tribes,   “It   will   be   the   duty   of   the  
government to make adequate provisions for the protection of the Indian Tribes, whose 
interest  and  wellbeing  are  involved  in  the  transfer.”106  
 
The Crown has only the authority granted to it in Treaty and any power is limited 
to  the  scope  of  the  agreements.  Henderson  in  his  article,  “Treaty  Federalism,”  notes,  “If  
no authority or power is delegated to the Crown, this power must be interpreted as 
reserved to First Nations respectively and are protected by prerogative rights and the 
common  law  since  neither  can  extinguish  a  foreign  legal  system.”107 He argues that the 
First Nations are properly considered as Foreign Nations under the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act, 1890.108 The Foreign Jurisdiction Act affirmed the separation between Treaty 
jurisdiction from parliamentary powers. The preamble of the Act confers the British 
Queen  with  “jurisdiction  over  Treaty  and  any  country  out  of  Her  Majesty’s  domain  ….as  
if Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of Territory.”109 
In effect, this means that First Nations were under the protection of the British Queen but 
not under its legislative authority under the terms of the peace and good order clause. 
They were immune from foreign powers and should have continued as separate and 
unique foreign nations. Fundamentally, this point has always been maintained by Treaty 
First Nations. Indigenous and Treaty First Nations are separate and autonomous nations 
possessing their own legal and Constitutional orders.  
                                                 
105 Ibid at 257, Henderson cites the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, where Foreign Jurisdictions 
are territory that is outside the Dominion, but are a protected state under Her Majesty, by virtue of 
a treaty or grant. Henderson notes that this argument has never been addressed by the courts nor 
has there been any compelling reason why First Nations should not have been considered foreign 
nations. 
106Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting Rupert’s  Land and North West Territory into 
Union, 1870 [UK] RSC 1985 Appendix II, No 9. 
107 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”  supra note 24 at 268. 
108 Ibid at 270, citing the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. 
109 Ibid, Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 at ss. 1 and 6.  
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The sacred and inviolable Treaties created a distinct legal category where Treaty 
First   Nations   were   immune   from   Parliament’s   authority   to   pass   legislation   that   was  
inconsistent with the treaties or any other authority it exercised over its own dominion, 
colonies or subjects. Thus, the political and legal relationship created by the Treaties was 
distinct and separate from the British Euro-political arrangements. As foreign nations to 
Indigenous nations, British legislation then could not be annexed into the shared or ceded 
territory or upon Indigenous governments without their consent.110  
 
The Royal Proclamation, 1763, The Rupert’s  Land  Act,   1870 and the Victorian 
Treaties established Treaty First Nations’ territory as an acknowledged and protected 
territory with its own Imperial Bill of Rights.111 The Treaties and the Royal Proclamation 
together, protected First Nations’ territorial jurisdiction. In order for First Nation 
territories to have been subject to Crown sovereignty, a formal annexation would have 
been required.112 In Canada, prior to the 1982 Constitutional reform, none of First Nation 
territory was ever annexed to the British Crown. Treaty First Nations were under the 
protection of the British Crown and not as annexed nations.113 Thus, the treaties, were 
treaties with Foreign countries under the protection of the British Queen pursuant to s. 
132 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 114 It provided to the Federal government all powers 
necessary to implement the Treaties. Section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867, states:  
 
                                                 
110 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”  supra note 24 at 257. 
111 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 868, quoting a statement made by the Honourable 
Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development acknowledging the Royal 
Proclamation as a declaration of Aboriginal peoples rights to land. (August 8, 1973) at 2; Indian 
and Northern Affairs, Federal Policy for the Settlement of Native Claims (Ottawa: Indian and 
Northern Affairs, March 1993) at 1. 
112 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”  supra note 24 at 271, cites Ex Parte Sikgome, [1910] 2 KB 
576  (CA),  where  the  Court  of  King’s  Bench held that until His Majesty and the African Chiefs 
agreed to an annexation of territory protected by a treaty, the territory remained a foreign country, 
to  the  surrounding  dominions  and  administered  by  His  Majesty’s  servants.  
113 Ibid., Ex Parte Sikgome,  at  620,  Kennedy  L.J.  held,  “  What  the  idea  of  a  Protectorate  excludes,  
and the idea of annexation on the other would include, is that absolute ownership [in the crown] 
which  was  signified  by  the  word  ‘dominium’  in  Roman  Law,  and  which,  though  perhaps  not 
quite  satisfactorily,  is  sometimes  described  as  territorial  sovereignty.” 
114 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 870, citing the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 
31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
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The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or 
proper for performing the Obligation of Canada or of any Province thereof, as 
Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties 
between the Empire and such Foreign Countries. 115  
 
This provision provides direction for Canada to implement the Treaties and to ensure that 
its legislation accords with that Constitutional duty. Treaty First Nations, as foreign 
jurisdictions, were separate from the legislative or regulatory authority of the Imperial 
Crown. The Victorian Treaties allowed for the formation of western Canada and are the 
framework for British jurisdiction on the Treaty First Nation territory. British jurisdiction 
applied only to British subjects who were in the unpurchased Foreign territories 
belonging to the Indigenous Nations.116  
 
2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF THE SACRED AND 
INVIOLABLE TREATIES  
 
The amendment of the British North America Act, 1867117 created Canada's 
Constitution Act, 1982, which is regarded as the supreme law in Canada.118 The new 
Constitutional reforms were to have provided a fresh vision of Canada, independent from 
the British Crown, but yet still colonial in its underpinning. The repatriation of Canada's 
Constitution also meant that the Indigenous Treaty order was repatriated from imperial 
law to Constitutional law. The 1982 Constitutional amendments saw the incorporation of 
s. 35(1) of The Constitution Act, 1982,  which   provides,   “existing   aboriginal   and   treaty  
                                                 
115 Ibid, Constitution Act, 1867, s. 132. 
116 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 853. Henderson notes that the Imperial 
instructions, proclamations, and legislation were addressed to the colonists who travelled in 
Indian Territory. The colonist had to adhere to those instructions and did not have an independent 
existence as First Nations. 
117 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict. c 3 (formerly The British North America Act, 
1867) 
118 Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 38 provides: "The Constitution of 
Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." This is often called the 
supremacy clause. See also R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 313 and Hunter v 
Southam Inc., [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 148. 
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rights of the aboriginal peoples  of  Canada  are  hereby  recognized  and  affirmed.”119 This 
affirmation of Treaty rights in the Constitution Act, 1982, has reaffirmed the Treaty 
order’s foundation to the creation of Canada and its converging role in shared 
governance.120 It has not altered the structure of Canadian federalism but was meant to 
remedy the denial of Aboriginal and Treaty rights and recognize that Aboriginal people 
were already here living in distinctive cultures mandating special legal Constitutional 
status.121 Through the inclusion of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, a new Constitutional 
order was created. 
 
English courts have confirmed the importance of the merging of the Treaty order 
in the repatriation of the Constitution. In R v Secretary of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Denning found that the Canada Act, 1982, carried a duty to 
solemnly respect Treaty rights and obligations,  
 
It seems to me that the Canada Bill itself does all that can be done to protect the 
rights and freedoms of the aboriginal peoples of Canada. It entrenches them as 
part of the Constitution, so that they cannot be diminished or reduced except by 
the prescribed procedure and by the prescribed majorities ... Their rights and 
freedoms have been guaranteed to them by the Crown, originally the Crown in 
respect of the United Kingdom now by the Crown in respect of Canada but, in any 
case, by the Crown. No parliament should do anything to lessen the worth of these 
guarantees. They should be honoured by the Crown in respect of Canada so long 
as the sun shines and the river flows. That promise must never be broken.122  
 
The importance of the constitutionalization of Aboriginal and Treaty rights in s. 35 was 
again commented on by the Supreme Court of Canada which  held,  “The  promise  of  s.  35  
as it was termed in R v Sparrow …  recognized  not  only  the  ancient  occupation  of  land  by  
Aboriginal peoples, but their contribution to the building of Canada and the special 
commitments made to them by successive governments. The protection of these rights, so 
recently and   arduously   achieved…reflects   an   important   underlying   constitutional  
                                                 
119 Section 35(1), Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c 11. 
120 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 821. 
121 Van der Peet, supra note 47 at 30. 
122 R v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [1981] 4 CNLR 86 (Eng. CA) at 
127 [Secretary of State]. 
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value.”123 The importance of treaty to the Constitution was reaffirmed in Badger, which 
held,  “The   treaties  are  an   integral  part  of   the   fabric  of  our  Constitution.  They   form   the  
bedrock foundation of the relationship between the Treaty First Nations and the 
Government of Canada.124 It is from the treaties that all things must flow in the treaty 
relationship. They represent the common intersection both historically and politically 
between nations. They created a relationship which is perpetual and unalterable in its 
foundation principles. The treaties are the basis for a continuous intergovernmental 
relationship.”125 The Crown in respect of Canada is the successor of the Imperial Crown 
and is charged with the imperial obligations to protect the Constitutional orders of First 
Nations126 and did not create a new statement of rights but an affirmation of old imperial 
rights in the new Constitutional order.127 Section 35 has brought Treaty and inherent 
Aboriginal rights in the Constitutional agenda and is the basis for Canada in re-examining 
its colonial narrative in all areas. 
 
The inclusion of s. 35(1) in the Constitution was a result the vigorous negotiations 
of Indigenous groups in Canada in the face of entrenched colonial agenda's and a 
historical period where the honour of the Crown was not upheld and there was disregard 
of the Treaty obligations. The new Constitution laid a foundation and has potential for 
Canada to move beyond past transgressions of the Treaty order. Section 35 specifically 
directs and mandates recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights 
at every level of Canadian society, creating a new framework for interpretation of 
governmental responsibility and treaty rights in Canada.128 In other words, s. 35 affirms 
the existence of Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders and positive law rights 
contained in the treaty order as enduring sources of Constitutional law.129 Regrettably 
however, the final version of the Constitution did not explicitly include Indigenous legal 
and Constitutional orders as part of the division of powers and shared rule. Instead, ss. 91 
                                                 
123 Quebec Secession Reference, [1998] 2 SCR 217 (SCC)[Quebec Secession] at para 82. 
124 Badger, supra note 9. 
125 James Youngblood Henderson, "First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights, Defining 
a Just Society", Native Law Centre, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan (2006) at 34. 
126 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note at 24 . 
127 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 5. 
128 Henderson, "Treaty Federalism," supra note 24 at 244. 
129 Ibid.  See  also  John  Burrows,  “Canada’s  Indigenous  Constitution”,  supra note 18. 
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and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, established an internal division of rule on the 
between the Provinces and the Federal Crown. The patriation of the Constitution in 
Canada occurred without the mutual consent of the Treaty First Nations, who did not 
consent to the altering of their relationship with the imperial Crown. Additionally, the 
process and language used in the patriation did not meet the rights guaranteed in 
Treaty.130 
 
The consent of Indigenous nations to Treaty allowed for the creation of Canada 
and for the British to establish and enact constitutions with their colonies through British 
statutes. As stated earlier, Indigenous Nations possessed their own legal and 
Constitutional orders. However since the Constitution Act, 1867, did not specifically 
address the Treaties, the unwritten Constitutional practices guided Treaty 
implementation.131 Accordingly, s. 91 (24) Constitution Act 1867, granted to Canada 
exclusive   jurisdiction   for   “Indians   and   Land   reserved   for   Indians”132 and embedded 
responsibility and transfer of administrative duties of Treaty implementation. The transfer 
is analogous to a constitutional encumbrance and was of an administrative nature and not 
a transfer of legislative power.133  
 
The Constitution Act, 1867 delegated s. 91 (24) and s. 132 the necessary powers 
to perform the Treaty obligations with foreign countries to Canada, including the Treaty 
obligations in the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.134 Henderson   in   “Empowering   Treaty  
Federalism”,  posits  that  all  the  Constitutional obligations of treaty implementation could 
be  fulfilled  through  federal  statutes  by  the  Federal  government’s  power  “to  make  laws for 
                                                 
130 Secretary of State, supra note 122. An application to the United Kingdom Secretary of State 
requested clarification of whether the United Kingdom or Canada has the responsibility of Treaty. 
The Secretary replied that all Treaty obligations became the responsibility of Canada with the 
attainment of independence. The Treaty First Nations then sought a declaration that treaties or 
other obligations entered into by the Crown to the Indian peoples of Canada are still owed by Her 
Majesty in right of Her Government in the United Kingdom and that the denial of such 
responsibility by the Secretary of State was incorrect. The court ruled that the responsibilities of 
the Imperial Crown were incrementally transferred to Canada by Imperial Acts from 1867 to the 
Statute of Westminster, 1931. 
131 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 272. 
132 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24), supra note 45. 
133 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 864. 
134 Ibid, supra note at 854. 
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peace   order   and   good   government   of   Canada.”135 However, the Federal Parliament 
interpreted their responsibilities without due regard to their Treaty implementation 
obligations, further, they completely ignored s. 132.136 The government of Canada would 
not read their obligations for Treaty implementation into the interpretation of s. 91(24), 
despite their obvious obligations to uphold their lawful responsibilities in treaty. The 
Canadian government did not provide direction, legislation or even policy on Treaty 
implementation although Canada possessed the administrative authority granted to them 
in Treaty.137 The   Federal   government’s responsibility was to implement the sacred 
treaties and its lawful promises, as clearly, both the current Federal and Provincial 
governments are beneficiaries and agents of the British Crown in Treaty implementation.  
 
The sacred and inviolable treaties created binding obligations on the Crown for 
their immediate implementation. The court in Sundown held,  “Treaties  may  appear to be 
no more than contracts. Yet they are far more, They are solemn exchange of promises 
made  by  the  Crown  and  various  First  Nations.”138 Then the court in Badger has held that 
treaties,  “create  enforceable  obligations  based  on  the  mutual  consent  of  the  parties.”139 In 
Sioui,   the   court   also   affirmed   that   the   Treaty   promises   are   rights  which   are   “mutually  
binding  obligations”140 and in Simon,  the  court  has  held  that  treaty  promises  are  ‘binding  
obligations   which   would   be   solemnly   respected.”141 Treaty rights are guarantee’s142 
which   should   be   “honoured   by   the   Crown   in   respect   of   Canada   and   never   be   broken,  
143and  “no  parliament  should  do  anything  to  lessen  the  worth  of  these  guarantee’s.”144 
 
Entrenching Treaty rights into the Constitution requires a blending of 
Constitutional rights and powers with the Treaty nations. It does not mean assimilation of 
                                                 
135 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”  supra note 24 at 275. 
136 Ibid at 865. 
137Ibid at 867. 
138 R v Sundown, [1999] 1 SCR 393 (SCC) at para 24 [Sundown]. 
139 Badger, supra note 9 at 401. 
140 Sioui, supra note at 1044. 
141 R v Simon, [1982] 2 SCR 387 (SCC) at 401 and 410 [Simon]. 
142 Ibid at 99. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
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Indigenous legal orders but rather to implement the Treaty rights into a equal way as the 
common law and French civil law are respected in Canada.145 Section 35 provides an 
avenue to create an innovative theory of Constitutional supremacy. 146 
 
2.3 THE TREATY ORDER AND CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 
 
Constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty rights placed Indigenous 
orders within the framework of Constitutional supremacy. Section 52(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 provides:   “The   Constitution   of   Canada   is   the   supreme   law   of  
Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the 
extent   of   the   inconsistency,   of   no   force   or   effect.”147 The consistency principle of 
Constitutional supremacy ensures that legislation is consistent with the Constitution, 
including the unwritten principles that framed the Treaties.148 The principles of 
supremacy include a relationship with all of the parts of the constitution without one 
section taking precedence over any others. This means that the determination and 
legitimacy of all exercises of executive and legislative power derives from the 
Constitution. Government executive and legislative actions must be harmonized with 
both the principles of the Constitution and the rule of law. Unilateral power asserted by 
Governments over Treaty nations is contrary to the terms of the Treaty and principle of 
Constitutional supremacy.149 The court in Manitoba Language Rights150 confirmed that 
any law that is not consistent with the Constitution is of no force or effect, thereby 
ensuring that Constitutional law prevails over the laws in Canada.151 Consequently, the 
                                                 
145 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 821. 
146 Ibid at 823, Professor Henderson states that Constitutional convergence can create an 
innovative theory of constitutional supremacy, constitutional equality, constitutional non-
derogation of treaties, the consistency test for ordinary legislation and constitutional inter-
delegation of Treaty delegations. 
147 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1) supra note 38. 
148 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 824. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721 (SCC) at 744-47. 
151 Ibid.  “…  [t]he  Constitution  of  a  country  is  a  statement  of  the  will  of  the  people  to  be governed 
in accordance with certain principles held as fundamental and certain prescriptions restrictive of 
the powers of the legislature and government. It is, as s. 52 of The Constitution Act, 1982 
declares,  the  ‘supreme  law’  of  the  nation,  unalterable  by the normal legislative process, and 
unsuffering of laws inconsistent with it. The duty of the judiciary is to interpret and apply the 
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courts must ensure that Canada and the Provinces do not legislate beyond their authority 
delegated by the Treaties.  
 
The principle of Constitutional supremacy provides constitutional limitations for 
Parliament’s   exercise   of   its   constitutional   powers. Constitutional supremacy requires a 
paradigm shift where s. 35 rights mandate constitutional deference to treaty rights in the 
highest order. Constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, and the non-derogation clause of 
s. 25 of the Charter,152 provide explicit protection of Treaty rights. Constitutional 
supremacy and the rule of law require the implementation of Treaty rights. Constitutional 
supremacy obliges the Government to safeguard Indigenous orders and requires 
Constitutional law be consistently applied in legislation, administration, and adjudication. 
It requires the Government to depart from familiar colonial and patriarchal values to 
protect people of various social status, class, race or gender. It requires a balancing of 
plural sources of Constitutional power and protects against unjustified legislative 
infringement.153  
 
2.4 LEGISLATION AND THE TREATY ORDER 
 
As a direct result of Government’s failure to implement the obligations of treaty 
rights through legislative form or through Schedule 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the 
courts have been left to the task of interpreting the Treaty agreements. The failure of the 
governments to honour their treaty agreements has resulted in that responsibility being 
left to the courts and represents a national travesty of the very foundation which this 
country was built. Much like the common law treatment of Aboriginal rights, Treaty 
rights   are   not   recognized   in   the   common   law   until   they   have   passed   the   court’s  
Eurocentric tests. The  Crown’s   ability   to   extinguish  Treaty   rights   and   the   court’s   tests  
                                                                                                                                                 
laws of Canada and each of the provinces, and it is thus our duty to ensure that the constitutional 
law  prevails.” 
152 Section 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the provisions of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms cannot abrogate the Aboriginal, treaty or other rights and freedoms that pertain to the 
Aboriginal people of Canada and although the Constitution is subject to a Charter review, it 
cannot abrogate or derogate from rights in the Constitution, 1867. 
153 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 855. 
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requiring proof the existence of the Treaty and justified infringement test have created a 
contradiction where the Crown is both a protector and a threat to Treaty Nations’ 
Constitutionally protected rights. 
 
Prior to Constitutional entrenchment under colonial law, Treaty Rights were 
vulnerable to unilateral extinguishment and unjustified infringement by governments. 
The court decisions of that era reflected bias and institutionalized racism. In R v Syliboy, 
154 the  court  declared,  “The  savages   right  of  sovereignty  even  of  ownership  were  never  
recognized.” The court in Moosehunter v The Queen 155 stated,   “The   Government   of  
Canada  can  alter  the  rights  of  Indians  granted  under  treaties,  Provinces  cannot”.  In  Sikyea 
v The Queen, 156 the court held that notwithstanding the rights in Treaty 11, the Migratory 
Bird’s   Convention Act applied. This result was also affirmed in R v George 157 and 
Daniels v White.158 As well, in the Robinson Annuities, the Privy Council stated that an 
Indian treaty was a mere promise and agreement and the duty to compensate was merely 
a personal obligation by the governor. In R v Wesley,159 and Pawis v The Queen 160 the 
court held that Treaties were merely a contract. In R v Taylor, the courts disallowed an 
interpretation where a treaty was negotiated by the Crown in the context of grossly 
unequal bargaining positions.161  
 
Yet the courts have allowed federal acts and other government instruments to 
modify or suspend some Treaty obligations. These decisions assert the Treaties are 
governed strictly by Canadian law, not law compatible with both nations. In British 
Constitutional traditions, any act of Parliament could be repealed by a subsequent act, 
thus the court presumed the Treaties could be amended or extinguished by subsequent 
                                                 
154 R v Syliboy, [1929] 1 DLR 307 (NS Co Ct) at 313 [Syliboy] in Simon, supra note 141, Chief 
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federal statute or agreements. The unilateral extinguishment of Treaty rights was not 
consented to or authorized by the Treaty agreements. Treaty authorized only limited and 
specific authority in the agreements but unilateral extinguishment, or infringement, were 
contrary to treaty governance. There was no legislative authority, independent of the 
treaties, of any foreign governments authority over Treaty First Nations. As the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concluded:  
 
According to the courts, prior to the constitutional reforms of 1982, Aboriginal 
treaties could be amended or overridden by federal statute, without the agreement 
of Aboriginal parties. This viewpoint was consistent with British constitutional 
traditions, under which even such fundamental documents as [the] Magna Carta 
could be repealed by a simple act of Parliament. However it did not correspond to 
Aboriginal conceptions of the treaties, which were viewed as sacred pacts, not 
open to unilateral repeal.162 
 
The burden to prove the existence of a Treaty right falls upon the Treaty First Nation 
person and fails to accord to the consensual agreements made. According to the court in 
Sioui 163and Simon,164 the test to prove a common law Treaty right includes:  
(1) Proof of Party to the Treaty – The parties must be the Crown and an 
Aboriginal Group;  
(2) Authority – The signatories to the treaty must have the authority to bind their 
principals, the Crown and Aboriginal group;  
(3) There must be proof that the parties intended to create legally binding 
obligations; The obligations must be assumed by both sides, so the agreement is a 
bargain; and  
(4) There must be a certain measure of solemnity.165  
 
The Sioui court identified five factors relevant in determining the intent of the parties to 
enter a treaty: the continuous exercise of a right in the past and at present; the reasons as 
to why the Crown made a commitment; the situation prevailing at the time the document 
was signed; evidence of relations of mutual respect and esteem between the signatories; 
                                                 
162 RCAP Final Report Vol. 2, supra note 42. 
163 Sioui, supra note 29. 
164 Simon, supra note 141. 
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and the subsequent conduct of the parties.166 In the common intention test, the Indigenous 
understandings must be weighed against the Crown understandings.167 The court has held 
in Treaty interpretation, that the words in the treaty must not be interpreted in their strict 
technical sense nor subjected to rigid modern rules of construction. Rather they must be 
interpreted in the sense that they would naturally have been understood by the Indians at 
the  time  of  the  signing.”168 In litigation both past and present, parties have disputed the 
promises made and the promises understood.169 Leonard Rotman has observed, "The 
Canadian judiciary recognized that treaties between representatives of the Crown and 
Aboriginal nations ought not to be governed by the ordinary principles of interpretation 
that are applicable to other agreements, such as private contracts or international 
treaties.”170 Greater emphasis began to be placed on methods of construing treaties that 
would give a more accurate portrayal of the agreements between the Crown and 
Indigenous peoples so that the promises made would be recognized and enforced by the 
courts. Current interpretations find government and courts in a positivist, literal 
interpretation, while Indigenous people view treaties as sacred, holistic and evolving.171 
The interpretive canons were intended to provide a fair a just guide.172  
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appeal  ref’d  [1981]  2  SCR  [Taylor and Williams]. 
167 Sioui, supra note 29.  
168 Mikisew Cree supra note 5 at para 29. 
169 See, for example, Benoit v Canada [2003] 3 CNLR 20 [Benoit]. During the Treaty 8 
negotiations several promises were made by the Treaty Commissioners to the Treaty 8 people 
with the urgent objective to have the treaty signed. Some of these promises were written in the 
Treaty text but many more took place during verbal negotiations and after the Commissioners had 
already drafted the document. The Commissioners assured the Indians that the treaty did not open 
the way to the imposition of any tax and this verbal promise was contained in the report by the 
Treaty Commissioners presented to Parliament. However, in dismissing the appeal, the Court of 
Appeal limited itself to a narrow issue of whether the trial judge erred in finding that the 
Aboriginal signatories had misunderstood what the Treaty Commissioners told them. The 
judgment was filled with disdain over the Aboriginal oral evidence and quickly disposed of the 
matter by ruling there was insufficient evidence of Aboriginal understanding that they would be 
exempted from taxation but completely ignored the single most important piece of evidence, the 
Treaty Commissioners Report.  
170 Leonard  R.  Rotman,  “Taking  Aim  at  the  Canons  of  Treaty  Interpretation  in  Canadian  
Aboriginal  Rights  Jurisprudence”  (1997)  46  UNBLJ  11-50  at  11  [Rotman,  “Taking Aim”]. 
171 Thomas Isaac and Kristyn Annis, Treaty Rights in the Historic Treaties of Canada (Saskatoon: 
Native Law Centre University of Saskatchewan, 2010) at 3. 
172 Rotman,  “Taking  Aim”,  supra note 170 at 20. 
 44 
The principles governing treaty interpretation were articulated by McLachlin J, in 
the Marshall No.1173 decision:  
 
1. Aboriginal treaties constitute a unique type of agreement and attract special 
principles of interpretation: R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R 393, at para. 24; R. v. 
Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at para. 78; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, at p. 
1043; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at p. 404. See also: J. [Sákéj] 
Youngblood  Henderson,   “Interpreting  Sui  Generis  Treaties”   (1997),   36  Alta.   L.  
Rev.  46;;  L.   I.  Rotman,   “Defining  Parameters:  Aboriginal  Rights,  Treaty  Rights,  
and  the  Sparrow  Justificatory  Test”  (1997),  36  Alta.  L.  Rev.  149.   
 
2. Treaties should be liberally construed and ambiguities or doubtful expressions 
should be resolved in favour of the aboriginal signatories: Simon, supra, at p. 402; 
Sioui, supra, at p. 1035; Badger, supra, at para. 52. 
 
3. The goal of treaty interpretation is to choose from among the various possible 
interpretations of common intention the one which best reconciles the interests of 
both parties at the time the treaty was signed: Sioui, supra, at pp. 1068-69.  
 
4. In searching for the common intention of the parties, the integrity and honour 
of the Crown is presumed: Badger, supra, at para. 41.  
 
5.   In   determining   the   signatories’   respective   understanding   and   intentions,   the  
court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and linguistic differences between 
the parties: Badger, supra, at paras. 52-54; R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 
at p. 907.  
 
6. The words of the treaty must be given the sense which they would naturally 
have held for the parties at the time: Badger, supra, at paras. 53 et seq.; 
Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, at p. 36.  
 
7. A technical or contractual interpretation of treaty wording should be avoided: 
Badger, supra; Horseman, supra; Nowegijick, supra.  
 
8. While construing the language generously, courts cannot alter the terms of the 
treaty  by  exceeding  what  “is  possible  on  the  language”  or  realistic: Badger, supra, 
at para. 76; Sioui, supra, at p. 1069; Horseman, supra, at p. 908.  
 
9. Treaty rights of aboriginal peoples must not be interpreted in a static or rigid 
way. They are not frozen at the date of signature. The interpreting court must 
update treaty rights to provide for their modern exercise. This involves 
determining what modern practices are reasonably incidental to the core treaty 
                                                 
173 Marshall, supra note 9 at 52.
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right in its modern context: Sundown, supra, at para. 32; Simon, supra, at p. 
402.174 
 
Brian Slattery notes the paradox of Indigenous people having to prove their 
inherent rights in accordance with the Canadian viewpoint,  
the   Crown’s   acquisition   of   sovereignty   over   Indigenous   peoples   and   their  
territories gave rise to Aboriginal rights in the Common Law of Canada. These 
rights continue to exist in their original form unless or until extinguished by 
legislation, voluntary surrender or other valid process. As legal rights, Aboriginal 
rights are cognizable and enforceable in Canadian courts. However, Aboriginal 
peoples have to prove the existence of these rights on a case by case basis in order 
to gain judicial protection.175  
 
Standing alone, judicial interpretative principles of Treaty are both piecemeal and 
unacceptable. The failure of the Crown to implement Treaty allows the validity of the 
Treaty to be determined by the courts in a manner that refuses to provide the full spirit 
and intent. Although the court has expressed some sympathy toward the plight of 
Indigenous people, as stated in Pasco v. Canadian National Railway Co., "We cannot 
recount with much pride the treatment accorded to the native people of this country,"176 
the court has not been able to extract themselves from a colonial paradigm. The full 
engagement of the Crown is required to fulfill their promises in manner which 
incorporates the restoration of the Indigenous and Treaty order of consensual nation-to-
nation agreements that cannot be altered or infringed without full consultation and 
consent. The Treaty agreements, Indigenous and Treaty orders and law, and the Crown 
through the Treaty Commissioners, established the continued process of consultation, it 
has just been ignored. 
 
The principles of Treaty interpretation and Treaty rights are Constitutionally 
binding obligations upon the Crown and its agents. The Treaty agreements are Treaty 
law,  and  described  by  Professor  Brian  Slattery,  “It   seems  clear   that   the  historic   treaties  
are governed, neither by English Common law nor Aboriginal customary law, but by a 
                                                 
174 Ibid at 52. 
175 Brian  Slattery,  “Aboriginal  Rights  and  the  Honour  of  the  Crown”,  (2005)  29  SCLR  at  434. 
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unique body of law that forms a branch of the doctrine of Aboriginal   rights.”177 As 
constitutional principles, the interpretations provide guidance in interpreting the Treaty 
order.  
 
2.5 UNILATERAL INFRINGEMENT OF THE SACRED AND INVIOLABLE 
TREATIES 
 
The court in Sparrow set out a framework for the justification of the infringement 
of Aboriginal rights. The Sparrow test set out four broad questions, 1) Is there an existing 
Aboriginal right, 2) Has the right been extinguished; 3) Has there been a prima facie 
infringement of the right; 4) Can the infringement be justified.178 The court has applied 
the same test of justification of a Treaty right through Badger. In R v Cote179 the court 
held  that  the  justification  test  applies,  “with  the  same  force  and  the  same  considerations  
to  both  species  of  constitutional  rights.”180  
 
Treaty rights, as sacred promises made between sovereign foreign nations, should 
not be infringed without the mutual consent of the signatories. Justified infringement and 
the widening scope of compelling reasons for justification, has the effect of overriding 
Treaty rights. Under the justification analysis, the court is only considering whether the 
Crown is infringing Treaty rights in the proper procedure or manner. It is not considering 
Treaty rights in accordance with their sacred and inviolable nature nor the principle of 
constitutional supremacy. The Sparrow justification test has limited use in respect of 
Treaty rights.181  
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The third question in the Sparrow test asks whether there is a prima facie 
infringement of a treaty right. The court has also distinguished  between  ‘significant’  and  
‘insignificant’  infringement. In Cote, the court held that the imposition of a fee for access 
did not infringe upon the Constitutional protected rights.182 But the court in Badger found 
that a licensing system that regulated the method of hunting, such as the kind of game, 
season and area, infringed upon the Treaty right to hunt.183 The court found the licensing 
system denied the holders of the Treaty right their preferred means of exercising those 
rights and was found to be in conflict with the treaty right.184 The court also held that the 
constitutional entrenchment of Treaty rights prevented unilateral extinguishment and 
must be justified in accordance with Sparrow.  
 
The court stated in Cote and R v Nikal185 that insignificant interference with a 
Treaty rights will not trigger constitutional protection. The court rejected the idea that 
anything that affects or interferes with the exercise of those rights, no matter how 
insignificant, constitutes a prima facie infringement. In Cote, the court found that a small 
access fee for access to a controlled harvesting zone infringed upon the treaty right to fish 
but  held  the  regulation,  “imposed  a  modest  financial  burden  on  the  exercise  of  the  alleged  
treaty   right”,   creating   only   an   insignificant interference and not a prima facie 
infringement.186 Consequently, an infringement can place a modest burden on the treaty 
right’s  holder  and  those  rights  can  be  infringed. Justification will only be required when 
infringement of the rights meets the court’s   definition   of   prima facie. The court in 
Sparrow outlined what is a prima facie infringement,  “First,  is  the  limitation  reasonable?  
Second, does the regulation impose undue hardship? Third, does the regulation deny to 
the holders of the right their preferred  means  of  exercising  that  right?”187 The court must 
examine if there is a cumulative effect of a constitutionally valid legislative regime. The 
Treaty rights holder bears the onus on proving the infringement.188 The Sparrow court 
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found a prima facie infringement if the regulation had an adverse restriction on the 
exercise of their right.189 In   effect,   a   prima   facie   infringement   requires   a   ‘meaningful  
diminution’  of  the  right.190 
 
In an Aboriginal rights context, the Gladstone court held that the questions about 
prima facie infringement are not determinative but are relevant to a prima facie 
infringement,  
 
The Sparrow test for infringement might seem, at first glance, to be internally 
contradictory. On the one hand, the test states that the appellants need simply show 
that there has been a prima facie interference with their rights in order to 
demonstrate that those rights have been infringed, suggesting thereby that any 
meaningful diminution of the appellants' rights will constitute an infringement for 
the purpose of this analysis. On the other hand, the questions the test directs courts to 
answer in determining whether an infringement has taken place incorporate ideas 
such as unreasonableness and "undue" hardship, ideas which suggest that something 
more than meaningful diminution is required to demonstrate infringement. This 
internal contradiction is, however, more apparent than real. The questions asked by 
the Court in Sparrow do not define the concept of prima facie infringement; they 
only point to factors which will indicate that such an infringement has taken place. 
Simply because one of those questions is answered in the negative will not prohibit a 
finding by a court that a prima facie infringement has taken place; it will just be one 
factor for a court to consider in its determination of whether there has been a prima 
facie infringement.191 
 
The courts have outlined the justifications for legislative or regulatory infringements on 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights include safety, conservation and resource management where 
they are for a compelling and substantial purpose.192 The Gladstone court expanded upon 
the range of objectives that can validly infringe on Aboriginal and Treaty rights, 
 
Aboriginal rights are recognized and affirmed by Sec. 35(1) in order to reconcile the 
existence of distinctive aboriginal societies prior to the arrival of Europeans in North 
America with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over that territory; they are the 
means by which the critical and integral aspects of those societies are maintained. 
                                                 
189 Sparrow, supra note 178 at 70. 
190 R v Morris, [2006] 2 SCR 915, [2007] 1 CNLR 303 [Morris]. 
191 Gladstone, supra note 188 at para 43. 
192 Sparrow, supra note 178 at 1113, and R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 SCR 672 at para 
97, [1996] 4 CNLR 130 [Smokehouse]. 
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Because, however, distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a 
broader social, political and economic community, over which the Crown is 
sovereign, there are circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of 
compelling and substantial importance to that community as a whole (taking into 
account the fact that aboriginal societies are a part of that community), some 
limitation of those rights will be justifiable. Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of 
the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader political community of 
which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, where the objectives furthered 
by those limits are of sufficient importance to the broader community as a whole, 
equally a necessary part of that reconciliation.193 
 
Included in the justifiable infringements are economic and regional fairness including 
non-aboriginal  people’s  reliance  on  fisheries.194 In Delgamuukw, the court outlined other 
valid objectives, 
 
The general principles governing justification laid down in Sparrow, and 
embellished by Gladstone, operate with respect to infringements of aboriginal 
title. In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify 
the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be 
traced to the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal 
peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the recognition 
that “distinctive   aboriginal   societies   exist   within,   and are a part of, a broader 
social,   political   and   economic   community”   (at   para.   73).   In   my   opinion,   the  
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general 
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the 
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the 
settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of 
objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the 
infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a particular measure or government act 
can be explained by reference to one of those objectives, however, is ultimately a 
question of fact that will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.195 
 
In effect, the court has held that a valid objective is one that is important enough to 
outweigh any Aboriginal or Treaty right.196 That determination is made by the courts and 
yet again shows the tension the court has in protecting the overarching power of the 
Crown against the existence of Treaty rights. For Treaty nations, the common law Treaty 
rights paradigm requires them to prove their rights and the harm the proposed 
                                                 
193 Gladstone, supra note 188 at para 73. 
194 Ibid at 75. 
195 Delgamuukw, supra note 39 para 165. 
196 R v McKenzie, (2006) 281 Sask R 243, [2006] 4 CNLR 223 at para 48. 
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infringement will have on that right. Even if that is done, the menu of compelling and 
substantial reasons is so expansive that the protection offered by constitutional 
entrenchment is dubious. 
 
Lisa Dufraimont in “From  Regulation  to  Decolonization:  Justifiable  Infringement  
of  Aboriginal  Rights  at  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada” explains the paradox: 
 
... broadening test for justification of infringement it informs, the discussion of 
reconciliation in Gladstone and Delgamuukw suggests that Aboriginal rights must 
give way when they conflict with public goals and interests. This idea of 
reconciliation is simply not a plausible articulation of the purpose of s. 35(1). 
Governments do not recognize and affirm minority rights for the benefit of the 
majority. Rather, the purpose of s. 35(1), as suggested in Sparrow, is remedial. 
Aboriginal rights have been constitutionalized precisely in order to promote a just 
settlement for Aboriginal peoples by strengthening and legitimizing their claims 
against the Crown.197 
 
Gordon  Christie’s  comments  in  "Aboriginality  and  Normativity,  Judicial  Justification  of  
Recent  Developments  in  Aboriginal  Law”  are particularly thought provoking and helpful: 
 
What role, in particular, should the judiciary be playing in this matter? The way 
forward is clear enough, if unpalatable to the judiciary. A Section One-like 
approach to justifying legislative interference with Aboriginal rights should never 
have been contemplated. The judiciary simply cannot justify this change to the 
law as it applies to Aboriginal peoples and their rights. Appeals to the need for the 
application of the rule of law are empty, as are notions that the Court requires 
such an approach to operate appropriately in a balanced constitutional democracy. 
As unpleasant as the resulting situation may be, Aboriginal rights, at this point in 
the process of reconciliation, must be accorded the sort of legal protection they 
demand – that  of  ‘sure  and  unavoidable’  rights.  These  would  be  the  sorts  of  rights  
which operate to protect essential Aboriginal interests – in living according to the 
good ways, knowledge of which has been handed down from generation to 
generation. 198 
 
                                                 
197 Lisa Dufraimont “From Regulation to Decolonization: Justifiable Infringement of Aboriginal 
Rights at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2000) 58 U.T. Faculty Law Review (QL) at para 24. 
198 Gordon Christie, "Aboriginality and Normativity, Judicial Justification of Recent 
Developments  in  Aboriginal  Law”  (2002)  17(2)  CJLS  41  at  69-70. 
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The common law Treaty rights paradigm provides Constitutional protection from 
infringement by the Crown or its agents and requires justification of infringement. The 
common law Treaty rights paradigm also is a threat to those very rights by allowing a 
broad range of infringements to encroach upon them. In effect, the court ignored the 
‘sacred  and  inviolable’  nature  of  Treaty  rights. As Harold Cardinal in The Unjust Society: 
The  Tragedy  of  Canada’s  Indians, has stated,  
 
To the Indians of Canada, the treaties represent an Indian Magna Carta. The 
Treaties are important to us, because we entered into these negotiations with faith, 
with  hope  for  a  better  life  with  honour…. 
……The  Treaties  were  the  way  in  which  the  white  people  legitimizes  in  the  eyes 
of the world, their presence in our country. It was an attempt to settle the terms of 
occupancy on a just basis, legally and morally to extinguish the legitimate claims 
of our people to title in our country ...199 
 
Indeed, the paradox of protector and competitor is evident as the history and 
jurisprudence is unpacked. It is clear, however, that the protection offered by the courts 
has halted the unilateral extinguishment of Treaty rights and has required the Crown to 
justify any legislative limitation on the constitutionally protected rights. The court must 
apply the principles of Constitutional supremacy that is encrypted in both section 35(1) 
through the operation of section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Treaty First Nations entered into Treaty as independent sovereign nations who 
were under the protection of the Crown yet remained foreign jurisdictions. The Treaty 
agreements provided for the Treaty chiefs to exercise all the powers of peace and good 
order over the ceded territory and to protect the livelihood of the treaty people. It 
provided for limited administrative authority over Treaty First Nations and Treaty First 
Nations’  lands  to the Crown and reserved all self-determination power for itself. Treaties 
created a distinct legal category under which Treaty First Nations peoples and Treaty 
First   Nations’   lands were immune from the British Parliamentary legislation that was 
                                                 
199 Harold Cardinal, The  Unjust  Society:  The  Tragedy  of  Canada’s  Indians (Edmonton: Hurtig, 
1969) at 28-20. 
 52 
inconsistent with the Treaty agreements. Pursuant to s. 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
Canada is obligated to perform all Treaty obligations with the autonomous Treaty First 
Nations.  
 
The inclusion of s. 35 in the Constitution Act provided an avenue for a new 
constitutional dialogue and consultation with the governments. Enshrining Treaty rights 
in the Constitution affirms the constitutional status and represents constitutional 
protection through constitutional supremacy. It provides a shield for rights holders 
against   continued   unilateral   action   by   the   Crown   and   limits   the   state’s   power. Treaty 
rights and the Treaty order are protected rights recognized by Imperial and Canadian 
constitutional law. Treaty rights cannot be extinguished200 and the principles of 
interpretation requires the performance201 and implementation in accordance with good 
government and Crown honour. The government of Canada has imputed knowledge of 
the existence of Treaty rights.202 The  words  “recognized  and  affirmed”  in  s.  35(1)  of  the  
sacred Treaties confirmed an underlying sui generis constitutional obligation in 
Canada.203 The obligation and wording of the treaties brought with it a constraint on the 
exercise of the  Crown’s  sovereign power.204 It incorporates the honour of the Crown and 
a fiduciary obligation on the Crown to the specific delegation of the treaties and the terms 
of the treaties are to be liberally construed with doubtful expressions resolved in favour 
of the Indians.205 In the exercise of constitutional power, the Crown is mandated to be 
‘trust   like’   and   ‘non-adversarial.’206 Treaties remain the foundation of Canadian 
Constitutional law and are therefore irrevocable. They have, after all, provided for a 
conditional consent to the peaceful settlement of European nations.
                                                 
200 Sioui, supra note 29 at 1066. 
201 Haida Nation, supra note 3 at para 19. 
202 Mikisew, supra note 5 at 1. 
203 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para 62. 
204 Ibid at para 62. 
205 Ibid at para 56. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
THE HONOUR OF THE CROWN PRECEPT REQUIRES TREATY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
"...there can be no doubt that over the years the rights of the Indians  
were often honoured in the breach"207 
 
3. 0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The centuries old British doctrine and early judicial ruminations of the special 
relationship between Indigenous people and the Government of Canada has produced, 
and now resurrected, the doctrine of the honour of the Crown. Judicially created, the 
doctrine of the honour of the Crown is meant to represent conduct that reflects the highest 
honour, integrity and fair dealing by the Crown in right of Canada. It had manifested 
itself predominantly in treaty rights jurisprudence which included principles of 
interpretation, implementation, legal and procedural duties and has evolved to embrace 
rights that are asserted and not yet proven.208 The honour of the Crown itself has been 
elevated to be a fundamental constitutional core concept that exists as a source of 
obligation independent of treaties.209 It implicates government and its institutions in 
virtually every aspect of its dealings with Indigenous people. It has been used by the 
court as a proxy for the fiduciary duties owed to Indigenous people in the exercise of the 
legal duty to consult. In this context, in determining whether the Crown has fulfilled its 
legal duties, the court has held that the controlling question in Constitutional situations is 
what is required to maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation between 
the Crown and the Indigenous peoples with respect to the interests at stake.210  
 
                                                 
207 Ibid at 1103, quoting McDonald J. in Pasco v Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] BCJ No 
2818,  [1986]  1  CNLR  35  at  37  (BCSC),  “We  cannot  recount  with  much  pride  the  treatment  
accorded  to  the  native  people  of  this  country.”  
208 Ibid. The Supreme Court of Canada extended the legal duty to consult where Aboriginal title is 
asserted but not yet substantiated. 
209 Haida, supra note 3 at para 16. 
210 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para 43-45. 
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This  chapter  examines  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada’s  doctrine  of  the Honour of 
the Crown in the jurisprudence manifesting in the duty to consult. First, the origins of the 
doctrine are examined to understand its colonial foundation. Then its judicial evolution 
from a fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to its current manifestation where the 
honour of the Crown is a surrogate where Indigenous claims are purported to be 
insufficiently specific to mandate a fiduciary standard on the Crown. The differences in 
the precepts has confused some courts and the term “honour of the Crown” has been 
thought of as imposing a moral and virtuous obligation on a Government who has 
anything but toward Indigenous Treaty People. Inherent difficulties arguably arise in 
calling  upon   the  Crown’s  honour   through   its   internal   tension  of  self  preservation in the 
face of competing Indigenous rights claims.  
 
 
3.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE HONOUR OF THE CROWN DOCTRINE 
 
The concept of the honour of the Crown is derived from a centuries old British 
tradition of acting honourably for the sake of the sovereign. The concept dictated anyone 
acting on behalf of the king owed great personal responsibility to maintain the power and 
prestige   of   his   king’s   name   or   fear   dire   consequences.211 Eventually the separation of 
Sovereign and government became less identifiable and appealing to the honour of the 
Crown was an appeal, not just to the sovereign as a person, but also to a traditional 
bedrock of principles of fundamental justice that lay beyond persons and politics.212 A 
notion arose of an unwritten figure of stateliness when action is undertaken in the name 
of the Crown.  
 
The concept of the Crown's honour is the basis of the Treaty relationship. 
Indigenous people based the Treaty accords on the strength of the oral promises of the 
Treaty  negotiator’s  words. The treaty negotiator’s  words  were  premised  under  the  oath  of  
                                                 
211 See  D.M.  Arnot,  “The Honour of the Crown”  (1996)  60  Sask  L  Rev  339.  To  cause  
embarrassment to the king would require the servant to answer with his life and fortune and could 
blemish the families name for generations. 
212 Ibid at 2. 
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the Queen’s honour and the honour and integrity of the Commissioners who had the 
authority to act on her behalf. To bring further credibility of the honour of their words, 
the Treaty parties travelled with clergy and missionaries who swore the truth of the 
Commissioners’ words. For example, during the Treaty 8 negotiations the Reverend 
Father Lacombe spoke of the honesty and honour of the Commissioners,  
  
I consented to come here because I thought it was a good thing for you to take the 
Treaty. Were it not in your interest I would not take part in it. I have been long 
familiar with the Government's methods of making treaties with the Saulteaux of 
Manitoba, the  Crees of Saskatchewan, and the Blackfeet, Bloods and Piegans of 
the Plains, and advised these tribes to accept the offers of the Government. 
Therefore, to-day, I urge you to accept the words of the Big Chief who comes here 
in the name of the Queen. I have known him for many years, and, I can assure 
you, he is just and sincere in all his statements, besides being vested with 
authority to deal with you. Your forest and river life will not be changed by the 
Treaty, and you will have your annuities, as well, year by year, as long as the sun 
shines and the earth remains. Therefore I finish my speaking by saying, Accept!213 
(emphasis added) 
 
Indigenous people held great reverence for the Queen as entering in a personal and 
kinship relationship through Treaty. The European nations were believed to be in an 
adopted family, akin to brothers, where they would be connected intimately to the Treaty 
First Nations into the future. Mutual respect and honour in the spoken word, promises 
exchanged and the responsibilities as family members was believed inherent in the 
relationship. It was regarded as special with the belief that the Crown also held the Treaty 
with the same reverence and in the best interest of the Indigenous people. The concept of 
the honour of the Crown, in its application to Indigenous people, evolved into Crown 
superiority and protector over Indigenous people and their interest. Initially, the Treaty 
                                                 
213 Charles Mair, Through the Mackenzie Basin, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1999) at 
64 [originally published in 1908]. Author Charles Mair was the English secretary to the scrip 
commission that travelled with the Treaty Commission on the Treaty 8 expedition 1899, detailing 
the Reverend Father Lacombe's speech as he travelled with the Treaty Commissioners during 
Treaty 8 Negotiations. When the Reverend finished speaking, the chiefs and counsellors stood up, 
and requested all the Indians to do so also as a mark of acceptance of the Government's 
conditions. Father Lacombe was thanked by several for having come so far, though so very old, 
to visit them and speak to them, after which the meeting adjourned until the following day. 
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doctrines of familial terms of the father / child, guardian / ward language evolved into 
dominance as reflected in early British policy, statutes and jurisprudence.214 Today, as in 
the past, the continued belief of the special relationship with the British Crown remains a 
beacon of hope for many Indigenous nations. Delegations of Chiefs and Indigenous 
people have long travelled to England, bearing declarations and letters of appeal for the 
Queen’s  intervention  for  just  treatment  by  the  Canadian  Government.215  
 
Judicial sentiments of the honour of the Crown doctrine in relation to the 
interpretation of Treaty rights found its beginnings in the dissent judgment from 1895 in 
Re Indian Claims.216 Therein, Gwynne J. held that the British Sovereigns’ pledged faith 
and   honour   when   entering   into   treaties   with   the   Indians,   “the   terms   and   conditions  
expressed in those instruments as to be performed by or on behalf of the Crown, have 
always been regarded as involving a trust graciously assumed by the Crown to the 
                                                 
214 See, for example: The Royal Proclamation 1763, "The several Nations or Tribes of Indians, 
with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection", Sheldon v. Ramsay, [1851] OJ 
No 82, 9 UCQB 105 (UCQB), held that the crown was acting in light of a parent in providing a 
grant to the Six Nations; Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), supra note 36 at 334, 
quoting a survey general memorandum, "The Indians have in fact been held to be the special 
wards  of  the  Crown;;  Morris,  “The  Treaties  of  Canada”  supra  note 86 at 296, "They are wards of 
Canada, let us do our duty towards them".  
215 Net News Ledger, "Attawapiskat Chief Seeks Assistance of Queen Elizabeth II in Addressing 
Dire Circumstances," by James Murray on February 23, 2012. 
<http://netnewsledger.netnewsledgercom.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/royalChristmasmessage.jpg >Attawapiskat First Nation has 
requested the assistance of Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, in addressing the dire circumstances 
experienced by the First Nation and its members. In a letter to be delivered to the Queen through 
her representative, Governor General Johnston today, Chief Spence calls to Her Majesty’s  
attention the actions of Crown officials in imposing third party management on the First Nation, 
in  an  apparently  punitive  response  to  the  First  Nation’s  request  for  assistance  to  deal  with  its  
housing crisis. The letter outlines the chronic underfunding experienced by the First Nation, the 
imposition of third party management, and the withholding of money for any government 
services  by  the  third  party  manager.  Chief  Spence  requests  the  Queen’s  assistance  in  encouraging  
Crown officials to act honourably by respecting the autonomy of the First Nation, and ensuring 
that the First Nation receive the support for infrastructure, government and administration that is 
available to all other Canadian communities, First Nations or otherwise. 
<http://netnewsledger.com/2012/02/23/attawapiskat-chief-seeks-assistance-of-queen-elizabeth-ii-
in-addressing-dire-circumstances> 
216 Province of Ontario v Dominion of Canada and Province of Quebec, Re Indian Claims (1895), 
25 SCR 434. Guerin, supra note at 411, Collier J. held "At the time and for many years before, 
according to the evidence, a great number of Indian Affairs personnel, vis a vis Indian band and 
Indians, took a paternalistic, albeit well-meaning, attitude; the Indians were children or wards, 
father knew best." 
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fulfillment of which with the Indians the faith and honour of the Crown is pledged and 
which trust has always been most faithfully fulfilled as a treaty obligation of the Crown 
…” Later, in R v Secretary of State, Lord Denning found that the transfer of treaty 
obligations from the imperial crown to the crown in right of Canada, carried with it a 
duty   to   solemnly   respect   Treaty   rights   and   obligations,   “No   Parliament   should   do 
anything to lessen the worth of these guarantees. They should be honoured by the Crown 
in  respect  of  Canada,  “so  long  as  the  sun  shines  and  the  river  flows.  That  promise  should  
never  be  broken.”217  
 
The sentiment that treaty rights obligations were considered to be legally binding 
on the Crown218 remained. The court held that at the time of the signing of the treaty, the 
British   Crown   assumed   a   ‘trust’   of   faith   and   honour   to   fulfill   the   terms   of   the   treaty  
negotiated and held.219 In the Robinson Treaties Annuities 220 case, Gwynne J., stated,  
 
What is contended for and must not be lost sight of, the that the British 
sovereigns, ever since the acquisition of Canada, have been pleased to adopt the 
rule or practice of entering into agreements with the Indians Nations or tribes in 
their province of Canada, for the cession or surrender by them of what such 
sovereigns have been pleased to designate that Indian title, by instruments similar 
to these now under consideration to which they have been pleased to give the 
designation  of  treaties’  with  the  Indian’s  in  possession  of  and  claiming  title  to  the  
lands expressed in those instruments as to be performed by or on behalf of the 
Crown, have always been regarded as involving a trust graciously assumed by the 
Crown to the fulfilment of which with the Indians the faith and honour of the 
Crown is pledged, and which trust has always been most faithfully fulfilled as a 
treaty obligation of the Crown.221 
 
                                                 
217 Secretary of State, supra note 122 at 99. 
218 Taylor and Williams, supra note 166. 
219 Marshall, supra note 9 at  para  50,  on  Gwynne  J’s  dissent  in  Canada (Attorney General) v 
Ontario (Attorney General), (1895) 25 SCR 434 (SCC) (dissenting) at 511-12, affirmed (1896), 
1896 Carswell Nat 44 (Canada PC); Seybold (1901) 32 SCR 1 (SCC) at 2 affirmed (1902) [1903] 
AC 73 (Ontario PC),  
220 Canada (AG) v Ontario (AG) (1897) AC 199 (PC) [Robinson Treaties Annuities], ibid at 511. 
221 Ibid. At issue was whether a promise made in Treaty to pay increased annuities was within s. 
109 of the Constitution Act, 1867,  which  vested  lands  to  the  provinces  “subject  to  any  Trusts  
existing in respect thereof and to any Interest other  than  that  of  the  Province  in  the  same.” Both 
the Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy Council held that it did not. [1897] AC 199 (UKPC). 
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Unfortunately, this principle of trust, faith and honour of the Crown has not been 
consistently applied through subsequent years by the judiciary. In the appeal of Re Indian 
Claims, Lord Watson, for the majority found that the honour of the Crown is not 
incorporated   in   Treaty   promises   when   he   commented,   “Their   Lordships   have   had   no 
difficulty in coming to the conclusion that under the treaties the Indians obtained no right 
to   their   annuities…beyond   a   promise   and   agreement   which   was   nothing   more   than   a  
personal  obligation  by  its  governor.”222 
 
This approach continued in St.  Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v R., where 
the Privy Council held that Aboriginal people’s  interest  in  their  lands  was  a  “personal  and  
usufructary   right,  dependent  upon   the  good  will  of   the  Sovereign.” 223 In the same case 
before the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice  Tashereau  stated,  “The  Indians  must  in  the  
future ... be treated with the same consideration for their claims and demands that they 
have received in the past, but, as in the past, it will not be because of any legal obligation 
to do so, but as a sacred political obligation, in the execution of which the state must be 
free from judicial control.”224 This perception of treaty obligations being merely political 
obligations was cited with approval in both R v Wesley225 and R v Sikyea.226  
 
The   Crown’s   practice   remained similar227 until 1966 R v George228 where the 
dissent held the honour of the Crown dictated the manner in which the Treaty and Acts of 
                                                 
222 Re Indian Claims, supra note 9 at 213. 
223 St.  Catherine’s  Milling  supra  note 36. 
224 Ibid at 649. 
225 Wesley, supra, note 159 at  788,  “In  Canada  the  Indian  treaties  appear  to  have  been  judicially  
interpreted  as  being  mere  promises  and  agreements.” 
226 Sikyea, supra note 156 at  154,  “  While  this  case  (Re Indian Claims) refers only to the annuities 
payable under treaties, it is difficult to see that the other covenants in the treaties, including the 
one we are here concerned with, can stand  on  any  higher  footing.”  See  also  Leonard  I.  Rotman,  
“My Hovercraft is full of Eels: Smoking out the message in R v Marshall”  (2000)  63  Sask  L  Rev  
at 617-644. 
227 Ontario Mining Co v Seybold, [1901] SCJ No 63, 32 SCR 1 at 3 (SCC), Gwynne Dissenting, 
Upon surrender the Indian Title consists in the honour of the Sovereign being pledged to a 
faithful observance of the conditions upon the faith of which the Sovereign procured each 
surrender to be made; Treaty No 3 Annuities, [1909] SCJ No 28, 42 SCR 1 at 103-104 Idington J., 
A line of policy begotten of prudence, humanity and justice adopted by the British Crown to be 
observed in all future dealings with the Indians in respect of such rights as they might suppose 
themselves to possess was outlined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 erecting, after the Treaty 
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Parliament should be interpreted. In 1981, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in Taylor and 
Williams, Mackinnon J, referenced the dissent in George, and invoked the honour of the 
Crown  as  an   integral  part  of  determination,  by  stating,  “The  principles   to  be  applied   to  
the interpretation of Indian treaties have been much canvassed over the years. In 
approaching the terms of a treaty quite apart from other considerations already noted, the 
honour  of  the  Crown  is  always  involved  and  no  appearance  of  ‘sharp  dealing”  should  be  
sanctioned.”229 
 
As a colonial doctrine, the honour of the Crown represented the British Crown's 
commitment and honour in the Treaty negotiations and promises made. Judicially, the 
doctrine of the honour of the Crown became imposed on the government as the Treaty 
obligations failed to be honoured. The court began to re-establish the principle of Crown 
honour on the Crown and reincorporated it as a positive duty. At the same time however, 
the tenets of Crown honour were not upheld uniformly. The judiciary had, for many 
years, completely ignored the honour of the Crown doctrine, thereby making it 
convenient for the Crown to also ignore. 
 
3.2 THE   JUDICIAL   EVOLUTION  OF   THE   CROWN’S   FIDUCIARY   DUTY  
TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLE TO THE HONOUR OF THE CROWN 
PRECEPT 
 
According to Black’s  Law  Dictionary,230 a fiduciary is derived from the Roman 
law, and means a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Paris in that year, amongst others, a separate government for Quebec, ceded by that treaty to 
the British Crown. That policy adhered to thenceforward, by those responsible for the honour of 
the Crown led to many treaties whereby Indians agreed to surrender such rights as they were 
supposed to have in areas respectively specified in such treaties. 
228 R v George, supra note 157,  Cartwright  J  in  dissent  stated,  “We  should  endeavour  to construe 
the treaty of 1827 and those Acts of Parliament which bear upon the question before us [ie 
whether the treaty right to hunt had been destroyed by statute] in such manner that the honour of 
the Sovereign may be upheld and Parliament not made subject to the reproach of having taken 
away by unilateral action and without consideration the right solemnly assured to the Indians and 
their  posterity  by  treaty.”   
229 Taylor and Williams, supra note 166 at 367. 
230 <http://blackslawdictionary.org/fiduciary/"> 
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that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous 
good faith and candor which it requires. In essence, a fiduciary duty in private law 
imposes a legal duty on a fiduciary whereupon the fiduciary undertakes to act on behalf 
of a beneficiary. The   doctrine   of   the   honour   of   the   Crown   and   the   Crown’s   fiduciary  
duties have the same tenets of trust, honour, integrity and to act in the best interest of 
their beneficiary.231 However, the fiduciary relationship is just one aspect of the 
relationship between the Crown and Indigenous people. The honour of the Crown and the 
fiduciary relationship has evolved to be treated independently by the courts.232 In the 
earlier jurisprudence, Treaty cases most often did not refer to the fiduciary duty and the 
honour of the Crown is not often highlighted in fiduciary jurisprudence. Fiduciary duties 
between the Crown and Indigenous people have a history in the jurisprudence and has 
been infused and confused with the honour of the Crown precept. Eventually the two 
doctrines were separated as arguably looser standard of legal obligation was imposed on 
the Crown when it could not be said it was acting for a specific Constitutional or statutory 
interest of the Indigenous people. The fiduciary obligation shifted from the Crown’s 
obligation of the highest standard of strict deference of Indigenous interests to an 
obligation of acting with honour.  
 
The evolution of the fiduciary doctrine toward the honour of the Crown precept 
began with the recognition of Crown duties as being a clear fiduciary duty towards the 
Musqueam people in Guerin.233 Specifically, the Crown was held to a strict fiduciary 
standard and duty when dealing with the interests of Indigenous land to which it asserted 
underlying ownership. In Guerin, the court was reluctant to find a trust created by the 
Crown to the Musqueam, which would have occurred had the Musqueam actually 
enjoyed independent interest in their own lands.234 The Constitutional fiduciary doctrine 
was based on sui generis nature of Indian title and the historic powers and responsibilities 
                                                 
231 For example in Sparrow, supra note178 at para 76-80, where the government was required by 
the court to make Aboriginal fishing for food a priority in the resource allocation. 
232 Leonard I. Rotman,  “Aboriginal Rights: Crown-Native Relations as Fiduciary: Reflections 
almost 20 years after Guerin”,  (2003)  22  Windsor  YB  Access  Just.  363  at  16-18. 
233 Guerin, supra note 2. 
234 Gordon Christie, “A  Colonial  Reading  of  Recent  Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and 
Haida  Nation”  (2005)  23  Windsor  YB  Access  Just  17,  at  14.  [Christie,  “A  Colonial  Reading”] 
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assumed by the Crown235. The court distinguished the special obligation by the Crown 
from a political,236 constructive or private law concept of trust.237 The lack of recognition 
of   Indigenous   rights   to   their   land   and   the   Crown’s   assertion   of   underlying   title   create  
lawful obligations in the common law but breach the Indigenous orders from which the 
rightful interest originates. The court indicated that the nature of the Indian interest in 
land and the fiduciary obligation is the same regarding proven or asserted title.238 
Aboriginal land title, regarded as only alienable by purchase by the Crown, constitutes 
the source of the fiduciary duty and places an equitable obligation on the Crown.239 
Similar principles apply to the ceded lands in Treaties.240  
 
The court then recognized a fiduciary duty owed by the Crown under s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, when justifying infringements of Indigenous rights under Sparrow, 
when it held, "the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with the Aboriginal 
people."241 The Sparrow court linked its decisions with the fiduciary duty in Guerin,242 
the honour of the Crown in Taylor and Williams243 and treaty interpretation in Nowegijick 
                                                 
235 Guerin, supra note 2 at para 59. 
236 James  (Sa’ke’j)  Youngblood  Henderson,  “Animating the Honour of the Crown”, Draft 
document, Unpublished and provided as part of course readings in Law 898. Term 2 2005/06 at 
19,  stated,  “The  political  trust  cases  concerned  essentially  the  distribution  of  public  funds  or  other  
property held by the government. These false ideas of political trust were fabricated by Canada in 
a similar representation to the prohibited process of the local legislature as described in the 1837 
Select Committee report Transfer of the fiduciary powers to Canada in s.91(24) did not resolve 
the problems of the trust or fiduciary administration in representative legislatures. In each case 
the party claiming to be beneficiary under such a trust depended entirely on statute, ordinance or 
treaty as a basis for a claim in its interest in the funds in question. Since Aboriginal title is an 
independent  legal  regime,  the  political  trust  decisions  of  public  law  duty  are  inapplicable.” 
237 Guerin, supra note 2 at 379, the court held that while it is not private law duty in the strict 
sense either, [the sui generis duty] is nonetheless in the nature of a private law duty. 
238 Ibid at  379,  “it  did  not  matter  that  the  case  was  concerned  with  the  interest  of  an  Indian  Band  
in a reserve rather than with unrecognized Aboriginal title in traditional tribal lands. The Indian 
interest  in  the  land  is  the  dame  in  both  cases,”  the  court  was  relying  on  AG Que. v AG Can., 
[1921] 1 AC 401 at 410-411 PC. 
239 Ibid at 287. 
240 Henderson,  “Animating the Honour of the Crown”,  supra note 236 at para 24. “Similar  
principles  apply  to  Treaty  rights  that  surrender  Aboriginal  tenure  to  the  Crown  creating  “Treaty  
Tenure”.” 
241 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para 62, 1114. 
242 Guerin, supra note 2. 
243 Taylor and Williams, supra note 166. 
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v The Queen,244 in confirming that the honour of the Crown is invoked in Treaty 
interpretation by holding, "... ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1). That is, the 
Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to 
Aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and Aboriginals is trust 
like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal 
rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship."245 (emphasis added). The 
history of the Treaties and the historic obligations of the Crown creates the special trust 
relationship based on the treaty principles.246 The Sparrow court’s concept of honour 
does not match the Indigenous Treaty principles of sacred inviolability. It became 
apparent that constitutional recognition of existing Aboriginal rights did not mean they 
were immune from infringement. Instead of requiring explicit extinguishment, the court 
opened the door to implicit abrogation through the justification test. The court had failed 
to comprehend that infringing and violating Treaty rights breaks the original compact and 
the consensual foundation of vested constitutional obligations upon which Canada is 
constructed. It violates both imperial and Constitutional promises, the honour of the 
Crown and constitutional fiduciary duties.247 Unilateral Crown infringements on Treaty 
rights are unconstitutional and not justifiable. 
 
In finding a fiduciary duty was owed by the Crown in respect of Indigenous lands 
and Treaty rights, the honour of the Crown doctrine remained a precept and part of the 
fiduciary doctrine. The court Van der Peet articulated both the fiduciary duty and the 
honour of the Crown as synonymous by stating,  
The Crown has a fiduciary obligation to Aboriginal peoples with the result that in 
dealings between the government and Aboriginals the honour of the Crown is at 
stake. Because of this fiduciary relationship, and its implication of the honour of 
the Crown, treaties, s. 35(1), and other statutory provisions protecting the interests 
                                                 
244 Nowegijick v The Queen [1983] SCJ No 5 [1983] 1 SCR 29 (SCC)[Nowegijick]. 
245 Guerin, Taylor and Williams, supra note 166, Nowegijick, Ibid. 
246 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para  59,  “In  our  opinion,  Guerin, together with Taylor and 
Williams, ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1). That is, the government has the 
responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to Aboriginal peoples. The relationship 
between the Government and Aboriginals is trust like, rather than adversarial and contemporary 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historical 
relationship.” 
247 Henderson,  “Animating the Honour of the Crown”  supra note 236 at 6.  
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of Aboriginal peoples, must be given a generous and liberal interpretation ... this 
general principle must inform the Court's analysis of the purposes underlying s. 
35(1), and of that provision's definition and scope.248 (emphasis added).  
 
The Supreme Court in remaining faithful to a holding the Crown to the highest standard 
of obligation, regardless of the doctrine label, stayed, at the very least, cognizable to the 
original understanding of Treaty First Nation people.  
 
Outside of the Constitutional obligations of the Crown, the Supreme Court began 
narrowing of the fiduciary doctrine by rearticulating the perimeters of the fiduciary 
doctrine of one where a fiduciary duty arises when unilateral power and discretion is 
exercised over another. In Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada,249 the minority court 
provided an explanation for the basis of a fiduciary relationship in private law when it 
held,  
Generally speaking, a fiduciary obligation arises where one person possesses 
unilateral power or   discretion   on   a   matter   affecting   a   second   “peculiarly  
vulnerable”  person:  The  vulnerable  party  is  in  the  power  of  the  party  possessing  
the power or discretion, who is in turn obligated to exercise that power or 
discretion solely for the benefit of the vulnerable party. A person cedes (or more 
often finds himself in the situation where someone else has ceded for him) his 
power over a matter to another person. The person who has ceded power trusts the 
person to whom power is ceded to exercise the power with loyalty and care. This 
is the notion at the heart of the fiduciary obligation.  
 
For Indigenous people, the exercise of unilateral power of governmental departments can 
be argued to have been consistently applied to their rights and lands.  
 
It was not until 2002 that the Supreme Court in Wewaykum Indian Band v 
Canada,250 drew a clear distinction between Constitutional obligations and statutory 
duties under the Indian Act and noted that since its decision in Guerin, that the courts 
have been flooded with fiduciary claims by Indian bands across a whole spectrum of 
                                                 
248 R v Van der Peet, supra note 47 at para 24. 
249 Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada, 1995 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 344 at para 38. 
[Blueberry], citing Frame v Smith, 1987 CanLII 74 (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 99; Norberg v 
Wynrib,1992 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 226; and Hodgkinson v Simms, 1994 CanLII 70 
(SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 377. 
250 Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 (CanLII), [2002] 4 SCR 245, 2002 SCC 79 
[Wewaykum]. 
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complaints.251 The court made the separation from an “at  large”  fiduciary  duty  owed  by  
the  Crown  to  a  restrictive  fiduciary  relationship,  "…  not  all  obligations  existing  between  
parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in nature ... and that this 
principle applies to the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. It is 
necessary, then, to focus on the particular obligation or interest that is the subject matter 
of the particular dispute and whether or not the Crown has assumed discretionary control 
in relation thereto sufficient to ground a fiduciary obligation."252 The court went on to 
state, "But there are limits. The appellants seemed at times to invoke the fiduciary duty as 
source of plenary Crown liability covering all aspects of the Crown-Indian band 
relationship. This overshoots the mark. The fiduciary duty imposed on the Crown does 
not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian interests."253 In effect, the court began 
to relieve the Crown of its liability and a strict standard of duty as fiduciary as it was 
inundated with claims of complaints of Crown statutory or regulatory conduct. The shift 
represents another turning point in the Aboriginal rights doctrine where the court is 
offering a narrow interpretation of statutory law and the protection offered therein. The 
tightening of the fiduciary doctrine begins the process of placing an obligation on a 
Crown to act honourably toward competing Indigenous rights when, inherently, it shows 
allegiance only to itself. 
 
Then in Haida, two years later, the Supreme Court returned to the Constitutional 
doctrine of the honour of the Crown by reiterating the fiduciary principles in Wewaykum 
and elevating and making explicit the doctrine of the honour of the Crown in the duty of 
consultation. The honour of the Crown is now deemed as being a broad duty, which may, 
in some cases, invoke a fiduciary duty, but stands independently. The Haida court held,  
  
The  government’s  duty  to  consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their 
interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown. The honour of the Crown is 
always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples. It is not a mere 
                                                 
251 Ibid at para 82. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid at para 81. 
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incantation, but rather a core precept that finds its application in concrete 
practices.254 
  
The honour of the Crown gives rise to different duties in different circumstances. Where 
the Crown has assumed discretionary control over specific Aboriginal interests, the 
honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty. The content of the fiduciary duty may 
vary   to   take   into   account   the  Crown’s   other,   broader   obligations.  However,   the   duty’s  
fulfillment   requires   that   the   Crown   act   with   reference   to   the   Aboriginal   group’s   best  
interest in exercising discretionary control over the specific Aboriginal interests at stake. 
As explained in Wewaykum,  the  term  “fiduciary  duty”  does  not  connote  a  universal  trust  
relationship encompassing all aspects of the relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal  peoples:  …  “fiduciary  duty”  as  a  source  of  plenary  Crown  liability  covering  
all aspects of the Crown-Indian  band  relationship  …  overshoots  the  mark.  The  fiduciary  
duty imposed on the Crown does not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian 
interests.255 
 
Specifically the court has held that Aboriginal rights that are in the pre-proof 
stage,  where  Aboriginal  rights  and  title  have  not  yet  been  proven  in  court,  the  “Aboriginal  
interest in question is insufficiently specific for the honour of the Crown to mandate that 
the Crown   act   in   the   Aboriginal   group’s   best   interest,   as   a   fiduciary,   in   exercising  
discretionary  control  over  the  subject  of  the  right  or  title”256 As stated in Chapter 2, the 
characterization of un-proven rights provides less protection than a stricter standard under 
a fiduciary doctrine. The fatal error in this reasoning is that rights that are deemed 'pre-
proof' are rights that exist, are known and confirmed in Indigenous nations and their legal 
orders.  
 
Then in respect of Treaty rights in Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister 
of Canadian Heritage),257 the court held that the taking up clause in Treaty 8 
                                                 
254 Haida, supra note 3 at 16._ 
255 Ibid at para 16, 18, citing Badger, supra note 9 at para 41; Wewaykum, supra note 250 at para 
79. 
256 Ibid at para 18. 
257 Mikisew supra note 5 
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contemplated that portions of the surrendered land would be taken up from time to time 
for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes258 and that  “the  Crown  was  
and is expected to manage the change honourably.”259 The court made clear that the 
honour of the Crown operates independent of a fiduciary duty by holding the duty to 
consult is grounded in the honour of the Crown, and it is not necessary for present 
purposes to invoke fiduciary duties,  
  
The honour of the Crown is itself a fundamental concept governing treaty 
interpretation and application that was referred to by Gwynne J. of this court as a 
treaty obligation as far back as 1895, four years before Treaty 8 was concluded: 
Province of Ontario v Dominion of Canada, (1895) 25 SCR 434 at pp.511-12 per 
Gwynne (dissenting). While he was in the minority in his view that the treaty 
obligation to pay Indian annuities imposed a trust on provincial lands, nothing 
was said by the majority in that case to doubt that the honour of the Crown was 
pledged to the fulfillment of its obligations to the Indians. This had been the 
Crown’s  policy  as  far  back  as  the  Royal Proclamation of 1763, and is manifest in 
the promises recorded in the report of the Commissioners. The honour of the 
Crown exists as a source of obligation independently of treaties as well, of course. 
In Sparrow, Delgamuukw, Haida and Taku River,  the  “honour  of  the  Crown”  was  
invoked as a central principle in resolving Aboriginal claims to consultation 
despite the absence of any treaty. 260 
 
The honour of the Crown remained a core precept in the implementation of Treaty rights 
claims as a 'central principle.' The Federal Court in Dene Tha' First Nation v Canada 
(Minister of Environment), again solidified the relationship of the doctrines by holding 
that where Indigenous people have no protection, the honour of the Crown fills in to 
ensure Crown conduct is in accordance with its Constitutional duty: "The major 
difference between the fiduciary duty and the honor of the Crown is that ... the latter can 
be triggered even where the Aboriginal interest is insufficiently specific to require that 
the Crown act in the Aboriginal group's best interest (that is, as a fiduciary). In sum, 
where an Aboriginal group has no fiduciary protection, the honour of the Crown  fills in 
                                                 
258 Ibid at para 30. 
259 Ibid at para 31. 
260 Ibid at para 51. 
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to insure the Crown fulfills the Section 35 goal of reconciliation of "the pre-existence of 
Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown."261  
 
Some lower courts have been confused about the differentiation in the fiduciary 
duty and the honour of the Crown, the British Columbia Supreme Court in Hereditary 
Chiefs Tony Hunt et al v Attorney General of Canada et al held, "I think it must be 
recognized that just as Aboriginal rights are sui generis, Aboriginal rights litigation is 
also unique. It involves hundreds of years of history and sometimes unconventional 
techniques of fact finding. It involves lofty, often elusive concepts of law such as the 
fiduciary duty and honour of the Crown."262 As well, the Ontario Superior Court in 
Platinex held, "…because the Crown’s  duty  to  consult  engages  the honour of the Crown 
and flows from its fiduciary relationship with First Nations peoples."263 In addition to the 
confusion between the two doctrines, legal commentators have been unclear about the 
legitimacy of the honour of the Crown, terming it a indefinable abstract notion stated in 
mystical terms.264 
                                                 
261 Dene Tha' First Nation v Canada (Minister of Environment), [2006] FCJ No 1677, [2007] 1 
CNLR 1 at para 81 [Dene  Tha’]. 
262 Hereditary Chiefs Tony Hunt et al v Attorney General Canada et al, 2006 BCSC 1368 at para 
26 [Hereditary Chiefs]. J. Satanove, continued by "We cannot simply view aboriginal claims in 
the same light as other civil litigation. I believe effective case management of Aboriginal 
litigation requires an effort on behalf of all parties and the court to find a creative way to try the 
issues without invoking oppressive conduct that deters the plaintiffs or prejudices the 
defendants." The conflict between the Kwakiult Hereditary Chiefs (plaintiffs) and the Federal and 
the Provincial Government of British Columbia over the right to fish is, according to court, 
notorious and has continued for many years. The Kwakiult Nation claim that a clause in the 1851 
treaty between the Hudson Bay Company and the Fort Rupert Indian Tribes, the Douglas Treaty, 
granted them exclusive fishing rights in these areas. 
263 Platinex Inc. v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, [2007] 3 CNLR 181 (ON SCJ) at 
para 85. 
264 Stoney Band v Canada, 2004 FC 122 [2004] 4 CNLR 348; 245 FTR 288 at para 33[Stoney], 
noting a case comment on R v Marshall[, where W. H. Hurlburt, LL.D. (Hon.) Q.C., of the 
Alberta Bar, wrote at para 26, “The actual effect of what the Supreme Court of Canada has done 
with the notion of the "honour of the Crown" is to hold that the Crown stood in a confidential 
relationship with aboriginal groups and that the confidentiality of the relationship imposed on the 
Crown a duty to adhere to standards of conduct higher than those which are imposed by ordinary 
commercial morality. It would, in my submission, be better to put it that way. A relational 
analysis can yield the desired result (the imposition of a higher standard of conduct on the Crown) 
without giving as the source of the higher duty an indefinable abstract notion stated in almost 
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The  court’s  jurisprudential  evolution  of  the  constitutional and statutory fiduciary 
doctrine   to   the   doctrine   of   the   honour   of   the   Crown   reflects   the   court’s   difficulty   in  
constructing the common law to fit the Constitutional agenda on Indigenous peoples. 
Specifically, the application of the Crown's fiduciary duty is a consequence of the Crown 
assuming unilateral control and underlying title over all Indigenous lands without moral 
and legal legitimacy. The Crown also claims the discretion in deciding which Indigenous 
rights it will afford legal recognition and protection to in the common law in the absence 
of Indigenous legal orders. The recognition of rights by the Crown and courts is directly 
proportional to the protection the right will be afforded and the Crown's corresponding 
duty. The constitutional status of Indigenous rights appears to have little consequence 
when not yet recognized by the common law. The court through the jurisprudence has 
successfully separated the Crown from stronger and more enforceable legal duty by 
narrowing the scope of Crown liability. The internal conflict between the Crown's duty to 
protect itself and its duty to act honourably in the face of Indigenous claims against itself 
causes the dichotomies in the law, which the court is complicit in perpetuating. A cogent 
example is in the Federal Court of Appeal case in Canada v Stoney Band, a complaint by 
the Stoney people against the Crown for a breach of fiduciary duty in a land surrender. 
The court held that in litigation, the Crown owes no fiduciary duty to its adversary, 
Indigenous people.265  
 
The Crown claims ownership over all Indigenous lands and has placed themselves 
and their institutions as the gatekeeper of ancient Indigenous rights, including where and 
when they can be exercised. The question must be asked, how can the Crown be said not 
                                                                                                                                                 
mystical terms. It would be better to state the proposition directly than to explain it by bringing in 
a concept of "the honour of the Crown". 
265 Canada v Stoney Band, 2005 FCA 15, 249 DLR (4th) 274, [2005] 2 CNLR 371 at para 22, 
held, in litigation, the Crown does not exercise discretionary control over its Aboriginal 
adversary. It is therefore difficult to identify a fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to its adversary 
in the conduct of litigation. It is true that an aspect of the claim against the Crown by the Stoney 
Band is based on an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the surrender and 
disposition of reserve land. But even if such a fiduciary duty existed, that duty does not connote a 
trust relationship between the Crown and the Stoney Band in the conduct of litigation.  
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to be acting in a trust-like responsibility in its dealings with Indigenous people? The 
Crown has created a number of dichotomies in the colonial assertion of sovereignty over 
Indigenous peoples by cloaking itself as having the control and responsibility over 
Indigenous interests. As such, Indigenous Treaty people assert that the Crown should be 
held to the highest standards of trust and protection of the Indigenous people interests 
they purport to control. 
 
Brian Slattery, in "Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown" advances 
three theories on how the honour of the Crown doctrine has arose; 1. That the Crown 
voluntarily assumed this duty when it asserted sovereignty over the Indigenous peoples of 
Canada, as evidenced by the Royal Proclamation; 2. The duty is a pre-existing legal duty 
or responsibility governed by the Crown's assertion of sovereignty over Indigenous 
peoples and required the Crown to deal honourably with these peoples and respect their 
basic rights; and 3. The duty to act honourably stems from the explicit rights recognition 
and affirmation of Aboriginal rights in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.266 Slattery 
notes that court rejected the third theory and through Haida, has positioned the honour of 
the Crown as a general principle in law at the time of asserted sovereignty: 
  
This process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty of honourable dealing 
toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the Crown's assertion of 
sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources 
that were formerly in the control of that people. As stated in Mitchell, "with this 
assertion [of sovereignty] arose an obligation to treat Aboriginal peoples fairly 
and honourably, and to protect them from exploitation”.267 
 
The Treaty nations shared,  without  purchase,  their  lands  and  this  mandates  the  Crown’s  
fiduciary duty to the Treaty nations. The  Crown’s  unilateral  assertion  of  sovereignty  and  
assumption of control over Indigenous interests mandates the Crown to honourable 
conduct. Indigenous Treaty people also envision a fourth theory, that of the Crown, as a 
                                                 
266 Brian Slattery, supra note 175 at 443-444. 
267 Haida, supra note 3 at para 32. 
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partner in the Treaty, in a remedial duty that encapsulates both trust, fiduciary principles 
and honour of the Crown tenets until there is a return to the equal partnership envisioned 
in Treaty. The court in Haida, Taku and Mikisew has began that process of demanding 
the Crown move toward a course of Indigenous rights recognition and mandates inclusion 
of the rights holders but it does not go far enough. A new Constitutional order is required, 
inclusive of Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders. 
 
It is important to note that the Haida court has indicated that the court can no 
longer sustain the assertion of unilateral Crown sovereignty and the special relationship 
between the Crown and Indigenous peoples mandates the Crown to act honourably in 
negotiating their rights, 
 
Put simply, Canada's Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and 
were  never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty 
of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, 
have yet to do so. The  potential rights embedded in these claims are 
protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown, 
requires that these rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, 
requires the Crown, acting honourably,to participate in processes of negotiation. 
While this process continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult 
and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.268 
 
The court is infusing a Constitutional duty of honourable conduct in the ongoing 
negotiation process of Constitutional rights recognition. The duty of consultation is one 
part of the honour of the Crown; it determines the scope of the duty and corresponding 
Crown honour. Canada is still very much in the grips of colonialism, and has not reached 
a point where it can be said to be a post-colonial state. Can a standard of honourable 
conduct of the Canadian government be capable of extricating itself from its foundational 
values? 
 
Within the honour of the Crown there are priorities and competing interests that 
conflict with the judicially created definition of Crown honour. The Crown has certain 
values and goals that are internal core 'laws' within itself. Two opposite and competing 
                                                 
268 Ibid at para 25. 
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goals collide when the honour of the Crown protects and defends itself against competing 
claims of Indigenous interests such as claims to underlying title. The  Crown’s  own  self  
interest will have priority over competing Indigenous claims. As such, the Crown will 
work naturally to preserve itself and its interests as a matter of survival and allegiance to 
itself. Its a trap of double speak to demand Crown honour. The present and historical 
injustices between the Crown and Indigenous people provide the salient example of 
Crown honour in operation. 
 
 
3.3 THE HONOUR OF THE CROWN AND THE TREATY ORDER 
 
The jurisprudence on the honour of the Crown and Indigenous treaty rights needs 
to embody the highest standard and protection possible to give content to the promises 
guaranteed to the Indigenous rights holders by the Crown. The treaties are Constitutional, 
sacred and inviolable covenants. They were signed so that the Treaty nations could retain 
their inherent sovereignty, their legal orders and their livelihood as Indigenous people 
forever. The Canadian government and the Canadian courts have used a number of 
theoretical arguments to undermine Treaty orders and sovereignty and to repudiate the 
spirit and intent of the Treaties. The breaches of Treaty obligations by the Crown began 
immediately by failing to implement the written terms of Treaty through the exclusion of 
the oral promises in the negotiation and consultations, creating a threat to proper 
interpretation of the agreements on which Canada has been founded. The Crown's pledge 
of honour failed to include the performance and implementation of Treaty. Even those 
promises expressly included in the written texts have been abrogated and narrowly 
construed. The basic and fundamental Indigenous right to hunt and fish as been 
increasingly restricted through legislation; clauses such as the medicine chest have been 
narrowly interpreted resulting in woefully inadequate treatment for Treaty beneficiaries; 
and promised education and housing provision has not been fully implemented leaving 
Indigenous treaty holders situated far below standards of other Canadians. 
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As treaty is an exchange of solemn promises between the Crown and Indigenous 
people, all of the treaty terms bind and govern the rights and responsibilities of the 
parties. Treaties are agreements between sovereigns; they supersede Canadian domestic 
laws, customs and conventions within which the Canadian government exercises its 
powers. Indigenous sovereignty is equal to the Crown's asserted sovereignty. As a branch 
of the Crown, the courts are expected to be impartial, independent and be capable of 
extricating itself of bias and prejudice that originates in the English language and the 
Eurocentric world view from which they originate. The Indigenous sovereigns expected 
the courts to be the guardians of Treaty and not allow Parliament to divest itself of its 
Treaty obligations to the Indigenous Treaty rights holders. Full compliance with the 
Treaties invokes the honour of the Crown; no government could act honourably and 
decline  to  uphold  the  Crown’s  solemn  promises.269 
 
The honour of the Crown involves a Constitutional duty to interpret and protect 
Treaty Rights. It provides positive rights on the Crown in Canadian federalism to respect 
the sovereignty of Indigenous Treaty nations and to consider always the treaty guarantee 
of collective survival, the enrichment of life and the future survival of the Treaty 
nations.270 The Indigenous Treaty nations were guaranteed a continuation of their way of 
life, this above all was a central concern, that they would be able to maintain their 
livelihood as autonomous people. Any federal law or policy that fails or failed to 
implement the treaties and reduced treaty nations to poverty or marginalization is and 
must be viewed as a breach of the honour of the Crown.271  
 
As stated throughout this thesis, Indigenous Nations had preexisting sovereignty 
that has been affirmed through the Treaties and Imperial law which protects their 
continued existence. Constitutional law together with Treaty rights informs the doctrine 
of the honour of the Crown. 272 Treaties are legally binding273 and   the  Crown’s  honour  
                                                 
269 Henderson, “Animating  the  Honour  of  the  Crown”, supra note 236 at 9. 
270 Ibid at 14. 
271 Ibid Mikisew supra note 5 at para 47-50. 
272 Ibid at 4. 
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requires the judiciary to assume that the Crown intended to fulfill its promises.274 The 
court has stated that the honour of the Crown is always involved in its dealings with 
aboriginal people, from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claim and treaty 
making and treaty interpretation.275 
 
The honour of the Crown is bound by a set of principles of treaty interpretation 
and the Courts are required to interpret the treaties in a manner that maintains the honour 
of the Crown.276. Treaties constitute a unique type of agreement and attract special 
principles of interpretation.277 Treaties should be given a large liberal construction and 
any ambiguities or doubtful expressions should be resolved in favour of the Indians.278 
The words of the treaty must be construed in the sense which they would naturally have 
been understood by the parties at the time and technical or contractual interpretation 
should be avoided. 279 The common law goal of treaty interpretation is to choose amongst 
the common intentions of the parties that best reconciles the interests and in doing so, the 
integrity and honour of the Crown is presumed.280 The honour of the Crown demands that 
the treaty terms be interpreted in a flexible way that is sensitive to the evolution of 
changes in normal practice.281 No appearance of sharp dealing will be tolerated.282 Nor 
can the Crown take and impoverished view of their lawful obligations.283 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
273 Taylor and Williams, supra note 166, Badger, supra note 9 at para 41, 47, Sioui, supra 29 note 
at 1044, Simon, supra 141 note at 401 and 410. 
274 Badger, supra note 9 at para 47, Taku River, supra note 4 at para 24. 
275 Haida, supra note 3 at para 19. 
276 Taylor and Williams, supra note 166 at 123. 
277 Sundown, supra note 138 at para 24, Badger, supra note 9 at para 78, Sioui, supra note 29 at 
para 1043, Simon supra note 141 at para 404. 
278 Simon, supra note 141 at para 402, Sioui, supra note 29 at para 1035, Badger, supra note 9 at 
para 52. 
279 Badger, supra note 9 at para 52-54, Nowegijick, supra note 244 at para 36. 
280 Sioui, supra note 29 at 1068-1069, Badger, ibid, at para 41. 
281 Marshall, supra note 9 at para 53, citing Simon, supra note 141 at 402. 
282 Haida, supra note 3 at para 19, Marshall, supra note 9 at para 49, Badger, supra note 9 at para 
41. 
283 Taku, supra note 4 at para 24, where the court held that the Crown submissions were 
‘impoverished’  when  it  asserted  it  owed  merely  a  common  law  duty  of  fair  dealing to the Indians 
whose claims may be affected by government decisions, and a duty to consult arises only after the 
rights have been proven, Haida, supra note 3 at para 28-34. 
 74 
Implementing the treaty within the character of the honour of the Crown ensures 
that the intended Treaty promises will be effectively implemented by Crown. The treaties 
created implementation obligations on both the Crown and Indigenous Nations in 
International law and British law.284 They require the administrators and courts to assume 
that the British Crown, its agents and the Indigenous Treaty Nations intended to fully 
comply with each promise, obligation, or right laid out in the Treaty negotiations and 
English Text.285 The Indigenous treaty nations have been the only party to honour their 
part of the bargain. The honour of the Crown is required to act in the strictest sense.  
 
Treaty-making attaches with it a Constitutional and fiduciary obligation for 
Canada to act as a trustee, representing an institution of the government. As such, there 
needs to be an constitutional change and understanding that the Treaty Constitutional 
order is of the same strength as the Canadian Constitutional order. The ability for the 
Crown to infringe upon Treaty rights is a violation and offence to the consensual treaty 
relationship. There is no legislative authority found in the Treaties and Treaty Indigenous 
people did not agree to be legislated over. In fact, Treaties are equal in strength as the 
legislative power. According to Indigenous law, Parliament cannot unilaterally effect a 
Treaty without the consent of the signatory Indigenous Treaty First Nations. The doctrine 
of the honour of the Crown exists to prevent infringements and encroachments on Treaty 
rights. The doctrine should operate to reject governmental regulatory schemes that are 
contrary to Treaty rights.286 
 
The honour of the Crown is a constitutional, legal, moral and political obligation. 
The Crown’s honour does not change with the political powers of the day. The Treaty 
Indigenous people are entitled to trust that their rights, as beneficiaries, will be 
implemented. Reparations for past injustices or treaty violations are due. The honour of 
the Crown doctrine ought to create the constitutional remedy of Treaty restitution, which 
                                                 
284 Henderson,  “Animating  the  Honour  of  the  Crown”,  supra note 236 at 27. 
285 Ibid at 13. 
286 Mikisew, supra note 5 at para 1 and Marshall, supra note 9 at para 63. 
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authorizes the provision of necessary services and to restore the damages of past colonial 
policies and paternalistic law to prevent further infringements of Treaty rights.287 
 
That said, the precept of the honour of the Crown is rendered meaningless without 
a commitment to enforce its application and practice. The existence of s. 35(1) is a 
Constitutional obligation to ensure that the Crown lives up to its historical and legal 
obligations. The honour of the Crown requires an immediate reversal in the current 
approach the Federal Government has taken in resolving its lawful, yet outstanding 
obligations. The current approach is to stall and delay resolution of claims, forcing 
protracted negotiation and lengthy court battles. Evidence of that approach can be found 
in the number of cases where the Supreme Court has chastised government for 
undermining the relationship. Joint commitments by the Crown reflect this attitude as in 
the 1998 Report of the Joint First Nations- Canada Task Force on Specific Claims Policy 
Reform which recommended a variety of means to reduce delays in resolving specific 
claims. The Federal government, a partner in developing the report, choose not to 
implement any of its recommendations. As well, the Report on the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal People has provided a comprehensive roadmap for government in a five-
volume, 4,000-page report, with 440 recommendations calling for sweeping changes to 
the relationship. Yet again, none of recommendations were implemented by the Federal 
Government. The failure to make meaningful change and to provide what is owed 
through Treaty and outstanding claims, only increases the financial and human costs to 
the Indigenous nations. By continuing these failed processes, the Crown forces litigation. 
This inherently unfair as Indigenous Nations often do not have the depth of resources to 
continue a protracted legal battle. As well, delays keep necessary funds out of a 
community, forcing capitulation due to need. There is no long-term financial saving in 
this strategy as the costs of the maintaining communities in poverty greatly outweighs the 
short-term benefit to the Crown of not meeting its legal and constitutional obligations 
immediately. That is not honourable. 
 
 
                                                 
287 Henderson,  “Animating the Honour of the Crown”,  supra note 236 at 17. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
For Treaty implementation to be truly effective, Canada and its institutions need 
to revisit Indigenous legal orders and sovereignty by giving substantial importance to 
their existence rather than piece meal acknowledgements without any substance. This 
would require implementing a shared Constitutional order which better reflects the 
realities of Constitutional supremacy. It requires a formal recognition of the reserved 
inherent Indigenous sovereignty in the treaties.  
 
It  is  the  Crown’s  constitutional  obligation  to  advance  Treaty implementation. As 
well, as an interpretive principle of the Constitution in s. 52, the honour of the Crown 
obligates governments and courts to conduct itself in accordance with the rule of law and 
Constitutional supremacy in all its dealings with treaty nations. On the basis of the 
honour of the Crown, it is critical for the Crown to consult with treaty beneficiaries to 
implement the treaty promises. Treaty promises must be implemented without delay. The 
Crown must act in accordance with the honour of the Crown when engaging in the 
ongoing process of implementation treaty rights in Canada's constitution. 
 
The government of Canada is responsible for upholding the honour of the Crown 
in their relationships with Treaty nations. Their obligation to uphold the honour of the 
Crown includes a fiduciary obligation or a mere responsibility to consult and possibly 
accommodate Treaty nations when their treaty rights have been negatively impacted. 
Upholding the honour of the Crown is required to manage the treaty relationship between 
Indigenous nations and the Crown.  
 
In the spirit of Treaty implementation and managing the Treaty relationship, the 
Crown must work to rebuild trust with Treaty beneficiaries. Recognition of Treaty 
federalism will create government to government relations to ensure that Treaty First 
Nations are no longer excluded and ensure that their rights and interests are fully 
respected and protected. Through the concept of the honour of the Crown and treaty 
implementation, there is an opportunity to alter the course of Indigenous Crown relations. 
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Canada can change the future by distancing itself from colonial and assimilative polices 
that have brought the original people to a nation of marginalization and extreme poverty. 
The term reconciliation is imbued with respect for rights and can forge a new relationship 
properly marked by nation-to-nation relations in confederation. 
 
The enshrining of Aboriginal rights in the Constitution was meant to prevent 
Federal, Provincial governments and even the judiciary from disregarding Treaty rights 
or their underlying principles. The protection offered by the Constitution was 
implemented not to make government or the courts’ jobs easier, but to make them more 
just.288 There is no honour in Canada denying and opposing the Indigenous rights and 
Treaty promises made to the Indigenous people. The Government of Canada spares no 
expense in denying their legal obligations of treaties, yet will   vigorously   argue   ‘their’  
treaty right to take up land. Consequently, Aboriginal governments continue to be nations 
on the defensive and as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples firmly concluded, 
“A   nation   on   the   defence   does   not   make   for   good   governance”   289 much less for 
honourable governance. 
                                                 
288 Henderson,  “Animating  the  Honour  of  the  Crown”,  supra note 236. 
289 See RCAP Final Report Vol. 1, supra note 42. 
 CHAPTER 4 
THE  CROWN’S  CONSTITUTIONAL  DUTY  OF  CONSULTATION  TO  TREATY  
RIGHTS HOLDERS 
 
"Government and developers come to our communities and they tell us: "We're going to 
build a house." They tell us precisely where the house will be located, the design of the 
house, when it will be built, who will build it and who will live in it. Consultation occurs 
only when they ask us: "What colour would you like the house to be?" That's it. We are 
not asked if we want the house built, or what its design should be, merely what colour the 
house should be. Consultation, as it currently occurs, is mere rhetoric and window 
dressing." 
       Grand Chief Stewart Phillip290 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
When Governmental action affects the holders of Treaty rights, the duty to 
consult with the people affected ought to be axiomatic, a natural consequence given the 
nature of the rights at stake. However, a century of legislation and decades of 
jurisprudence have demonstrated that unilateral Governmental action has continued 
seemingly unabated. Treaty nations have persistently faced a lack of inclusion in 
processes and decisions that infringed their inherent and Treaty rights. Consultation, if it 
occurred, was regarded as procedural, at best.  
 
This chapter   will   canvass   the   historical   neglect   of   the   Crown’s   duty   to   consult   with  
holders of Treaty Rights to demonstrate that the requirement by the courts to hold 
governments accountable to consult has, for a number of years, been ignored. The failure 
to consult resulting in unilateral legislation over Treaty First Nation people in the Indian 
Act and 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreement. Both of these laws remain 
pervasive obstacles for Treaty Nations. Next, the chapter will examine the legal duty of 
                                                 
290 Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, President, Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, presentation to the 
"Consultation with First Nations: New Law and New Practices" conference, Pacific Law and 
Business Institute (2002). 
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consultation in Treaty rights cases which began with the Aboriginal rights and title 
cases.291  
The duty to consult can be seen as judicial victory for First Nations people in the 
defence of their rights. It can also be seen an opportunity for reconciliation between the 
Crown and First Nations. At the same time however, the duty to consult reveals a 
continuation of Crown colonial authority premised upon a common law Aboriginal and 
Treaty rights paradigm that denies Indigenous legal and treaty orders, denies Indigenous 
sovereignty and fails to fully recognize Treaty rights. Examination of the legal duty to 
consult shows the breaches of the consensual Treaty relationship and fails to accord with 
International standards on the Rights of Indigenous people. Most importantly, 
consultation with Treaty rights holders should properly occur through Constitutional 
dialogue in Constitutional conferences which reflect the informed consent of the Treaty 
signatories.  
 
4.1  THE CROWN'S FAILURE TO CONSULT TREATY RIGHTS HOLDERS 
 
Historical unilateral royal land grants, legislation, regulations and agreements 
have fundamentally affected Treaty First Nation people in Canada. In 1670, King Charles 
II, by Letters Patent, granted 1.5 million square miles of land, known as Rupert's Land292 
to the Hudson Bay Company, who in 1868, transferred their interests back to the 
Dominion of Canada, without the consultation or consent of the Treaty people in that 
area.293 It is noted in the negotiations of Treaty 4, that for the first four and one-half days 
of preliminary discussions, the negotiators for the Saulteaux nation refused to engage in 
                                                 
291 Guerin, supra note 2, Sparrow, supra note 178, Delgamuukw, supra note 39. 
292 Rupert's Land, Canadian territory held (1670–1869) by the Hudson's Bay Company, named for 
Prince Rupert, first governor of the company. Under the charter granted (1670) to the company 
by Charles II, the region comprised the drainage basin of Hudson Bay. The area embraced what is 
today the provinces of Ontario and Quebec North of the Laurentians and West of Labrador; all of 
Manitoba; most of Saskatchewan; the southern half of Alberta; the eastern part of Nunavut 
Territory; and portions of Minnesota and North Dakota in the United States. In 1870 the Hudson's 
Bay Company transferred Rupert's Land to Canada for 300,000 pounds sterling but retained 
certain blocks of land for trading and other purposes. 
<http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0842686.html#ixzz1lp1ZTJ4V> 
293 Order  of  Her  Majesty  in  Council  admitting  Rupert’s  Land and North West Territory into 
Union, 1870 [UK] RSC 1985 Appendix II, No 9. 
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substantive negotiations because they were upset that land, which was their territory, was 
“sold”  to  the  Dominion  of  Canada  without  their  consent. Saulteaux negotiator "Gambler" 
articulated their concern, 
  
 …  The  company  have  stolen  our   land.   I  heard   that  at   first.   I  hear   it   is   true.  The  
Queen’s  messengers  never  came  here...  the  Company  have  no  right  to  this  earth ... 
The Indians were not told of the reserves at all. I hear now, it was the Queen gave 
the land (to the HBC). ... The Indians did not know when the land was given [to 
the company].294 
 
In 1876, while the Victorian treaties were being negotiated by Treaty Commissioners of 
the Queen, unilateral federal legislation was being enacted. Instead of implementing 
Treaties, the legislation created colonial laws. The Treaty only provided for certain 
regulation on reserves, but not in the ceded territory. The British agenda focused on 
expansion and the dispossession of the land from Indigenous people and that agenda has 
continued with the Crown’s  failure to recognize Indigenous legal orders and the  Crown’s  
failure to implement the sacred treaties.  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Federal Crown, under the provisions of s. 
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 295 failed to consult with the Indigenous nations 
when it enacted unilateral and damaging federal legislation in the Indian Act.296 The 
Indian Act was built on the disgraceful premise of Aboriginal inferiority, aimed at 
assimilation through the destruction of the Aboriginal culture. It usurped traditional 
Indigenous legal orders and structures and laws and enforced colonial law and ideals. 
Paternalistic, the Indian Act sought to control every aspect of First Nations lives 
including membership, banning of religious ceremonies, and strict control of the land and 
                                                 
294 Office of the Treaty Commissioner, "Statement of Treaty Issues", Chapter 2.7.1., The Prairie 
Treaties of Saskatchewan - Treaties 4, 5 and 6. The oral history of Treaty 4 First Nations in 
Saskatchewan is consistent on two points regarding the status of land ownership: the land was to 
be shared; and the newcomers had only a limited right to use that shared land. 
295 The Constitution Act, 1867. 
296 Canada, Indian Act (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989).  
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resources.297 The Indian Act defined an Indian as not a person.298 The powerful 
assimilative objective was made clear to Parliament by the Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs, Duncan Campbell Scott, when he stated, "Our objective is to continue until there 
is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been adsorbed into the body politic and there 
is no Indian question, and no Indian department."299  
 
The Indian Act is a result of a failure to implement Treaty coupled with mistaken 
colonial assertion of sovereignty over Indigenous people. There was no authorization 
through any Treaty or British statute for the Provincial or federal governments of Canada 
to enact a legislative code over Treaty First Nations. Neither federal nor, later, Provincial 
legislative authority over Indians was agreed to in Treaty. The Indian Act should have 
rightly been the statutory form of Treaty implementation under s. 91(24) and s. 132, but 
instead was used as a comprehensive and damaging legislative tool over Indians. 
Canada’s   Parliament,   under   the   pretext   of   parliamentary   sovereignty   began   to   legislate  
over Indians on matters not delegated to it by the Treaties. This legislative power by the 
Crown was false and outside of its competence.300 The courts however, were not given 
                                                 
297 The devastating effects of Indian Act removed children from their homes under the guise of 
education. Free people were confined to the reserve and prohibited from leaving without a permit. 
Treaty Indian people lost their Indian status and benefits from Treaty if they became a lawyer, 
doctor, clergy, graduated from university or travelled abroad. Further, Treaty Indians were 
prohibited from making any claims against the Crown as the Indian Act made it illegal for monies 
to be raised or used for that purpose. Indigenous governments have been reduced to subordinate 
administrators to aid the federal government in administering reserves and have few 
responsibilities or abilities that are independent of federal oversight. Band governments can make 
a number of by-laws pertaining to traffic regulations, the establishment of dog pounds, noxious 
weed control, the regulation of bee-keeping and the maintenance of local infrastructure. Current 
band councils administer federal policies and programs such as health care, education and social 
services. The Federal Department of Aboriginal Affairs controls of all band funds including 
administrative and accountability requirements, the use of third party management protocols, and 
its ability to override election results. Indian Act Band councils are not true governments under 
the Indian Act. 
298 The Indian Act, SC 1876, c 18 s 12, An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting 
Indian, “The  term  person  means  an  individual  other  than  an  Indian,  unless  the  context  clearly  
requires  another  construction.” 
299 John, Leslie, Ron Maguire, eds., The Historical Development of the Indian Act, (Ottawa: 
Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Department of 
Indian and Northern Affairs, 1979) at 114. 
300 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 276. 
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authority to question any federal enactment only whether the enactment was in its proper 
Constitutional authority.301  
 
The Indian Act ignored the imperial relationship between the First Nations, the 
Crown and the government of Canada and ignored the Treaty obligations. The federal 
government became focused on the civilization and assimilation of Treaty First Nation 
people.302 The Indian Act was unilateral, enacted without the consent of Treaty First 
Nations and and neglected the sacred Treaty agreements. The Indian Act inconsistently 
applies power over Treaty First Nations across the land without regard to the specific 
Treaty terms each had signed and consented to. The Minister of Indian Affairs asserted 
power  over  every  Treaty  First  Nations  person’s  life  with  complete  and  total  ownership  of  
all land.  
 
The Indian Act created devastating economic barriers preventing First Nations 
from taking advantage of the benefits of their own land and inherent and Treaty rights. 
Within the Indian Act there are no provisions for Indigenous Treaty land tenure. 
Agriculture, lumber, mining and any natural resources were strictly controlled under this 
law with the underlying title belonging to the Crown. The Indian Act represents the 
purest form of colonial law and controls First Nation land tenure, property and economic 
initiatives according to Eurocentric values.303 The Indian Act has been widely recognized 
by Canadian courts and international forums as violating human rights, yet continues to 
be in force. Treaty First Nations assert that the passing of any colonial legislation 
affecting their rights, such as the Indian Act, is in direct violation of the Treaty 
                                                 
301 Ibid, citing Ontario (AG) v Canada (AG), [1912] AC 571 at 583 (PC) and British Railways 
Board v Pickin, [1974) AC 765 (H.L.) where courts lacked jurisdiction to consider whether 
statutes have been procured by fraud.  
302 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 277. 
303 Through the Indian Act, First Nations economic development projects and their relation to the 
land is often absent First Nation visions, and decision-making  capacity  on  their  community’s  
priorities. Under the Indian Act title to reserve lands is held by the Crown. The Indian Act sets out 
the rules for managing First Nation land and focuses on the Federal Government role as central in 
dealings between the Indians and other parties. The Indian Act requires First Nation governments 
to surrender the land to the Federal Government in order for development to take place. Nowhere 
else in Canada do people have to give up their land in order to have a business or economic 
development initiative. 
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agreements. It was, and still is, a complete abrogation of the consensual partnership 
between respectful nations.  
 
Unilateral legislation and the historical neglect of Treaty First Nation rights 
continued as the Crown, in 1930, in accordance with s. 109 of the Constitution Act 
1867304 transferred responsibility for public lands and resources to the four western 
prairie Provinces through the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA).305 At the 
expense of the Treaty nations, the NRTA provided the new western Provinces with 
ownership and administration over the lands, minerals and other natural resources. 
However, this transfer was subject to existing trusts. The NRTA transfer occurred without 
the involvement or the consent of the Indian signatories of the treaties in those respective 
provinces. The Supreme Court in Horseman306 and Badger 307 examined the effect of the 
NRTA on Treaty Rights and held that the NRTA effected a unilateral change to Treaty 8 
by extinguishing the right to hunt commercially but preserving only the right to hunt for 
food. The court  based   its  decision  on  a   literal   interpretation  of   the  words  “for   food”   in  
paragraph 12 of the NRTA which states:  
  
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of 
game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws 
respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the 
Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians 
shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, 
trapping and fishing for food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown 
lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians may have a right of 
access.308 
 
The court in Badger remarked that the federal government was empowered to enact the 
NRTA unilaterally, although it was unlikely that it would proceed in a unilateral manner 
                                                 
304 The Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 45. s. 109 states that ownership of the land and natural 
resources located in a province at union belongs to the Crown in right of the province. 
305 The Natural Resources Transfer Agreement in Constitution Act, 1930 (UK) 20-21 Geo V c 26, 
reprinted in RSC 1985, App II No 25 [NRTA]. 
306 R v Horseman [1990] 1 SCR 901, [1990] 3 CNLR 95. 
307 Badger, supra note 9. 
308 NRTA supra note 305 at para 12 . 
 84 
today.309 In   the   Court’s   view,   this   reduction   of   the   Treaty right to hunt was 
counterbalanced by an expansion of the geographical area in which the Indians could 
hunt for food.310 The effects of the unilateral transfer of resources and infringement of 
Treaty rights continue to impede Treaty First Nation people in the exercise of their rights. 
In Saskatchewan, the transfer of Crown lands, minerals and natural resources to the 
Province, coupled with the failure of the Province to set aside adequate lands with 
minerals in the fulfillment of Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) and the failure to give 
priority to Treaty nations in the granting of Crown mineral dispositions, violates the 
Treaty agreements and the TLE Framework Agreement, so recently signed.311 The NRTA 
continues to deeply affect the treaty relationship existing between the Provinces, Canada 
and Treaty rights holders.  
 
4.2  THE JUDICIAL GENISIS OF CONSULTATION 
 
The common law Aboriginal and Treaty rights paradigm is a result of the 
Crown’s failure to implement the sacred inviolable Treaties and to recognize the legal 
and Constitutional orders of the Indigenous Nations. Each common law decision can be 
traced back to these systemic failures and has resulted in a very slow, incremental and 
painful drawing out of only some of the inherent and Treaty rights with the duty to 
                                                 
309 Badger, supra note 9 at para 72, 84, Cory J. stated, The NRTA only modifies the Treaty 8 
rights. Treaty represents a solemn promise of the Crown. For the reasons set out earlier, it can 
only be modified or altered to the extent that the NRTA clearly intended to modify or alter those 
rights. The Federal government, as it was empowered to do, unilaterally enacted the NRTA. It is 
unlikely that it would proceed in that manner today. The manner in which the NRTA was 
unilaterally enacted strengthens the conclusion that the right to hunt which it provides should be 
construed in light of the provisions of Treaty 8.  
310 Mikisew, supra note 5 The Supreme Court of Canada in Mikisew rejects this argument. 
311 In 1992, Canada and Saskatchewan signed the Treaty Land Entitlement Framework 
Agreement, <http://www.publications.gov.sk.ca/details.cfm?p=1023>, and also signed An Act to 
Confirm and Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
Saskatchewan Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, ss 1993 c s-31.1 at 
<http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/documents/English/Statutes/Statutes/S31-1.pdf>, in order to address 
the provincial obligations undertaken in the TLE Framework Agreement. Treaty First Nations 
groups and Provincial Aboriginal organizations have long lamented the lack of consultation by 
Canada in the NRTA. Treaty Nations affected by the NRTA convened a Western Treaty Nations 
National Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA) National Summit, hosted by Manitoba 
Keewatin Okimakanak (MKO), the Treaty 8 First Nations of Alberta and the Prince Albert Grand 
Council (PAGC) in June 2011. 
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consult doctrine now acting as a conduit. The duty to consult doctrine has become a body 
of law mired in complexities and self- machinations. Courts, legal312 and academic 
scholars have begun the process of sorting through the contours of the legal duty to 
consult. 
 
 It has been heralded as a victory for First Nations in the protection of their rights 
as it has put a constraint   on   the   Crown’s   unilateral   approach   to   First   Nations. Yet, it 
continues the  Crown’s  complete  authority  over   Indigenous  people  and   their   rights. The 
genesis of the doctrine of the duty to consult and accommodate demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court of  Canada’s  jurisprudence  plays  a  central  role  in  the  continuation  of  the  
Crown's colonial authority premised upon an Aboriginal and Treaty rights paradigm that 
denies Indigenous sovereignty and fails to fully recognize the Treaty order and the legal 
and Constitutional rights of Treaty First Nations.  
 
This judicial genesis of the legal duty of consultation began not with Treaty rights 
matters but with a series of Aboriginal right and title decisions.313 Those decisions 
                                                 
312 See for a comprehensive review of the duty to consult, Newman, Dwight G. The Duty to 
Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples. Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2009; Other 
publications include; Kirk Lambrecht, “Aboriginal  Consultation,  Environmental  Assessment  and  
Regulatory  Review  in  Canada”,  University  of  Regina  Press,  2013;;  Maria  Morellato,  “The  
Crown’s  Constitutional  Duty  to  Consult  and  Accommodate  Aboriginal  and  Treaty  Rights,”  
National Centre for First Nations Governance Research Paper (2008); Heather Treacy, Tara L 
Campbell,  Jamie  Dickson,  “The  Current  State  of  the  Law  on  Crown  Obligations  to  Consult  and  
Accommodate  Aboriginal  Interests  in  Resource  Development”  (2007) 44 Alta L Rev 571; Keith 
Bergner,  “Consultation  Requirements  in  the  Post-Treaty  Context”,  Paper  presented  to  Insight  
Aboriginal  Law  Forum,  May  2006;;  Thomas  Isaac  &  Anthony  Knox,  “The  Crown’s  Duty  to  
Consult  Aboriginal  People”  (2003)  41  Alta  L  Rev  49;;  Patrick Macklem & Sonia Lawrence, 
“From  Consultation  to  Reconciliation:  Aboriginal  Rights  and  the  Crown’s  Duty  to  Consult  (2000)  
79 Can Bar Rev 252; 
 
313 Prior to the patriation of the Canadian Constitution, the Supreme Court in Guerin, supra note 
2, found that the Crown had violated its fiduciary duty to the band by failing to consult with them 
when they accepted a lesser lease and unilaterally changed the legal position of the band, without 
their knowledge or consent. Justice Dickson  stated  “In  obtaining,  without  consultation,  a  much  
less valuable lease than the promised, the Crown, breached the fiduciary obligation it owed the 
band.” Then in 1990, the Supreme Court in Sparrow, supra note 178 deliberated its first post 
1982 Aboriginal rights case to explore the content of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, where 
the court expressly limited Crown power and conduct by affirming a duty to consult with West 
Coast Salish asserting their inherent and constitutionally protected right to fish through a 
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recognized that interference with the rights of Aboriginal people required some form of 
consultation and provided the foundational principles. Eight years later, two Supreme 
Court cases on the duty to consult were released in Haida Nation v British Columbia 
(Minister of Forests)314 and Taku River Tlingit v. British Columbia (Project Assessment 
Director),315 delineating a constitutional duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal 
                                                                                                                                                 
justification test where the duty to consult is one factor to be considered when justifying an 
infringement on Aboriginal rights. In 1996 the Supreme Court further developed foundational 
principles on the duty to consult in their adjudication of the definition of an Aboriginal right in R 
v Van der Peet, supra note 47. Next in 1996, another Supreme Court decision constraining crown 
power and affirming the duty to consult regarding resources to which Aboriginal peoples make 
claim was made in Nikal, supra note 185, where Cory J. wrote: “So   long   as   every   reasonable  
effort is made to inform and to consult, such efforts would suffice to meet the justification 
requirement”.313 Similarly, the court in R v Gladstone, supra note 188, applied and modified the 
Sparrow justification test to the Heiltsuk Aboriginal right to harvest and sell herring spawn on 
kelp. The court held, "Questions relevant to the determination of whether the government has 
granted priority to aboriginal rights holders are those enumerated in Sparrow relating to 
consultation and compensation, as well as questions such as whether the government has 
accommodated the exercise of the Aboriginal right to participate in the fishery..." Then, in 1997 
the Supreme court in R v Delgamuukw, supra note 39, expanded the scope of the duty to consult 
with the introduction of a spectrum on consultation, the greater the impact of the rights, the 
greater the consultation and in some cases, consent would be required.  
314 Haida, supra note 3, At issue was the question of what duty, if any, does the government owe 
the Haida people and whether they are required to consult with them about decisions to harvest 
the forests and further, to accommodate their concerns before they have proven their title to land 
and their Aboriginal rights. In its ruling, the court found that  the  Haida’s  claim  to  title  to  the  area  
is strong. The Supreme Court provided several important principles on the duty to consult by 
holding that a claim of Aboriginal title to land exists even if not yet proven in court. “The 
government’s   duty   to   consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests is 
grounded in the honour of the Crown, which must be understood generously. While the asserted 
but unproven Aboriginal rights and title are insufficiently specific for the honour of the Crown to 
mandate that the Crown act as a fiduciary, the Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run 
roughshod over Aboriginal interests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously 
pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof. The foundation  of  the  duty  in  the  Crown’s  
honour and the goal of reconciliation suggest that the duty arises when the Crown has knowledge, 
real or constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates 
conduct that might adversely affect it. The court held that consultation and accommodation before 
final claims resolution preserve the Aboriginal interest and is an essential corollary to the 
honourable process of reconciliation that s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, demands. any 
consultation process. It held, "..pending settlement, the Crown is bound by its honour of tie 
response to Aboriginal concerns.” 
315 Taku River, supra note 4, Tlingit First Nation (TRTFN) opposed the effects of a proposal to 
reopen the Tulsequah Chief mine by building an industrial highway through the heart of the 
Tlingit’s’  traditional  territory. The Taku River First Nation participated in a environmental 
assessment process but disagreed with the recommendation report and sought to quash the 
approval of the project. The court found that the First Nations role in the environmental 
assessment was sufficient to uphold the Provinces honour and met the requirements of the duty. 
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rights holders.316 Theses   decisions   were   in   the   context   of   “asserted   but   unproven”  
Aboriginal right claims confirming the Crown’s   duty   when   it   has   knowledge,   real   or  
constructive of the potential existence of and Aboriginal right or title and contemplates 
conduct that may adversely affect it. The broad principles in both cases informs the 
jurisprudence on the duty to consult Aboriginal right claims and are also used in the 
Treaty rights context.  
  
4.3 THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S FRAMEWORK ON THE DUTY 
TO CONSULT TREATY RIGHTS HOLDERS  
 
The focus of this thesis is on the numbered Treaties which differ greatly from the 
modern Treaties. Modern Treaties exercise governance over lands and resources 
including planning, approvals and controls. They also address consultation requirements 
in the details of the agreements. The Supreme Court has considered consultation 
requirements under modern treaties in Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation 
                                                                                                                                                 
By participating in the environmental review process which included measures to address its 
concerns, the court held that the Province was not under a duty to reach an agreement with the 
Tlingit people and their failure to do so did not breach its obligations. The court expected that the 
process of permitting and development of a land use strategy, the Crown would fulfill its 
honourable obligations. The court rejected the Provinces 'impoverished vision of the honour of 
the Crown" by arguing before the determination of rights through litigation or conclusion of a 
treaty,  it  owes  only  a  common  law  “duty  of  fair  dealing.” The Taku court affirmed the principle 
that the honour of the Crown, prior to proof of asserted rights or title, to be given full effect in 
order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
316 The legal tests and principles expounded by the Supreme Court on the duty to consult guide 
lower courts to make the same determinations. There exist several lower courts decisions in 
Canada which articulate the duty to consult Aboriginal rights holders that spans both the 1990's 
316, increasing after the 2005 Haida trilogy, through to 2010. R v Bones, [1990] BCJ No 2897 
dismissed on appeal, R v Bones, 1993 CanLII 936 (BCSC), R v Jack, [1995] BCJ No 2632 
(BCCA), Halfway River First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), (1999) 64 BCLR 
(3d) 206 (BCCA), Musqueam Indian Band v British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource 
Management), 2005 BCCA 128, Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, [2006] BCCA 2, R v 
Douglas, [2006] BCSC 284, Hupacasath First Nation v B.C.(Minister of Forest), [2005] BCJ No. 
2653, Hupacasath First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2006] 1 CNLR 22 
(BCSC), Native Council of Nova Scotia v Attorney General of Canada, [2006] 2 CNLR 103 (FC), 
R v Douglas, [2006] 2 CNLR 140 (BCSC), R v Douglas, [2007] 3 CNLR 277 (BCCA), R v Kapp, 
CA 277, Kruger v Betsiamites First Nation [2006] QCCA 567, Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada 
(Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [2007] 4 CNLR 1 (FC), Tsilhqot'in Nation v British 
Columbia, [2008] 1 CNLR 112 (BCSC), Standing Buffalo First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 
2009 FCA 308 (CanLII),  
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317 and Quebec (Attorney General) v Moses, 318. In Beckman v. Little Salmon Carmacks 
the  court  noted,  “Where  adequately  resourced  and  professionally  represented  parties  have  
sought to order their own affairs, and have given shape to the duty to consult by 
incorporating consultation procedures into a treaty, their efforts should be encouraged 
and, subject to such constitutional limitations as the honour of the Crown, the court 
should strive to respect   their   handiwork.”319 The numbered Treaties, by contrast, must 
rely on the interpretation provided by the courts and cover the majority of the land mass 
in Canada. This  thesis  traces  the  court’s  path  in  the  litigation  of  the  Treaty  8  people  of  the  
Mikisew Cree Nation. 
 
  The   duty   to   consult’s   relationship to Treaty rights was extended through the 
Supreme  Court’s  decision   in  Mikisew Cree First Nation v The Minister of Heritage. 320 
The approach taken by the court parallels the jurisprudential treatment of Aboriginal 
rights in the justification test used to infringe Aboriginal rights which was applied, 
unmodified, to Treaty rights in Badger.321 There the court acknowledged the difference 
between Aboriginal and Treaty Rights but stated although Treaty rights are the result of 
mutual agreement, they, like Aboriginal rights, may be unilaterally abridged. That 
decision remained consistent in Cote322 where the court held that the justified 
infringement test applies with the same force and the same considerations to both species 
of Constitutional rights. Treaty First Nation people view infringement capability as a 
fundamental breach of the consensual foundation of the Constitutional obligations in 
Treaty. 
 
                                                 
317 Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 [Little Salmon} 
318 Quebec (Attorney General) v Moses 2010 SCC 17, [2010] 1 SCR 557. 
319 Little Salmon, supra note  at  para  54.  The  Court  stated  at  para  46,  “the  parties  themselves  may  
decide therein to exclude consultation altogether in defined situations and the decision to do so 
would be upheld by the courts where this outcome would be consistent with the maintenance of 
the  honour  of  the  Crown.” 
320 Mikisew Cree First Nation v The Minister of Heritage [2001], 214 FCT 1426, 214 FTR 48 at 
para 4. [Mikisew FCT] 
321 Badger, supra note 9 at 771. 
322 Cote, supra note 179. 
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The Mikisew Cree Nation is a signatory to Treaty 8 who sought a judicial review 
of a Parks Canada decision, pursuant to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act to 
expropriate land by building a winter ice road through their traditional territory, a 
decision which they foresaw would have had an injurious effect on their traditional 
lifestyle of hunting, trapping and fishing. Parks Canada provided the Mikisew Cree First 
Nation with a standard informational package and invited them to a public open house 
but did not directly engage in consultations about the road or its subsequent realignment. 
The Mikisew asserted the Crown breached its Constitutional and fiduciary duty under 
Treaty   8   to   consult   with   them   about   the   extent   of   the   road’s   impact   on   their   Treaty  
harvesting rights. The Mikisew were successful at trial but an appeal to the Federal Court 
ruled the Crown had no duty to consultation. Then the Supreme Court provided a 
definitive ruling on the application of the Crown’s  duty to consult Treaty right holders.  
 
4.3.1 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. The Minister of Heritage - Federal Court Trial 
Division 
 
The Federal Court Trial Division found the open houses and public notices were 
insufficient given the  nature  and  scope  of  the  impact  the  road  would  have  on  the  Cree’s  
harvesting rights. An injunction against the ice road was issued. The Federal Court found 
that the Mikisew were entitled to a distinct process as the right at risk was a 
Constitutional one.323 The Crown set forward several arguments including that the Treaty 
rights of the Mikisew were extinguished when the Park was created or by statute; all 
levels of the court rejected both of these extinguishment arguments.324 After trial, the 
Federal Court found that the proposed winter road would create a geographical limitation 
which would have a injurious effect on the exercise of the Treaty-protected hunting 
rights. Justice   Hansen   held   that   the   court’s   duty   was   not   to   reconcile   existing   Treaty 
rights by accommodating non-aboriginal interests, rather it is one of the responsibilities 
                                                 
323 Mikisew FCT, supra note 320 para 170-171, Hansen J.,  determined  that,  …the  Cree  did  not  
breach their reciprocal obligation by refusing to participate in the open houses and public 
comment because what is at stake was a constitutionally protected Treaty right. The First Nation 
was more than just a stakeholder, at the very least, Mikisew is entitled to a distinct process if not 
a more extensive one. 
324 Ibid. 
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and obligations of the Crown toward Treaty First Nation people.325 It held that the social 
and economic interests of those who would benefit from the road were not a compelling 
and  substantial   enough  objective   to  curtail   the  Cree’s   right   to  hunt  and   trap. Therefore, 
the Court held, the Crown failed to justify the infringement.326 
 
Justice  Hansen  noted  that  with  Treaty  rights   the  court’s   role in s. 35 was Treaty 
implementation rather than Constitutional reconciliation. She noted that the court in 
Marshall did not demand the reconciliation of Treaty rights as the main purpose of s. 35, 
nor to focus on the economic interests of non-aboriginals Instead, the court focused on 
the responsibility of the Crown to Treaty First Nations. The Federal Court held that the 
social and economic interests of others through an ‘enhanced   regional   transportation  
network’,   (the  winter   road)  was   not   a   compelling   and   substantial   objective   that  would  
justify  weakening  the  Mikisew’s  treaty  right   to  hunt  and  trap.327 As the compelling and 
substantial legislative objective failed, the Federal Court did not need to decide whether 
the Crown’s actions were consistent with their fiduciary duty but answered the question 
to be sure. The court reviewed the actions of the parties including the communications.  
 
In reviewing the communications, Justice Hansen determined despite emails, 
meetings, phone calls and open houses attended by two trappers, it was insufficient. The 
court held that the onus of proof on the consultation engaged is with the Crown, not the 
Indians.328 The Treaty First Nation did not have to prove that the government did not 
adequately consult with them. It did find that consultation is reciprocal, a two way street 
in which the Aboriginal group cannot remain complicit.329 The court was careful to point 
out the participation does not mean   ‘informed   consent’,   nor   did   it   give   the   Treaty  
beneficiaries veto over the proposed action. However, they cannot frustrate, refuse, 
impose demands and then complain about the efforts of consultation.  
 
                                                 
325 Ibid at para 120-122. 
326 Ibid at para 122. 
327 Ibid at para 120-122. 
328 Ibid at para 157. 
329 Ibid. 
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The trial court in Mikisew held that the duty does not mean that whenever a 
government proposes to do anything in the Treaty 8 surrendered lands it must consult 
with all signatory First Nations, no matter how remote or unsubstantial the impact. But 
the duty to consult is triggered at a low threshold and adverse impact is a matter of degree 
as  is  the  Crown’s  duty.  In  this  case,  it  was  found  that  the  impacts  were  clear,  established  
and demonstrably adverse to the Treaty rights holders’ hunting and trapping rights.330 
The court held that the timing of the consultation is an indication of genuine consultation; 
the Mikisew Cree were not included in the early stages and decisions had been effectively 
made without their input.  
 
The Crown argued that the Mikisew Cree were provided meaningful opportunities 
to participate and relied on Halfway River v. British Columbia.331 However, the trial court 
held that line of authority was in tension with other cases which suggest that consultation 
must be conducted in good faith with the intention of substantially addressing the 
concerns of the First Nations.332 The court drew on Halfway River to demonstrate the 
content of the duty imposes a positive obligation to ensure that all information is 
provided in a timely manner for the Cree to express their concerns and have them taken 
                                                 
330 Ibid at para 55. 
331 Halfway River First Nation v BC [1999] BCJ No 1880 (CA) the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal found that the government breached its duty to consult when approving an application for 
a permit for logging on Crown land, adjacent to the Halfway River First Nation. The Halfway 
Nation people are descendants of the Beaver People who were signatories to Treaty 8 in 1900 and 
claimed the area under the Treaty wherein they practiced the traditional right to hunt. 
Additionally the Halfway Nation had an outstanding Treaty Land Entitlement Claim against the 
federal Crown that may have included lands recoverable in the area where the permit was 
granted. The Halfway River First Nation argued a unjustifiable infringement on their hunting 
rights under the Treaty and breach of administrative law duty of fairness in the application of 
government policy by the District Manager by failing to give adequate notice of his intention to 
decide the question, and failing to provide an adequate opportunity for the Halfway people to be 
heard. The government argued the Halfway First Nations right under Treaty 8 to hunt is subject to 
the Crown's right to "require", or "take up" lands from time to time for, among other purposes, 
"lumbering"; and that the issuance of permit did not breach or infringe the treaty rights to hunt. 
Alternatively, they argued that if the treaty right to hunt was breached, that breach was justified 
within the Sparrow test. The court concluded that the only lack of procedural fairness in the 
decision-making process of the District Manager was the failure to provide to the Halfway River 
First Nation an opportunity to be heard. The court also concluded that the issuance of the cutting 
permit infringed the Halfway River First Nations treaty right to hunt and that the Crown has 
failed to show that infringement was justified. 
332 Mikisew FCT, supra note 320 at para 151. 
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seriously and integrated into the proposed plan.333 Justice Hansen held that the Mikisew 
had not breached their reciprocal obligations or frustrated the process. She rejected the 
Crown’s   submission   that   the   Cree   were   treated   to   the   same   consultation   as   all   other 
stakeholders, on the basis that what was at stake for the Cree was the infringement of a 
constitutionally protected right. The Mikisew were, at the very least, entitled to a distinct 
process if not a more extensive one.334 The court held the fiduciary relationship and the 
Constitutional status demand priority.335  
 
The trial court in Mikisew looked at the timing of consultations as indicative of 
whether there was a genuine intention of addressing the First Nation concerns.336 In this 
case,  the  Mikisew’s  concerns were not addressed at the planning stage and they were not 
engaged until the decision had essentially been made, without the Treaty First Nation’s 
concerns in the process. The Federal Court found that the duty to consult intersects with 
other elements of the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown. In Sparrow, the Supreme Court 
emphasized the question of whether Crown had given adequate priority to the First 
Nations’ rights over other community interests.337 The court noted that if the consultation 
did not occur in that manner, that the Minister’s decision would have been challenged as 
the constitutional rights were not given adequate priority.338 
 
The court found there was not serious consultation with the Mikisew to ensure 
minimal impairment of their Treaty rights. Justice Hansen also found that there was an 
‘air  of  secrecy’  in  the  consultation  process  engaged  by  the  Crown  with  the  Mikisew. The 
importance of good faith negotiations includes transparent inquiries into the Mikisew 
concerns about the road and that the Indians might have knowledge that is not available 
                                                 
333 Ibid at para 131. 
334 Ibid at para 152- 153. 
335 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para 65,70, 81-83, wherein the SCC examined the question of 
whether the Indians food fishing interests were given priority over the interests of the general 
community. It held that the Indians were entitled to the distinct process given their constitutional 
status and the fiduciary relationship. 
336 Mikisew FCT, supra note 320 at para 154. 
337 Sparrow, supra note at para 65, 70. 
338 Mikisew FCT, supra note 320 at para 155. 
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to the Crown.339 The court noted that minimal impairment is not difficult to determine 
and could be achieved by asking the Mikisew a simple question of what would be the 
most favorable route in their opinion.340 Genuine efforts are required to ensure 
consultation reveals the impacts upon the Constitutional rights by the Treaty 
beneficiaries. The decision was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal.  
 
 
4.3.2 The Federal Court of Appeal 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal, however, set aside the trial court decision on the 
basis that the land taken for the winter road was properly seen as 'taking up' and that there 
was no legal duty to consult with the Mikisew although it would be good practice.341 
Justice Rothstein held that the taking up of land for the road was within the Treaty and 
not an infringement of the right. The court held that the park was vested in the 
government of Canada and that transportation was an implied purpose for which the land 
could be taken up.342 The majority reasoned that settlement, mining, lumbering and 
trading all necessarily imply access and transportation. In turn, access and transportation 
necessarily imply the construction of roads and therefore is another purpose for which 
land may be taken up. The court held that those lands taken up where provided in Treaty 
did not include s. 35(1) rights. It reasoned that s. 35 protected the right to hunt on land 
that is not required for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.343 
Consequently, it held that if there is no infringement, there is no duty to consult.  
 
The  court  stated   that  Alberta’s  argument  based   the   interpretation  of  Treaty  8  on 
principles of contract law. If one of the terms of the contract gives a party a unilateral 
right to take certain action, then the contract is not breached if that action is taken. A 
                                                 
339 Ibid, at para 174. 
340 Ibid at para 174. 
341 Mikisew Cree First Nation v The Minister of Heritage [2004] 3 FCR 436, 2004 FCA 66 at para 
24. The majority stated that the Minister was not obligated to consult under the taking up clause 
but it would have been good practice. However, the advisability and extent of such consultation 
was  within  the  Minister’s  discretion.   
342 Ibid at para 13. 
343 Ibid at para 14, 18, and 21.  
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literal reading of Treaty 8 gives the Crown the unilateral right to remove land 
permanently for settlement, lumbering, mining or other purposes. This argument would 
allow the Crown unfettered authority to take lands without a duty to consult, negotiate or 
even give advanced notice to the Mikisew.344 The Federal Court of Appeal held that 
taking up land is not an infringement unless it is taken up in bad faith or so much land has 
been taken up that there is no meaningful right to hunt remaining.345 In following Badger, 
the  court  held  the  Treaty  right  was  ‘suspended’  if  land  taken  up  is  used  for  a  purpose  that  
is visibly incompatible with the right. 346 The   court   held,   “as   the   approval of the road 
constituted  a  taking  up  within  the  meaning  of  Treaty  8,  the  Mikisew’s  treaty  right  to  hunt  
on the road corridor is suspended for as long as it is being used for a purpose visibly 
incompatible with hunting. There therefore has been no infringement of Treaty 8, as 
constitutionalized  by  s.  35,  that  requires  the  application  of  the  Sparrow  test.”347 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal did not concern itself with the Honour of the Crown 
and the consensual nature of the Treaties. It did not read that the taking up of land 
provision as being a discretionary, not a mandatory provision, temporarily from time to 
time and not permanent and comprehensive.348 The taking up provisions created a treaty 
tenure where the treaty right to harvest was still central and enduring.349  
 
The  minority  decision  however,  held  that  the  Crown’s  right  to  take  up  land  is  not  
absolute   and   unfettered   and   the   Minister’s   decision,   rather   than   the   legislation,  
constituted a violation of the treaty right.350 It relied on the majority decision in Badger 
which held that the Treaty First Nation were willing to accept settlement and other uses 
of the land that would restrict their right so long as sufficient unoccupied land remained 
to allow a continuation of their way of life.351 Again, the treaty order allowed for the 
                                                 
344 Ibid at para 120. 
345 Ibid at para 19. 
346 Badger, supra note 9 at para 23, the court held that hunting on land with a occupied farmhouse 
was incompatible and therefore the Treaty right did not extend to that area.  
347 Mikisew FCA, supra note 341 at para 23. 
348 Henderson, Treaty Rights, supra note 52 at 913. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Mikisew FCA, supra note 341 at 117.  
351 Badger, supra note 9 at para 54-58. 
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taking up of land from time to time, to be conditional on the continuation of the Treaty 
First Nation’s rights of harvesting and hunting. The dissent relied on Halfway River, 
where   the  court  held   that   the  Crown’s   right   to   take  up   land  under treaty is not stronger 
than   the   Treaty   Indian’s   rights   under   the   same   Treaty. It   held,   “Assuming,   without  
deciding,  that  the  Crown’s  right  to  take  up  land  has  constitutional  status,  that  right  cannot  
be stronger than any other constitutional power of the Crown, including the constitutional 
power that the Crown sought to exercise in Sparrow. In my view the fact that the Crown 
asserts its rights under Treaty 8 can place it in no better position vis a vis a competing or 
conflicting Aboriginal treaty right than the position the Crown enjoys in exercising the 
powers granted in either s. 91 or 92 of the Constitution Act, 1967.”352 This decision was 
appealed.  
 
 
4.3.3 The Supreme Court of Canada 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mikisew began with the 
historical context of Treaty 8 and the court’s   observation that the post Confederation 
numbered Treaties were designed to open the Canadian west to settlement and 
development. Treaty 8 guaranteed:  
 
And Her Majesty the Queen HEREBY AGREES with the said Indians that they 
shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing 
throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such 
regulations  as may from time to time be made by the Government of the 
country, acting under the authority of Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such 
tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, 
lumbering, trading or other purposes.353  
 
The court noted that from the outset there existed an 'uneasy tension' between First 
Nations’ expectation that they were as free to live off the land after Treaty as before, and 
                                                 
352 Mikisew FCA, supra note 341 at para 123, Halfway River, supra note 331 at para 129. 
353 Treaty 8, signed on June 21, 1899.  
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the Crown's expectation of increasing numbers of settlers moving into the surrendered 
territory. The court stated, "None of the parties in 1899 expected that Treaty 8 constituted 
a finished land use blueprint."354 Treaty 8 was meant to explain the relations that would 
govern future interactions and thus prevent any trouble. The court noted that the Treaty 
Commissioners who negotiated the Treaty, could therefore, express confidence to the 
First  Nations  that  “the  same  means  of  earning  a  livelihood  would  continue  after  treaty  as  
existed  before  it.”355 
 
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Binnie found that the language of the 
treaty could not be any clearer in expressly limiting the Treaty right to land not required 
or taken up, however, the Crown was bound to implement an honourable process when 
taking up lands.356 The court outlined the process of treaty implementation in which lands 
may be transferred from one category, where First Nations people have the right to hunt 
and fish, to the other category, where they do not. The court found that when the Crown 
exercises its Treaty 8 right to take up land, the honour of the Crown doctrine in 
Constitutional law dictates the process. A key question in taking Treaty lands is whether 
the degree of the adverse effect on the rights is sufficient to trigger the duty to consult.357 
The court held the winter road was a permissible purpose for taking up Treaty 8 land. The 
court was satisfied that the impacts of the proposed road were clear, established, and 
demonstrably adverse to the continued exercise of the Mikisew hunting and trapping 
rights over the lands in question. In particular, the fragmentation of wildlife habitat, 
disruption of migration patterns, loss of vegetation, increased poaching due to motor 
vehicle access and increased wildlife mortality due to motor vehicle collisions adversely 
affected the Mikisew Treaty rights to hunt and trap.358 Further, the adverse effects were 
sufficient to engage the duty to consult. 
 
                                                 
354 Ibid at para 27. 
355 Ibid at para 30. 
356 Ibid at para 31. 
357 Ibid at para 33-34. 
358 Ibid at para 44. 
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In   describing   the   proposed   “taking   up”,   the court held that it is not correct to 
move directly to a Sparrow justification analysis, as the lower courts did, even if there is 
an infringement. Rather, the court must first consider the Crown’s  process and whether it 
is compatible with the honour of the Crown.359 This means that the first consideration is 
the process by which the taking up is planned and whether the process and consultations 
are honourable. If it is not, the First Nation may be entitled to succeed in setting aside the 
Minister's order on the process ground, whether or not the facts of the case would 
otherwise support a finding of infringement of the hunting, fishing and trapping rights. 
Thus a court can deny a project approval due to inadequate consultation even if the 
project would have been justified had consultation taken place. 
 
The court found that the winter road was a minor infringement. The court applied 
many principles of Crown consultation articulated in Haida, to this Treaty context. “The 
duty to consult is … triggered at a low threshold, but adverse impact is a matter of 
degree,  as  is  the  extent  of  the  Crown’s  duty.” 360 The court found that the Crown's treaty 
right to take up surrendered lands brings several duties: first, a duty to inform itself of the 
impact its project will have on the exercise by the Mikisew of their treaty hunting, fishing 
and trapping rights, second, an obligation to communicate its findings to the Mikisew 
Cree Nation,361 and third, an  obligation   “to   act   in   good   faith   and  with   the   intention   of  
substantially addressing the Mikisew concerns.”362 The court notes that under Treaty 8, 
the First Nations’ Treaty rights to hunt, fish and trap are limited geographically and by 
specific forms of government regulation, as in Badger,363 but  also  by  the  Crown’s  right  to  
take up lands and subject to its duty to consult.364  
 
The   court   further   held   that   the   Crown’s   honour   infuses   every   treaty   and   the  
performance of every treaty obligation.365 But “this does not mean that whenever 
                                                 
359 Ibid.  
360 Ibid at para 55. 
361 Ibid . 
362 Ibid also quoting Delgamuukw at para 168. 
363 Ibid at para 42, referring to Badger, supra note 9 at para 37. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid at para 33, quoting Haida at para 19. 
 98 
government proposes to do anything in the Treaty 8 …   lands it must consult with all 
signatory First Nations, no matter how remote or unsubstantial the potential impact.”366 It 
held, therefore, that Treaty 8 provided the Mikisew Cree Nation with both procedural 
rights, such as consultation, and substantive rights of hunting, fishing, and trapping. 
  
 Infusing the honour of the Crown into the interpretation and application of Treaty 
8, it:  
…  gives rise to Mikisew procedural rights (e.g., consultation) as well as 
substantive rights (e.g., hunting, fishing and trapping rights). Were the 
Crown to have barreled ahead with implementation of the winter road 
without adequate consultation, it would have been in violation of its 
procedural obligations, quite apart from whether or not the Mikisew could 
have established that the winter road breached the Crown's substantive 
treaty obligations as well.367 
 
Justice Binnie rejected the Federal Court of Appeal’s finding that no breach of the 
duty to consult occurred based on his rejection of the  Crown’s  argument  that  the  duty  to  
consult was discharged in 1899 by the pre-treaty negotiations.368  
 
Here the most important contextual factor is that Treaty 8 provides a 
framework within which to manage the continuing changes in land use 
already foreseen in 1899 and expected, even now, to continue well into the 
future. In that context, consultation is key to achievement of the overall 
objective of the modern law of treaty and aboriginal rights, namely 
reconciliation.369  
 
Displacing the Mikisew from their hunting grounds violated the treaty promise that the 
Indians’ right to hunt and fish would continue after the treaty, as the right existed 
before.370 The Court correctly noted that the Treaty 8 Indians paid dearly “for their 
entitlement to honourable conduct on the part of the Crown; surrender of the aboriginal 
interest in an area of land larger than France.”371 The trial court in Mikisew wrote,  “…  it  
                                                 
366 Ibid at para. 55. 
367 Ibid at para 57. 
368 Ibid at para. 54-55. 
369 Ibid at para 63. 
370 Ibid at para 47, quoting Badger, supra note 9 at p. 5. 
371 Mikisew, supra note 5 para 52. 
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is not consistent with the honour of the Crown, in its capacity as fiduciary, for it to fail to 
consult with a First Nation prior to making a decision that infringes on constitutionally 
protected   treaty   rights.”372 The   Supreme   Court   of   Canada   held,   “…   consultation in 
advance of interference with existing treaty rights is a matter of broad importance to the 
relations between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples.”373. The Court posits the Treaty 
as a vehicle to govern and manage ongoing relations with the objective of reconciliation. 
However, the Court held, that since the proposed winter road is on surrendered land, the 
Mikisew  rights  were  expressly  subject   to   the  Crown’s  ability   to   take  up   land  for  public  
purposes. As such, the duty lay at the low end of the spectrum.374 The Court noted that 
the Minister of Heritage strongly advocated that this unilateral Crown action was lawful, 
an argument the Court rejected because such unilateral Crown action was inconsistent 
with  “the mutual promises of the treaty, both written and oral,  … [and] is the antithesis of 
reconciliation and respect.” The Court continued: 
  
It is all the more extraordinary given the Minister’s acknowledgment at 
para. 41 of her factum that "[i]n many if not all cases the government will 
not be able to appreciate the effect a proposed taking up will have on the 
Indians’ exercise of hunting, fishing and trapping rights without 
consultation.”375  
 
The Court found that the duty to consult flows from the honour of the Crown376 and that 
the  government’s  approach, undermined the process of reconciliation between the Crown 
and the Treaty 8 First Nation. Advance consultation prior to the interference is of great 
importance and goes to the heart of the relationship.377  
 
The contemplated process is not simply one of giving the Mikisew an opportunity 
to blow off steam before the Minister proceeds to do what she intended to do all 
along. Treaty making is an important stage in the long process of reconciliation, 
but it is only a stage. What occurred at Fort Chipewyan in 1899 was not the 
                                                 
372 Mikisew FCT, supra note 320 at para 157. 
373 Mikisew SCC, supra note 5 at para 3. 
374 Ibid at para 64. 
375 Ibid at para 49, Binnie J., in reference to the arguments advanced by the federal and Alberta 
governments  which  ignore  the  significance  and  practicalities  of  a  First  Nation’s  Traditional  
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376 Ibid at para 4. 
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complete discharge of the duty arising from the honour of the Crown, but a 
rededication of it.378 
 
The  Supreme  Court  properly  found  the  Crown’s  duty  to  consult  Treaty  rights  holders  was  
breached. This decision does not, however, resolve any systemic problems in Treaty 
interpretation imbued in the doctrine of Treaty rights. The Mikisew court has held that the 
Crown, as a Treaty partner, will always have notice of the contents of the Treaty but went 
on to indicate that there will be instances where asserted Treaty rights will not always 
engage the duty to consult.379 The Mikisew court entrenched mechanisms for lawful 
infringement of Treaty rights when the Crown takes up of land; and it applied the test for 
justifying or allowing infringement of Aboriginal rights from Haida and Taku, to Treaty 
rights and peoples.  Indigenous Treaty people have long asserted that Treaty did not 
intend the taking up provisions to be blanket surrender of the land. Surrender provisions 
and the duty to consult jurisprudence have again highlighted this long standing difference 
in Treaty interpretation. 
 
4.4 CONSULTATION, PROTECTION OR AVENUE OF INFRINGEMENT? 
  
The jurisprudence establishes that if the Crown makes reasonable efforts to 
consult and perhaps accommodate Aboriginal concerns, that all parties will participate in 
good faith and reach fair resolutions without needing assistance from the courts. It 
essentially holds that if the Crown conducts an appropriate degree of consultation and if 
the Crown makes reasonable efforts at accommodating the Treaty rights at stake, then the 
courts are prepared to accept the outcomes.380 The court has held that it is more 
concerned if consultation had not occurred than if the process is imperfect, so long as the 
Crown made a reasonable effort.381 The court has found the standard of review of 
                                                 
378 Ibid at para 54. 
379 Ibid at para 34 and 55. 
380 Native Council of Nova Scotia v Canada, 2008 FCA 113, 165 ACWS (3d) 1 [2008] 3 CNLR 
286 at para 89; Labrador Métis Nation v Newfoundland and Labrador (Minister of 
Transportation and Works) 2007 NCLA 75, 288 DLR (4th) 641 at para 52; R v Lefthand, 2007 
ABCA 206, 77 Alta LR (4th) 203 at para 42; Hupacasath First Nation v British Columbia 
(Minister of Forests) 2008 BCSC 1505 [2009] 1 CNLR 30 at para 252. 
381 Haida, supra note 3 at para 62, 63. 
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correctness applies if the Crown misunderstood the seriousness of the Aboriginal rights 
claim and or the adverse effect of infringement.382 Where the Crown correctly 
understands the rights claimed and the adverse impact of the infringement, courts will 
review the nature and degree of consultation and accommodation on the reasonableness 
standard.383 The honour of the Crown and reasonableness standard is invoked and not a 
fiduciary standard.384 Can a reasonableness standard adequately protect Treaty rights and 
their vulnerability under the current common law treaty rights paradigm? Simply because 
consultation follows the standards set by the court, it does not mean the result is just. 
 
The court has also indicated that s. 35 rights can only be infringed for compelling 
and substantial reasons such as conservation, to ensure long term sustainability for a 
resource, was the appropriate standard. Public policy reasons were explicitly rejected by 
the court in Sparrow as so vague to provide no meaningful guidance and so broad to be 
unworkable to justify infringing constitutional rights.385 As well, in Gladstone, the court 
held that the guarantee of s. 35 rights provided substantive and procedural rights which 
required the Crown to justify the process and result when allocating a resource.386 The 
court’s   balancing   of   interests   pits   Aboriginal   rights   holders   against   the   interests   of  
others.387 The court in in Haida, Taku and Mikisew, undertook a balancing of interests but 
not for the purpose of conservation, i.e. to protect a natural resource, but rather to 
maximize the benefits for non-Aboriginal people, despite the adverse effects on the 
constitutional rights holder. At a systemic level, these governmental and judicial 
decisions about balancing interests are erroneous because the scale is faulty. Because the 
current common law system and Crown policies do not recognize the Treaty legal order 
as an equal Constitutional authority, Treaty rights are not given due weight and accord. 
The court has undertaken a path where routine public policies justify infringing 
Constitutionally-protected Treaty rights. The Mikisew court held that where Treaty is at 
                                                 
382 Ibid at para 63. 
383 Ibid at para 62. 
384 Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) 2008 FCA 112 at para 
54; Saulteaux First Nation v British Columbia (Oil and Gas Commission) 2004 BCCA 286. 
385 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para 72. 
386 Gladstone, supra note 188 at para 62. 
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issue, the Crown will always have notice of the Treaty’s contents and the only question 
then is the adverse effect on those rights.388 Potential significant infringement engages the 
Crown’s   honour   and   requires consultation according to the spectrum offered in Haida. 
Therefore, according the jurisprudence, all that is required is for the Crown to undertake 
some minimally reasonable degree of consultation and, a non-mandatory attempt at 
agreement or accommodation and the Crown would have fulfilled its legal duties. Where 
then, does this leave Treaty rights holders? 
 
In Haida, Taku and Mikisew, the courts have held that consultation is a two way 
street and Aboriginal parties are required to act in good faith, not frustrate or take 
unreasonable positions to thwart the process.389 Aboriginal parties have a duty to 
participate and express their concerns; they cannot make unreasonable demands.390 At the 
same time, the doctrine of the duty to consult does not require the Crown to act as a 
fiduciary or be loyal to fiduciary-like principles. This means that the Crown has no 
obligation to accede to every request for further consultation or to accommodate every 
Aboriginal concern. Even if the courts require the Crown to be reasonable, First Nation 
people will be forced to live with the results, as Taku River demonstrates. First Nation 
people, therefore, have reason to be cautious about how they engage in consultation and 
must consult in a manner that equips First Nations for judicial review, namely, by 
keeping records and other evidence that shows they did not frustrate the Crown's attempts 
to   consult   and   that   the   Crown’s   consultation   process   was   inadequate.391 In effect, the 
court is forcing the Aboriginal party to engage in an adversarial project whether it wants 
to or not. This is not honourable nor does it demonstrate the spirit of reconciliation or 
posit Canada in a post-colonial era.  
 
Even where Aboriginal rights are established, the Haida court has held the Crown 
need not obtain the consent of the First Nation whose rights are infringed. Further, the 
                                                 
388 Ibid at para 34. 
389 Haida, supra note 3 at para 42. 
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consent spoken about in Delgamuukw is required only in rare cases where there are 
established rights.392 The Mikisew court stayed consistent with Haida and Taku in 
expressing that the Mikisew had no veto on the project stating, "Had the consultation 
process gone ahead, it would not have given the Mikisew veto over the alignment of the 
road. As emphasized in Haida, consultation will not always lead to accommodation, and 
accommodation may or may not result in an agreement."393 The court outlined that the 
Mikisew had a reciprocal duty to make their concerns known, respond to government 
attempts to address the concerns and to try to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. 
Even in this recent Mikisew decision, several principles in the duty to consult doctrine 
show colonial ideology persists: first, permitting infringements though the Treaty First 
Nation opposed or did not agree to the infringement, second, forcing or requiring Treaty 
First Nations to participate in every consultation/accommodation process, and third, 
allowing some infringements that do not substantially impair Treaty rights with no 
consultation or notice to the First Nation, whatsoever..  
 
The results of the lack of any requirement to obtain consent of the First Nation 
were made frighteningly clear in the Ontario Supreme Court decision in Platinex Inc. v. 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation.394 The court considered whether to extend 
an injunction preventing a junior drilling company (Platinex) from exploration drilling on 
the   Kitchenuhmaykoosib   Inninuwug   (KI)   First   Nation’s   traditional   lands,   lands which 
were subject to a pending Treaty Land Entitlement claim. The lower court found the 
Crown breached the duty to consult and the court granted a five-month injunction in 
favour of the KI for the parties to come to an agreement. The court also stated that the 
                                                 
392 Haida, supra note 3 at para 48. 
393 Ibid at para 66. 
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injunction enhances public interest by making the consultation process meaningful and 
by compelling the Crown to accept its fiduciary obligations and to act honourably.395 
Despite the parties’ efforts, no agreement was reached at the end of the five month 
period. Back before the court, the Ontario Supreme Court dismissed the First  Nation’s  
interlocutory injunction application through a balancing of interests and stated that 
unestablished Aboriginal rights do not automatically trump competing rights, whether 
they be government, corporate, or private in nature.396 The court found that the balance of 
convenience favored the Company because granting the injunction would cause 
irreparable harm to Platinex and would likely put the company out of business.397 The 
court held that on the evidence presented, the harm to the harvesting rights, culture and 
community of the First Nation was inconclusive. In granting a declaratory order the court 
gave the parties a further two weeks to come to an agreement. In May 2007, no 
agreement had been reached, and the court gave permission to Platinex to begin drilling. 
The KI rejected the order of the court and on December 14, 2007, the Chief, council and 
band administrators were found in contempt of court order for impeding or threatening to 
impede Platinex and were each sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.398 On appeal, the 
sentences were reduced to 2 months, a result Platinex supported.399 The imprisonment of 
the Chief and Headmen for steadfastly defending their Treaty hunting rights exemplified 
the   depths   of   the   divide   created   by   the   Crown’s   asserted ownership of the land and 
Indigenous legal order, in which how the duty of consultation is operating to subjugate 
Indigenous people.400 
 
In addition to implementing Treaty rights, First Nations communities have often 
requested Canada to conform to international legal standards on free, prior and informed 
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consent and for Canada to adhere to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.401 Canadian law must be in line with the international standards 
represented in the UN Declaration. Implementing the UN Declaration in Canada is key 
to ensure that Indigenous peoples’  rights  are  fully  realized and recognizing Aboriginal 
self-determination, inherent rights, and land tenure including the principle of free, prior 
and informed consent. The Assembly of First Nations in a joint statement to the 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues402 cautions against replacing the established 
International standard of consent with the lesser standard of consultation (Free Prior and 
Informed Consultation) and that governments or corporations would continue to be free 
to act in their own interests and the interests of other powerful sectors of society while 
ignoring the decision made by Indigenous peoples. 403AFN has provided a list of 
recommendations for Canada in respect of FPIC: 
1. Urge states and specialized agencies to adopt a standardized interpretation 
of FPIC consistent with international human rights standards. 
2. Highlight the need to address the unequal bargaining power generally 
existing between state/third party developers and Indigenous peoples, by 
ensuring that the peoples concerned have the necessary financial, technical 
and other assistance to fully and effectively participate at all stages. States 
have a role and responsibility to ensure just and democratic processes, 
consistent with the principle of sustainable and equitable development. 
3. Urge states that are undermining FPIC to uphold their international 
obligations, so as to ensure full respect and implementation of all 
Indigenous  peoples’  rights,  including  those in Treaties with such peoples. 
In this context, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is 
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inseparable  from  states’  obligations  under  diverse  treaties. 
4. Urge states to fully respect FPIC, in regard to all customary rights of 
Indigenous peoples to genetic resources without discrimination. Provisions 
in the Nagoya Protocol that could serve to dispossess Indigenous peoples 
of such resources lack validity and require urgent redress.404 
Consultation is not consent. The principle of FPIC upholds the human rights of 
Indigenous people and is an expression of the inherent right to self determination. It was 
also the underpinning of the Treaty First Nations ability to conclude the numbered 
Treaties with the Crown. However, under the weight of unrecognized rights, failure to 
implement Treaties, and consultation instead of informed consent, First Nation 
communities continue to appeal to international venues for remedies. 
 
The duty to consult jurisprudence provides no protection for First Nations that 
have experienced breaches of the duty to consult in the past, nor breaches that are 
ongoing, as evidenced by the recent Supreme Court case in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v 
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council.405 The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the 
British Columbia Utilities Commission, as a government tribunal, had jurisdiction to 
consider the scope and nature of the duty of to consult with the Carrier Sekani Tribal 
Council First Nations in regard to infringements. At issue was the Kenney Dam, built in 
the 1950's by the BC Government to produce hydro and smelt aluminum, an industrial 
process which altered the water flow into the Nechako river where the Carrier people 
fished in since time immemorial. The BC government failed to consult with them when 
they built the dam and sought approval for the sale of the excess hydro from the dam to 
another crown corporation.406 The Supreme Court did not address the ongoing breach 
occurring with the dam and narrowed the scope of the issue to whether the sale of the 
excess hydro constituted a fresh breach that adversely impacted the Carrier Sekani rights. 
The court, in applying Haida, confines the duty to consult to adverse impacts flowing 
from the specific Crown proposal at issue and absent this requirement, suggests that other 
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remedies may be appropriate.407 By denying a remedy for past or continuing breaches of 
the duty to consult, the court renders this Constitutional protected Treaty right to be 
hollow for some. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in West Moberly408 may have 
departed from the Supreme Court’s  approach  in  Rio Tinto, indicating that where a causal 
connection could be established between current Government action and future effects 
courts can examine cumulative effects, including historic elements, in applying the duty 
to consult. 
 
Timothy Huyer in Honour of the Crown: The Approach to Crown-Aboriginal 
Reconciliation,409 points out the similarities between the duty to consult and 
accommodate Aboriginal people with the duty to consult the public contained in the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,410 whose purpose is to ensure that there be 
opportunities for timely and meaningful participation throughout the environmental 
assessment process. Critics of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act point out that 
it has not guaranteed protection of the environment or Aboriginal rights. Despite having a 
process, Huyer notes projects are overwhelmingly approved. The Act, in substance, 
implementation, or both, favors development over sustainability.411 Huyer states, "If the 
environmental assessment process with all of its requirements for consultation and 
consideration of environmental effects (all of which are subject to judicial review) fails to 
provide meaningful protection of environmental effects, a similar duty (existing 
independently of statute) to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples cannot ensure 
that Aboriginal rights are meaningfully protected.412 Where the CEAA review process is 
highly regulated, the process for consultation and accommodation is highly discretionary. 
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In cases on the duty consult, we see a pattern: an Aboriginal right is asserted, the 
Crown acknowledges it, if the supporting evidence exists, the project plan may be altered, 
and ultimately the project goes ahead. The best that can be hoped for is Aboriginal people 
are able to discuss how the project will infringe their rights and perhaps participate in that 
infringement. Thus, the duty of consultation means that Aboriginal rights and title do not 
truly inform Government decisions. As Prof. Christie, in his article,  “A Colonial reading 
of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation”413 points out: 
 
The ability to make these sorts of decisions is not threatened under the 
doctrine of Aboriginal rights, the only impact these rights have on such 
decisions is in relation to how these decisions are put into operation 'on the 
ground'. The decision to build a road, for example, might have to be made 
through consultation with potentially affected Aboriginal rights-holders, 
and the road itself might have to be constructed in such a way as to 
'accommodate' certain of the interests expressed during consultation, its 
construction might even have to be delayed until treaty arrangements are 
made. But almost certainly the road will be built.414 
 
Prof. Christie further points out that the duty to consult has emerged from a 
colonial narrative where the judiciary protects the overarching power of the Crown and 
its visions on Aboriginal, Treaty rights and land title. Specifically, he points out several 
features of the common law system that do not take full account of Treaty-protected First 
Nations legal orders: the conceptualization of Aboriginal land interests as 'burdens' on 
underlying Crown title, Crown Sovereignty, the creation of the fiduciary doctrine and 
requirement of a specific interest, the transformation of pre-existing rights in one 
normative system with Aboriginal rights in another normative system; the creation of 
Aboriginal rights without internal limits, the system for justifying infringement on 
inherent and constitutionally protected rights. He notes that when the Crown is obligated 
to consult with an Aboriginal nation, it is not about how its collectivity is seen in relation 
to land (and rights) but rather how the Crown is obliged to consult about its visions of 
land use will be implemented. Further, there is never any question in the court's mind that 
the Crown has complete power to determine what land means, what uses the land will be 
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put to and how Aboriginal people will live in relation to both the land and resources. 
Christie  argues  that  the  defining  characteristic  in  the  court’s  decisions  leading  the  Duty  to  
consult, is that it works to push and pull Aboriginal title holders along an assimilative 
path. 415 On this path, the courts have institutionalized the continuing erosion of Treaty 
rights by various means, including systematically justifying infringements of Treaty 
rights. 
 
Each First Nation has the inherent right and responsibility to express their 
relationship to the land through their own jurisprudence. Indigenous people are asserting 
their fundamental right to determine what development they wish to pursue, both within 
their reserves lands and traditional territories. Government and industry, as evidenced in 
the jurisprudence, have initiatives for development that do not fit within the visions of 
Indigenous peoples. Indigenous concepts of land tenure and land use view land as more 
than merely a commercial and economic interest. Differences in the development of land 
and economic development projects reflect the differences between cultures. First 
Nations place great importance on collectivist priorities that include the spiritual value in 
land and protection of the nation from the continued threat of colonial assimilation laws 
and policies. There must be community participation in economic and environmental 
projects. Projects cannot be undertaken alone by industry or government. There also must 
be a consensual basis for agreement and active participation. There must be full social 
and economic justifications sanctioned by the community and through their leadership. 
The Treaty relationship, the Crown’s fiduciary   duty,   the   Crown’s   honour,   imports   a  
positive duty to protect First Nation jurisdiction by supporting those First Nations who do 
not want to be forced into consultation processes. The result should not have to be a stark 
choice between free participation in economic development projects and forced 
participation which entrenches colonial assertion of western superiority and economic 
values. 
 
 The following chapter provides the avenue for proper consultation of the 
constitutionally protected Treaty rights. Specifically, a repatriation of Treaty 
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constitutionalism in Canadian federalism wherein any consultation regarding 
infringements of treaty rights occurs on a nation-to-nation basis, as the treaty itself was 
negotiated. Proper consultation requires constitutional reform with constitutional 
dialogue through constitutional conferences.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
  The historical neglect of  the  Crown’s  duty to consult Treaty people have resulted 
in a century of unilateral land grants, legislation, regulations and agreements by the 
Crown. The history of unilateral action is directly proportional to the failure of the Crown 
to recognize and implement the sacred Treaty agreements between the sovereign nations. 
The Supreme Court, in the duty to consult cases, has definitively held that unilateral 
Crown action is no longer acceptable nor legal, and set out legal framework which must 
be respected by the Crown. Unfortunately, the duty to consult framework is premised on 
a Aboriginal and Treaty rights paradigm that denies Indigenous sovereignty and fails to 
fully recognize the treaty order and the full legal and constitutional rights of Aboriginal 
and Treaty First Nations. 
  
The judicial treatment of duty to consult Treaty rights holders was reflected in the 
various court decisions in Mikisew. The Supreme Court provided direction to the Crown 
on the nature of the Treaty relationship and their legal duty to consult which 
demonstrated the Crowns unilateral actions toward the Mikisew was destructive to the 
Treaty relationship. Binnie J.C. stated  
The fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights is the 
reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their 
respective claims, interests and ambitions. The management of these relationships 
takes place in the shadow of a long history of grievance created by the 
indifference of some government officials to aboriginal peoples concerns, and the 
lack of respect inherent in that indifference has been as destructive of the process 
of reconciliation as some of the larger and more explosive controversies. And so it 
is in this case.416  
 
                                                 
416 Mikisew, supra note 5 at para 1. 
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Treaties are nation-to-nation covenants and there is a legal frame work of Treaty that has 
never been realized. The Crown undertook a positive duty to protect Aboriginal lands and 
peoples from the impacts of the European settlement and the laws. Included in that duty 
is the protection and fulfillment of inherent rights and Treaty implementation. Treaties 
are spiritual and living covenants. Treaty sovereignty underlies treaties and has never 
been extinguished nor has it authorized modification or infringements. The Treaties are 
sacred promises made by two sovereigns, Kihci-Asotamâtowin, that cannot be changed or 
altered without mutual consent. Canada possesses the framework to engage in proper 
consultation on the numbered Treaties through the inclusion of Treaty Constitutionalism.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TREATY CONSTITUTIONALISM WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES 
AS MODELS OF CONSULTATION 
 
“We  don’t  want  to  scare  people  with  our  terminology. No one is scared in this country by 
the  fact  that  Ontario  and  Manitoba  can  make  laws  in  education…They  are  sovereign  in  
their area of jurisdiction. We,  likewise,  want  to  have  clear  powers  over  our  territories.” 
  
   ~George Erasmus, Former Chief of the Assembly of First Nations 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders are the foundation for the consensual 
nation-to-nation agreements made in Treaty to share the land in peaceful coexistence with 
European people and their descendants. Centuries of colonial policy, legislation and case 
law have denied Treaty governance and rights. The judiciary has played an integral role 
in maintaining a colonial paradigm by articulating the duty of consultation and 
accommodation and the doctrines of the honour of the Crown and reconciliation that do 
not incorporate Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders. Sympathetic and Indigenous-
friendly ruminations from the court and Crown have failed to effect the change required 
to repatriate Indigenous nations to their rightful place in the Canadian federation. This 
chapter discusses the urgent requirement for Constitutional reform through a shared 
Constitution. Constitutional reform can achieve a bi-lateral federation envisioned by 
Treaty through the inclusion of Treaty Constitutionalism. The governments will, then, be 
able to engage in proper and just consultation on Treaty rights through Constitutional 
dialogue by means of Constitutional conferences.  
 
Also  examined  in  this  chapter   is   the  court’s  precept  of  reconciliation. Much like 
the honour of the Crown, the doctrine of reconciliation has been used by the courts and 
governments to describe the relationship between Indigenous people and the Crown. The 
Supreme Court has indicated that reconciliation is the underlying purpose behind s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. However the court has used the concept of reconciliation as a 
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guise to further the colonial agenda by undermining Indigenous sovereignty and 
broadening of legislative infringements of Indigenous rights. Both the courts’ and 
Crown's notions of reconciliation do not go far enough to effectively bring a true 
reconciliation to address the ills of centuries of colonialism and the denial of Indigenous 
legal orders. True reconciliation will only occur through a complete paradigm shift 
through the inclusion of Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders in a tripartite 
federation. 
 
 
5.1 RESTORATION OF TREATY CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
The history of the Treaty relationship is marked by colonialism, domination and 
failed treaty implementation. Canadian Parliament, politicians, courts and institutions, 
and some lawyers wilfully deny the rights of Treaty and refuse to acknowledge the 
authority of First Nations, thereby unjustly conferring power, wealth and privilege onto 
themselves. The denial of Treaty First   Nations’   legal   orders and of Treaty 
Constitutionalism deprives treaty First Nations of their human right to self-determination 
and maintains First Nations in poverty. In the denial of Treaty, the colonial goals of 
oppression and subjugation became the objective instead of honouring the legal 
agreements signed. The British system of government was unilaterally imposed by 
Canada on the Indigenous nations which made no room for Indigenous legal orders.417  
 
In fact, many Canadians see Treaty rights as a handout. Canada continues to deny 
Treaties and even the existence and preoccupation of Canada by Treaty Nations. This fact 
was recently made clear in the 2013 Throne Speech, where the Prime Minster’s Office, 
through the Governor General, went  so  far  as   to  say   that  “no  one  was  here”   in  Canada  
when the brave pioneers arrived.418 The Governor General stated,  
This is Canada's moment, together we will seize it. And as we do, we draw 
inspiration from our founders, leaders of courage and audacity. Nearly 150 years 
                                                 
417 See RCAP Final Report Vol 1, supra note 42. 
418 2013 Canadian Federal Throne Speech , <http://www.speech.gc.ca/sites/sft/files/SFT-
EN_2013_c.pdf> 
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ago, they looked beyond narrow self-interest. They faced down incredible 
challenges - geographic, military, and economic. They were undaunted. They 
dared to seize the moment that history offered. Pioneers, then few in number, 
reached across a vast continent. They forged an independent country where none 
would have otherwise existed.419  
 
The existence of Treaty and the obligations to implement them were not mentioned. What 
has remained consistent is that regardless of the political party in power, all have 
consistently failed to honour the Treaties. Successive government failure to take concrete 
action to alleviate the disparity has not gone unnoticed by international human rights 
forums.420  
 
The brute facts reveal that any efforts made by the Crown and the judiciary have 
been ineffective to implement the Treaty obligations owed by the Crown to Treaty 
nations. The courts have proven unable to extract themselves from a colonial paradigm of 
protector of the state as evidenced in the common law Aboriginal and treaty rights 
paradigm, the duty to consult jurisprudence, and the judicial doctrines of the honour of 
the Crown and reconciliation. The courts’ decisions are premised on the denial of 
                                                 
419 Ibid. 
420 “Top  United  Nations  expert  James  Anaya  urges  Nations  to  Honour  Treaties  with  Indigenous  
Peoples, by Michael Woods, Post Media News, Canada.com, August 9, 2013, 
<www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=8770753&sponsor=hp-storytoolbox>; Montreal Gazette, 
"UN slams Canada for First Nations treatment" by Lee Berthiaume, Post media News, Feb 22, 
2012, Canada's international reputation came under fire in Geneva on Wednesday as a UN expert 
panel delivered scathing criticisms over the government's treatment of First Nations and recent 
changes to the country's immigration system. Members on the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, all of them human-rights experts from around the world, questioned why 
headway has not been made in resolving the disparities between First Nations communities and 
the rest of the country. "This problem should not continue the same way as it has in the past," said 
Noureddine Amir, vice-chairman of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
"How long will this be ongoing?" The treatment of natives jumped back onto the federal political 
agenda after the Red Cross delivered humanitarian aid to the First Nations community of 
Attawapiskat in northern Ontario late last year. Since then, opposition parties and aboriginal 
groups have called on the Conservative government to provide more funding for education, better 
infrastructure and a move toward self-determination. There are also concerns that the 
government's omnibus crime bill will have a disproportionate impact on natives. In response, the 
government says it will focus on bringing job training and other actions to ensure Canada's more 
than one million aboriginal people can compete in the workplace and enjoy the same economic 
benefits and prosperity as other Canadians. 
<http://www.canada.com/news/slams+Canada+First+Nations+treatment/6193201/story.html#ixz
z1nE3S9ml> 
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Indigenous legal, Constitutional and Treaty orders. The court, as a colonial Crown 
institution, operates to protect the sovereignty of the Crown, despite musings to the 
contrary, which are, at best, sympathetic to Indigenous orders. It is clear that the court 
alone is not responsible, but they have played a central role in maintaining a colonial 
state.  
 
What is required is a new Canada created on new Constitutional orders with the 
Treaties as the founding principle. From the Treaty arrangement Canadian federalism 
emerged. Canadian federalism should have been Treaty Constitutionalism. Treaty 
Constitutionalism requires institutional reform of governmental bodies that are consistent 
with Constitutional supremacy, the full embodiment of the honour of the Crown. Unless 
Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders are integrated into federalism there will 
continue to be structural inequality. Legal and academic commentators have also 
advocated for this type of approach.421  
 
 
5.2 TREATY CONSTITUIONALISM AS RECONCILIATION 
 
The concept of reconciliation has increasingly been used by the courts and 
governments to characterize a political process between Aboriginal rights and the 
                                                 
421 J. Borrows,  “Constitutional  Law  From  a  First Nations Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal 
Proclamation”(1994)  28  U.B.C.L.  Rev.  1;;  B.  Slattery,  “The  Organic  Constitution:  Aboriginal  Peoples  and  
the  Evolution  of  Canada”  (1996)  34  Osgoode  Hall  L.J.  101;;  B.  Ryder,  “The  Demise  and  Rise  of  the  
Classical  Paradigm  in  Canadian  Federalism:  Promoting  Autonomy  for  the  Provinces  and  First  Nations”  
(1990-1991)  36  McGill  L.J.  308;;  P.  Macklem,  “First  Nations  Self-Government and the Borders of the 
Canadian  Legal  Imagination”  (1990-1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382; Indigenous Difference and the Constitution 
of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); M. Hudson,  “Reconciling  Diversity  with  Unity-
Canadian Federalism in the 21st Century’,  presentation  to  Canadian Bar Association Canadian Legal 
Conference, August 14-16, 2005, Vancouver. See  the  work  of  political  scientists  like  K.L.  Ladner,  “Treaty  
Federalism: An Indigenous  Vision  of  Canadian  Federalisms”  in  F.  Rocher  and  M.  Smith,  eds.  New Trends 
in Canadian Federalism, 2d ed. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003) 167. J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); S. LaSelva, The 
Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes, Achievements, and Tragedies of Nationhood 
(Montreal:  McGill  Queen’s  University  Press,  1996)  M.  Hanvelt  and  M.  Papillon,  “Parallel  or  Embedded?  
Aboriginal Self-government  and  the  Changing  Nature  of  Citizenship  in  Canada”  in  G.  Kernerman  and  P.  
Resnick, eds., Insiders and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and the Reshaping of Canadian Citizenship 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 242 at 248-249; I.  Peach  and  M.  Rasmussen,  “Federalism and the First 
Nations:  Making  Space  for  First  Nations’  Self-determination  in  the  Federal  Inherent  Right  Policy”  online  
http//www.cst.ed.ac.uk/2005conference/papers/Peach_Rasmussen_paper.pdf (last accessed March 2005). 
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assertion of  Crown  sovereignty.  It’s  a  word  that  connotes  a  bringing  back  together  of  two  
groups after separation or dispute. The Supreme Court has held that the underlying 
objective of s. 35(1) in the Constitution is reconciliation, but the court has used the 
concept of reconciliation in a contradictory manner. The descriptions and exercises of 
reconciliation have taken many forms, including: federal power to federal legislative 
duty,422 Aboriginal rights to the larger society,423 prior Aboriginal occupancy to the 
assertion of Crown Sovereignty,424 Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal perspectives425 and the 
honour of the crown.426 Reconciliation has been used to facilitate and justify a 
proliferation of legislative infringements on Aboriginal rights and then, on the other hand, 
to also protect those rights through the honour of the Crown precept. Throughout it all, 
what is clear is that reconciliation between Indigenous nations and the Crown cannot be 
achieved through Canadian courts on the current course.  
 
The sacred and inviolable Treaties represent a true reconciliation between the 
Crown and Indigenous nations. They were entered into through an exclusive nation-to-
nation relationship that solidified peaceful coexistence and a shared, consensual union. 
The parties agreed to share the same land and resources as independent nations. 
Indigenous nations maintained all legal rights and jurisdiction within their territories and 
those exclusive rights that have not yet been properly reconciled with the Crown through 
a shared Constitutional arrangement. The  court’s  articulation  of  reconciliation  falls  short  
of demanding formal reconciliation of Indigenous legal orders and their sovereignty. 
 
An examination of the jurisprudence reveals that the courts have demonstrated 
that they are unable to be effective in reaching a true reconciliation, one that is defined by 
inclusion of a Indigenous conception of reconciliation. Courts have been unable to 
provide the possibility of just reconciliation of Indigenous sovereignty as the court itself 
                                                 
422 Sparrow, supra note 178 at 45. 
423 Van der Peet, supra note 47 at 52. 
424 Delgamuukw, supra note 39 at para 186, Van der Peet, supra note 47 at para 31 
425 Van der Peet, supra note 47 at para 49, 50. 
426 Haida, supra note 3 at para 17. 
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is unable to remove itself from a colonial paradigm and protector of the overarching 
colonial power of the Crown.  
 
Legal scholars critical of the use and misuse of the concept of reconciliation have 
described it as a 'doctrine plucked from thin air'427 as well as being a 'front' for 
assimilation. Much like other legal constructions in the Aboriginal rights discourse, 
reconciliation has been used as an excuse to infringe Indigenous rights and is a part of the 
ongoing colonial narrative on Indigenous people by Crown and courts. John Borrows in 
“Domesticating  Doctrines:  Aboriginal  Peoples  after  the  Royal  Commission” puts it aptly,  
  
Courts have read Aboriginal rights to lands and resources as requiring a 
reconciliation that asks much more of Aboriginal peoples than it does of 
Canadians. Reconciliation should not be a front for assimilation. Reconciliation 
should be embraced as an approach to Aboriginal-Canadian relations that also 
requires Canada to accede in many areas. Yet both legislatures and courts have 
been pursuing a course that, by and large, asks change only of Aboriginal peoples. 
Canadian institutions have been employing domesticating doctrines in their 
response to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. This approach  hinders 
Aboriginal choice in the development of their lands and resources, rather than 
enhancing it.428 
 
5.2.1 The Reconciliation of Federal Power & Duties: Sparrow 
The concept of reconciliation has been used by the courts to reconcile Federal power and 
duties with Constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights. In 1990, the courts, in justifying 
the  Crown’s   legislative   infringements   on  Aboriginal   rights   in   Sparrow, had introduced 
the concept of Constitutional reconciliation. In particular, the court stated section 35 
rights are not absolute and federal legislative power must be reconciled with its fiduciary 
duty to Aboriginal people:  
  
                                                 
427 Russell Lawrence Barsh, James Youngblood Henderson, "Aboriginal Rights, Treaty Rights, 
and Human Rights: Indian Tribes and Constitutional Renewal" (1982) 17 J Can Studies Rev 55 at 
998,  see  also  Russell  Barsh  and  James  Sakej  Henderson,  "The  Supreme  Court’s  Van der Peet 
Trilogy: Native Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) 42 McGill L J 993. 
428 John  Borrows,  “Domesticating  Doctrines:  Aboriginal Peoples after the Royal Commission”  
(2001) 46 McGill L J 615 (QL) at para 64. 
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There is no explicit language in the provision [s. 35(1)] that authorizes this Court 
or any court to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that restricts 
aboriginal   rights.   Yet,   we   find   that   the   words   “recognition   and   affirmation”  
incorporate the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some 
restraint on the exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and 
affirmed are not absolute. Federal legislative powers continue, including, of 
course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be read together with 
s. 35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and 
the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any 
government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights.429 
 
The   court’s   conception   of   reconciliation   in   Sparrow maintains the Crown's legislative 
power over Aboriginal people of Canada notwithstanding the existence of Indigenous 
orders or Treaty agreements that require consent to any changes in their rights. In the 
context of Treaty obligations, there are no provisions in Treaty that agreed for legislative 
authority over Indigenous Treaty nations. 
 
5.2.2 Reconciliation of Indigenous People to Crown Sovereignty: Van der Peet 
Trilogy   
The   court’s   theory   on   reconciliation   was   then   reinterpreted   in   Van der Peet, 
Gladstone, and Smokehouse. In defining the scope of Aboriginal rights protected by s. 
35(1), the court moved from the need to reconcile the Constitutional recognition of 
Aboriginal rights with federal legislative power to reconciling the rights of Aboriginal 
people with the Crown's sovereignty. The Gladstone court considered the kinds of 
legislative objectives which they considered to be sufficiently compelling and substantial 
to justify the infringement of Aboriginal rights. After referring to Van der Peet, Lamer 
C.J.C. stated, 
In the context of the objectives which can be said to be compelling and substantial 
under the first branch of the Sparrow justification test, the import of these 
purposes is that their objectives which can be said to be compelling and 
substantial will be those directed at either the recognition of the prior occupation 
of North America by aboriginal peoples or – and at the level of justification it is 
this purpose which may well be most relevant — at the reconciliation of 
aboriginal prior occupation with the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.430 
                                                 
429 Sparrow, supra note 178 at 1113-1115. 
430 Gladstone, supra note 188 at para 72. 
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Later   in   the   same   decision   the   court’s   revision   of   reconciliation   reframed   the   need   for  
reconciliation to pursue compelling and substantive objectives that are important to the 
boarder community as a whole,  
 
Because   … distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a 
broader social, political and economic community, over which the Crown is 
sovereign, there are circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of 
compelling and substantial importance to that community as a whole (taking into 
account the fact that aboriginal societies are part of that community), some 
limitation of those rights will be justifiable. Aboriginal rights are a necessary part 
of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader political community 
of which they are a part; limits placed on those rights are, where the objectives 
furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance to the broader community as 
a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation.431 
 
The court also stated both the definition of the Aboriginal rights and the reconciliation of 
prior occupation of 'Canadian territory' by Aboriginal people with the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty must “take into account the Aboriginal perspective …   in terms which are 
cognizable to the non-aboriginal legal system.”432 The Van der Peet decision is rife with 
colonial objectives in expanding the justifiable infringements coupled with the 
requirement of Indigenous legal orders being read down and altered to fit into the 
Canadian common law system. 
 
In Van der Peet, McLachlin J., for the minority court, was not in complete 
agreement to the majority’s interpretation of s. 35. The minority court noted that “s. 35(1) 
recognizes not only prior aboriginal occupation, but also a prior legal regime giving rise 
to aboriginal rights which persist, absent extinguishment.”433 Reconciliation, the court 
held, occurs when the Aboriginal rights claims are reconciled with European settlement 
and sovereignty “in a way that provides the basis for a just and lasting settlement of the 
                                                 
431 Ibid at para 73. 
432 Ibid at para 49. 
433 Ibid at para 230. 
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claims and consistent with the high standard which the law imposes on the Crown in its 
dealings with aboriginal peoples.”434 The minority stated, 
  
My third observation is that the proposed departure from the principle of 
justification  elaborated  in  Sparrow  is  unnecessary  to  provide  the  “reconciliation”  
of aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests which is said to require it. The Chief 
Justice  correctly identifies reconciliation between aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
communities as a goal of fundamental importance. The desire for reconciliation, 
in many cases long overdue, lay behind the adoption of s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. As Sparrow recognized, one of the two fundamental 
purposes of s. 35(1) was the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of 
aboriginal claims. The Chief Justice also correctly notes that such a settlement 
must be founded on reconciliation of aboriginal rights with the larger non-
aboriginal culture in which they  must,   of   necessity,   find   their   exercise  ….   The  
question is how this reconciliation of the different legal cultures of aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal peoples is to be accomplished. More particularly, does the goal of 
reconciliation of aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests require that we permit the 
Crown to require a judicially authorized transfer of the aboriginal right to non-
aboriginals without the consent of the aboriginal people, without treaty, and 
without compensation? I cannot think it does.435 
 
The  minority’s  understanding  of  reconciliation  was  correct  in  finding, first, the departure 
from the justification in Sparrow of federal power and duties, and second, the Van der 
Peet reconciliation of Aboriginal people to the broader community, failed to give proper 
accord to the Constitutional principles. The minority also noted that Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal perspectives have historically been reconciled through Treaties and that 
negotiation of settlements is the process of reconciliation. The court went on to state that 
until the traditional means by which aboriginal and non-aboriginal legal perspectives may 
be reconciled have been exhausted, the courts should be careful not to suggest more 
radical methods of reconciliation possessing the potential to erode aboriginal rights 
seriously.436 
                                                 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid at para 310. 
436 Ibid at  para  313,  McLachlin,  CJ  held,  “It  is  for  the  Aboriginal  peoples  and  other  peoples  of  
Canada to work out a just accommodation of the recognized aboriginal rights. This process 
definition of the rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) followed by negotiated settlements – is the means 
envisaged in Sparrow, as I perceive it, for reconciling the aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
perspectives. It has not as yet been tried in the case of the Sto:lo. A century and one-half after 
European  settlement,  the  Crown  has  yet  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  them.” 
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As   can   been   seen,   the   court’s   theory   on   reconciliation   shifted   toward   a   idea   of  
Constitutional priority of the democracy of Canada. The Van der Peet majority linked 
reconciliation and the justification of infringements test which subjects breaches of 
Aboriginal rights to a Charter s. 1 justification analysis. The minority points out this is 
contrary to the Constitution and perhaps even contrary to the objectives behind the 
entrenchment of Sec. 35(1). In the end, however, what remains is that the interests of the 
broader Canadian society trumps the Constitutionally entrenched rights of Indigenous 
peoples. The universal definition of reconciliation as the restoration of harmony, after 
centuries of historical injustices toward Indigenous peoples, becomes perverted and 
misused by the needs of the colonizing Crown. This articulation of reconciliation of the 
entrenchment of s. 35(1) is unacceptable. The purpose of reconciliation, as stated by 
Sparrow, is to remediate the conflicts that have resulted from the ongoing colonial project 
by the Crown. The courts deem that Indigenous nations are better at bearing the brunt of 
infringement than Canadians are at tolerating the recognition and implementation of 
Indigenous rights. 
 
5.2.3 Reconciliation of Aboriginal Rights by Unlimited Infringement: Delgamuukw 
In   keeping  with   the   court’s   jurisprudential   course   of   denying   Indigenous   rights 
that arise from Indigenous legal orders, the Delgamuukw court affirmed and applied the 
Gladstone justification test to infringements of Aboriginal title, expanding the list of 
justifiable infringements of Aboriginal title,  
  
In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the 
infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of those objectives can be 
traced to the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by 
Aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the 
recognition  that  “distinctive  Aboriginal  societies  exist  within,  and  are a part of, a 
broader  social,  political  and  economic  community”  (at  para.  73). In my opinion, 
the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the 
general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of 
the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the 
settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of 
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objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the 
infringement of aboriginal title.437 
 
5.2.4 Reconciliation of Aboriginal Rights through the Duty to Consult: Haida 
The Supreme Court in Haida returns to a vision of reconciliation that focuses on 
reconciliation through negotiated settlements of Indigenous rights and sovereignty 
claims. The court outlined that the Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal 
sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed 
by s. 35. The court noted that s. 35 represents a promise of rights recognition and, as 
stated in Badger, that it is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. 
The court held that honourable negotiation is the means to achieve the reconciliation of 
rights recognition and claim of sovereignty. The court stated that "It is a corollary of s. 35 
that the Crown act honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling them 
with other rights and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if appropriate, 
accommodate."438 The court describes reconciliation, 
 
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to consult and 
accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins 
with the assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution. 
Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather it is a process 
flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This 
process   of   reconciliation   flows   from   the   Crown’s   duty   of   honourable   dealing  
toward Aboriginal peoples,   which   arises   in   turn   from   the   Crown’s   assertion   of  
sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources 
that were formerly in the control of that people. As stated in Mitchell v MNR, 
2001 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2001] 1 SCR 911, 2001  SCC  33,  at  para.  9,  “[w]ith  this  
assertion [sovereignty] arose an obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and 
honourably, and to protect them from exploitation.” 439 
 
The passage makes clear that reconciliation is an ongoing process beyond claims 
resolution as part of a Constitutional duty. Reconciliation is properly seen as a remedial 
legal duty not a doorway to unlimited infringement of Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The 
court reaffirmed the danger in redefining reconciliation in a meaningless way, 
                                                 
437 Delgamuukw, supra note 39 at para 165. 
438 Haida, supra note 3 at para 20. 
439 Ibid at para 32. 
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To limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating reconciliation as a 
distant  legalistic   goal,   devoid   of   the   “meaningful   content”   mandated   by   the  
"solemn   commitment”   made   by   the   Crown   in   recognizing   and   affirming  
Aboriginal rights and  title: Sparrow, supra, at p. 1108. It also risks unfortunate 
consequences. When the distant goal of proof is finally reached, the Aboriginal 
peoples may find their land and resources changed and denuded. This is not 
reconciliation. Nor is it honourable.440 
 
The decision in Haida is consistent with the minority in Van der Peet, wherein 
reconciliation allows the Crown to require courts to transfer an Indigenous right to non-
Indigenous Canadians without the consent, without a treaty and without compensation of 
Indigenous people. The Haida court returns the focal point to a theory of reconciliation 
which acknowledges the historical injustices suffered by Aboriginal peoples and places 
limits on Crown’s ability to modify the right in the pre-proof stage.  
 
5.2.5 Reconciliation as Managing the Treaty Constitutionalism: Mikisew 
In Mikisew, the court emphasized the importance of reconciliation by stating the 
fundamental objective of the modern law of Aboriginal and Treaty rights is the 
reconciliation of Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples and their respective 
claims, interests and ambitions.441 The court recognized the relationship has a long 
history of grievances and misunderstandings created by the indifference of government 
officials  to  Aboriginal  people’s  concerns, and the disrespect inherent in that indifference. 
The result undermined the process of reconciliation.442 The court has reaffirmed that 
where Treaty exists, there is an ongoing duty of consultation and reconciliation in 
keeping with the honour of the Crown. Consultation is a means of reconciliation that is 
demanded by s. 35 to manage the treaty relationship existing in Canada.  
 
Unfortunately the Treaty jurisprudence is flawed in the first instance by altering 
and infringing the Treaty without the consent of the Indigenous treaty party. Legislative 
infringement is in direct violation of the Treaty as there were no lawful transfer of power 
                                                 
440 Ibid at para 33. 
441 Mikisew, supra note at para 1. 
442 Ibid. 
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nor a delegation of any Indigenous orders to the Crown through the Treaty process. The 
Indigenous Treaty people did not agree to enveloping their legal orders into the Canadian 
Constitutional order through Treaty or otherwise.  
 
Brian Slattery in his article “Principles  of  Recognition  and  Reconciliation," states 
that reconciliation must strike a balance between the need to remedy past injustices and 
the need to accommodate contemporary interests.443 Indeed, Sec. 35 and reconciliation 
require the Crown to take positive steps to identify Indigenous legal orders by the 
standard, content, participation and consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned. Slattery 
describes the basic principles of recognition and reconciliation: 
 
1. They  should  acknowledge  the  historical  reality  that  “when  the  settlers  came,  the  
Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their 
forefathers  had  done  for  centuries,”  as  Judson  J.  observed  in  the  Calder  case. They 
should  not  draw  arbitrary  distinctions  between  “settled”,  “nomadic”,  and  “semi-
nomadic”   peoples   but   accept   that   all   of   the   Indigenous   peoples   in   Canada   had  
historical rights to their ancestral homelands — the lands from which they drew 
their material livelihood, social identity, and spiritual nourishment — regardless 
of   whether   they   had   developed   conceptions   of   “ownership,”   “property,”   of  
“exclusivity,”   and  without   forcing   their practices into conceptual boxes derived 
from English or French law; 
 
 2. They should take account of the long history of relations between Indigenous 
 peoples and the British Crown, and the body of inter-societal law that emerged 
 from those relations; 
 
3. They should draw inspiration from fundamental principles of international law 
and justice, principles that are truly universal, and not grounded simply in rules 
that European imperial powers formulated to suit their own convenience, such as 
the supposed  “principle  of  discovery”;; 
  
4. They should envisage the continuing operation of customary law within the 
Indigenous group concerned. At the same time, they should explain the way in 
which the collective title of an Indigenous group relates to the titles of other 
Indigenous groups and to rights held under the general land system.444 
 
                                                 
443 Brian Slattery "The  Metamorphosis  of  Aboriginal  Title” (2006) 85 Can Bar Rev 255. 
“Principles  of  Recognition  and  Reconciliation”  at  283. 
444 Ibid at 283-284. 
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Indigenous legal activists are clear that simply Indigenizing current Canadian institutions 
fails to go far enough. There needs to be a gargantuan Constitutional paradigm shift in the 
highest order. Indigenous legal orders and their Constitutional orders need to be accorded 
an equal place in the creation of a new Canadian federation. Canada itself needs to be 
recreated with the inclusion of Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders. The colonial 
legal theories, principles and tests in Canadian law were created are designed to further 
the goals of a colonizing state. For Canada to advance to a nation-to-nation post colonial 
state, Indigenous people must occupy an equal Constitutional position. This can only be 
accomplished by the Crown placing Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders back into 
the legal position occupied by them as nations, in the same state they were in 500 years 
ago, that being, organized societies with existing legal and Constitutional orders 
operating well before the arrival of the European colonist. 
 
The courts have a broad discretion to help make a paradigm shift in the context of 
their Constitutional obligations. However the court has proved it is ill-equipped to effect 
a reconciliation of competing interests. Cogent evidence are the legal tests required to 
establish Indigenous rights, Treaty rights and title, ignoring contemporary evolution of 
rights, denying Indigenous sovereignty and denying the nation-to-nation agreements that 
were made in Treaty. The court has demonstrated that it is a colonial institution that 
protects the sovereignty of the Crown, despite ruminations to the contrary, the outcome 
will always result in the undercutting of Indigenous rights. Like the internal competing 
interests and priority of self preservation of the Crown, the courts, as an extension of the 
Federal Crown, inherently protect its overarching power. The courts have played an 
integral role in maintaining a colonial paradigm and its claim of reconciliation of 
Indigenous people to Crown sovereignty sanctions colonization. The theory of 
reconciliation and the duty to consult fit neatly within that process. True reconciliation 
can only be effective at a Constitutional level. The  Court’s  role  is  one  step  in  the  process  
of reconciliation, but as can be seen from the jurisprudence, it cannot completely protect 
the integrity of Indigenous rights as it cannot even see them. 
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Indigenous nations never surrendered their sovereignty nor consented to its 
disappearance. Any rationale used by the courts or the Crown to support that assertion is 
simply not credible. Indigenous legal orders, laws and jurisdiction form the basis of 
Canada's existence. The courts have framed reconciliation in a manner that does not 
address the damaging and ongoing problem of colonization. Political and institutional 
decolonization and reconciliation is required from the top down. The current 
interpretation of the reconciliation is demonstrative of the approach in which the Supreme 
Court , in effect, denies Indigenous rights. The opportunity to re-establish Indigenous 
legal and Constitutional orders is not yet comprehended.  
 
The  court’s  conception  of  reconciliation  transformed  the  concept  from  a  'bringing  
back together' to a ruse for a broad expansion of legislative infringements on Aboriginal 
rights and the maintenance of the colonial project of dispossession and subjugation. 
Colonialism marks both the past and current relationship between Indigenous nations and 
the Crown. Any discussion of reconciliation will be futile unless and until it is premised 
on the full recognition of Indigenous rights, legal and Constitutional orders. Any 
discussion on reconciliation also must be premised on the nation-to-nation relationship 
that permitted European settlement in Canada. In the end, any discussion on 
reconciliation must include reaffirmation and repatriation of Indigenous orders through 
Treaty federalism and institutional decolonization.  
 
Reconciliation through the Treaty process means both the Indigenous 
Constitutional order and imperial Constitutional orders have been reconciled. Sec. 35 
Constitution Act, 1982, can be interpreted to reconcile these orders and place them within 
Constitutional supremacy. In essence, treaty federalism means Constitutional pluralism. It 
is a process that honours the original spirit and intent of the Treaties, rather than the 
colonial interpretations provided by the courts and Crown that denies the consensual 
foundation of Treaty. Treaty did not alter the original rights, laws and jurisdictions unless 
agreed upon by the parties themselves. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People 
concluded that the Canadian Constitution has evolved from the Treaty order and Treaty 
Constitutionalism when it held, 
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..over time and by a variety of methods, Aboriginal people became part of the 
emerging federation of Canada while retaining their rights to their laws, lands, 
political structures and internal autonomy as a matter of Canadian common law. 
... the current constitution of  Canada has evolved in part from the original treaties 
and other relations that First Peoples  held with the Crown and the rights that flow 
from those relations. The treaties form a fundamental part of the constitution and 
for many Aboriginal peoples, play a role similar to that played by the Constitution 
Act, 1867 in relation to the provinces. The terms of the Canadian federation are 
found not only in formal constitutional documents governing relations between 
the federal and provincial governments but also in treaties and other instruments 
establishing the basic links between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown445 
 
In essence, Treaty Constitutionalism, treaty federalism is a part of the framework of the 
Canadian Constitution. As well Sakej Henderson, Marjorie Benson, and Isobel Findlay in 
Aboriginal Tenure in the Constitution of Canada,  argue  that  “the  spirit  and  the  intent  of  s.  
35(1),  then,  should  be  interpreted  as  ‘recognizing  and  affirming’  Aboriginal  legal  orders,  
laws and jurisdictions unfolded  through  Aboriginal  and  treaty  rights.”446 These rights are 
Constitutionally vested and protected by the supremacy clause pursuant to s. 52(1) 
Constitution Act 1982, and from abrogation of derogation by individual rights and 
freedoms in s. 25 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus Indigenous governments 
will have the ability to exist parallel to federal and provincial governments, exercising 
those jurisdictions afforded by their Constitutional order and treaty relationship and as 
recognized and affirmed within section 35 of the Canadian Constitution while federal and 
provincial governments exercise those jurisdictions afforded by their Constitutional order 
under s. 91, 92 and 93.447  
 
                                                 
445 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission, Vol. 2, (Ottawa: 
Canada Communications Group, 1996), 193-194 [RCAP, Final Report Vol. 2]. Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-
Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1993) [RCAP, 
Partners] at 193-194.  
446 James Sákéj Henderson, Marjorie Benson, and Isobel Findlay, Aboriginal Tenure in the 
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) [Henderson, Aboriginal Tenure]. 
447 Kiera  Ladner,  “(RE)creating  Good  Governance Creating Honourable Governance: Renewing 
Indigenous  Constitutional  Orders”, Paper presented at the Annual conference of the Canadian 
Political Science Association, Ottawa May 27-29, 2009 at 10. 
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Subsequently, Constitutional reconciliation, as an Constitutional interpretive 
principle, can provide both the court, and the governments with a framework to 
implement treaty Constitutionalism. It holds potential, however, only if we can escape the 
colonial mentality which upholds the sovereignty of the Crown and denies Indigenous 
nations the same. As Justice Binnie in Mitchell noted,   “The   constitutional   objective   is  
reconciliation  not  mutual  isolation…Aboriginal  peoples  do  not  stand  in  opposition  to,  nor  
are they subjugated by, Canadian sovereignty. They are a part of it.”448 
 
5.3 THE CONVERGENCE OF THE TREATY ORDER THROUGH TREATY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Shared rule or a bi-lateral federation has been described as Treaty Federalism449 
or Treaty Constitutionalism. Treaty Constitutionalism restores the original position of 
Indigenous people, possessing their own legal, Constitutional and Treaty orders and 
existing side by side with the Canadian Constitution. Treaties constitute the original 
Constitutional order. They are the foundation of Canada and created shared 
responsibilities while preserving Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders.  
 
The goal of restoration of Treaty Constitutionalism has been identified by legal 
scholars and royal commissions alike. The final report on the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal People came to same conclusion by confirming that Indigenous peoples are 
equal partners in Canadian federalism, 
   
We believe Aboriginal people must be recognized as partners in the complex 
arrangements that make up Canada. Indeed we hold that Aboriginal Governments 
are one of three orders of government in Canada- Federal, Provincial/Territorial 
and Aboriginal. The three orders are autonomous within their own spheres of 
jurisdiction, thus sharing the sovereignty of Canada as a whole. Aboriginal 
governments are not like municipal governments, which exercise powers 
delegated from provincial or territorial governments. Shared sovereignty is an 
important feature of Canadian federalism. It permitted the early partnership 
                                                 
448 Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 SCR 911 (SCC) at para 133 and 135. 
449 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24. 
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between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, and later it permitted the union of 
provinces that became Canada.450 
 
Other legal scholars have also envisioned Treaty Constitutionalism. Michael Hudson, in 
"Reconciling Diversity with Unity, Canadian Federalism in the 21st Century," has argued 
that true reconciliation requires that Canadians of all origins accept that Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal citizens share the country and its institutions. This reality must then be 
reflected in Canada's Constitutional order. Such a shared Constitutional order must reflect 
a shared sovereignty between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians."451 Hudson 
posits that the architecture for shared sovereignty is in place and what is required is a 
fresh examination of the Constitution. Kiera Ladner has been very helpful in "Visions of 
Neo-Colonialism, Renewing the Relationship with Aboriginal People," where she notes 
that Treaty federalism accepts that Constitutional law, the terms of the nation-to-nation 
agreements established in the Royal Proclamation, the Treaties, and early agreements 
demonstrate that Aboriginal people were already 'partners in Confederation.'452  
 
Similarly, Henderson in "Empowering Treaty Federalism," argues that treaty 
federalism means Treaty First Nations’ free association in a new federalism will enhance 
Canadian democracy principles: 
  
My suggestion is that the Treaty First Nations should merge treaty federalism 
with provincial federalism at both the federal and provincial levels. Federalism 
and the British idea of free association are standards that most Canadians share. 
These standards are related to human needs and rights and are evidenced in the 
treaties and the constitutional Acts. Also, these standards inform the context of 
self-determination as described in the UN Human Rights Covenants. Under the 
authority of maintaining peace and good order, the Treaty First Nations should 
send Treaty Delegates to Parliament and the provincial legislative assemblies 
which have intruded on their constitutional rights. Treaty First Nations should 
require a free association with federal and provincial governments based on the 
principles of political equality, cultural integrity and economic opportunity. It will 
                                                 
450 RCAP Final Report Vol. 2, supra note 445 at 168. 
451 Michael Hudson, "Reconciling Diversity with Unity, Canadian Federalism in the 21st 
Century," Paper presented to the Canadian Bar Association, August 14-16th, 2005, Vancouver, 
B.C. at 2. 
452 Kiera  Ladner,  “Visions  of  Neo-Colonialism? Renewing the Relationship with Aboriginal 
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be a new partnership in a revitalized federalism and an extraordinary 
democracy.453  
 
Each agreement comprises a central treaty and subsequent ratification treaties. Together 
these relationships are often called treaty federalism. Treaty federalism was the original 
Aboriginal prerogative federation with Great Britain and was an indispensable step that 
had to occur before the spirit and intent of treaty federalism was recorded in Treaty. 
Treaty federalism is concerned with:  
  
 (1) protection of inherent Aboriginal rights;  
 (2) distribution of shared jurisdictions;  
 (3) territorial management;  
 (4) human liberties and rights; and  
 (5) treaty delegations. 454 
 
Henderson indicates that these five categories in the treaties illustrate the process of 
Aboriginal autonomy and choice in pursuing their own economic, social and cultural 
development. Aboriginal self-determination is affirmed by the first principle of the rule 
of law in the United Kingdom – that all peoples, despite race or ethnicity, are to be secure 
in what the Crown has recognized as their liberties and entitlements. He states that by any 
normal rule of law and by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, each Aboriginal nation 
and the Crown is bound only by what it has agreed to in the Treaties. They are not bound 
to unwritten customary law, to written Constitutional norms or to the domestic law of the 
other party. The Treaty delegations to the Crown established the limits of Parliament and 
of the legislative assemblies. Additionally, the promises and terms of the Treaties created 
a fiduciary duty in the Crown to protect the right of Aboriginal self-determination.455  
Further, Henderson argues that Treaty federalism needs to be consolidated with 
provincial federalism into a shared rule in Canada. He explains that Provincial federalism 
is a derivative jurisdiction established by the First Nations' treaties and was constructed 
                                                 
453 Henderson,  ‘Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 326. 
454 Ibid at 251. 
455 Ibid at 269. 
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not on constitutional legal rules but on English political conventions.456 He explains that 
in Treaty federalism, the Treaty order has delegated responsibilities to the Crown. 
Matters that have not been delegated remain in the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Indigenous legal and Constitutional order. In Canada, there are portions of Indigenous 
territory where no treaties exist and all jurisdictions, rights and responsibilities are 
retained by the Indigenous nation. Those inherent rights have not been subsumed or 
reconciled. Sec. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, merely reaffirms that prior Treaty 
reconciliation and delegation. Treaty federalism has created jurisdictional borderlines and 
did not replace either Indigenous or British legal systems.457 Treaty federalism exists and 
is subject to Constitutional supremacy, not parliamentary or judicial supremacy, to justify 
unconstitutional infringements. 
 
Constitutional inclusion recognizes that Aboriginal people have a different set of 
rights than other Canadians. Legal scholar, Patrick Macklem, in "Indigenous Difference 
in the Canadian Constitution," points out that the Constitutional relationship between 
Aboriginal people and the Canadian state promotes equal citizenship by acknowledging 
the Constitutional relevance of Indigenous difference. He notes that Aboriginal people 
are in a Constitutional relationship with Canada that does not exist with any other 
Canadian. He states that Constitutional law aspires to distributive justice and the 
Constitutional protection the equal distribution of Constitutional power. Macklem notes 
that the Constitutional power of Indigenous difference authorizes Aboriginal people to 
engage in the exercise of their rights, preserve their ancestral territories and entrench the 
promises made by the Crown in Treaty negotiations. It also gives rise to corresponding 
state obligations to establish the fiscal, social and institutional arrangements necessary to 
fulfill Treaty rights including Treaty processes.458  
 
Consequently, consolidating treaty federalism into the Constitution of Canada is 
urgent and is an unfinished Constitutional reform. Treaty Constitutionalism has at least 
                                                 
456 Ibid at 274. 
457 Ibid at 301. 
458 Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2002) .  
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eight goals, (a) recognition of the legal personality of Treaty First Nations already 
acknowledged by prerogative treaties; (b) consolidating the existing treaties and 
determining the extent of each treaty's implementation or non-implementation; (c) 
immediate vesting of the specific power of self-determination of those recognized Treaty 
First Nations; (d) including the Treaty First Nations in the electoral apportionment of 
federal and provincial governments; (e) including Treaty First Nations in the national 
equalization formula; (f) limiting the powers of federal and provincial governments over 
Treaty First Nations to those that were formally delegated to the Crown in the treaties; (g) 
broad acknowledgment of the right of Aboriginal communities to enter into new treaties 
where there are no existing treaties; and (h) filling gaps in the old treaties in accordance 
with Human Rights Covenants.459 
 
To be clear, Treaty Constitutionalism is not affirmative action based on race, it is 
based solely and exclusively on legal relationships and legal obligations from the sacred 
and inviolable Treaties. Treaty orders can unite with the current Canadian federalism to 
effect a reconciliation and does not have to undermine the foundation of Canada.460 In 
fact, it is key to the elimination of colonialism and systemic racism that pervades the 
main stream Constitutional debate.461 Treaty Constitutionalism would demand the 
informed consent of Treaty First Nations and accord with International standards.  
 
Additionally, the solution of institutional reform for Treaty implementation was 
subject to comprehensive study by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People. The 
final report, in addition to recommending a tri-partite federation, also recommended 
changes in the political institutions. Other recommendations suggest Parliament establish 
a Crown Treaty office, Treaty Commissions, and an Aboriginal Land and Treaties 
Tribunal. As well, the report suggested a new department of Aboriginal relations be 
created in each Province, with the Crown Treaty office leading the nation-to-nation 
Treaty process. The Treaty commissions would be permanent, independent, neutral 
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bodies that would facilitate and oversee Treaty negotiations.462 The Royal Commission 
also recommended Treaty legislation in Parliament that: 
 
(a) provides for the implementation of existing treaty rights, including the treaty 
rights to hunt, fish, trap; 
 
(b) “…  affirms liberal rules of interpretation of historical treaties, having regard to 
(i) the context of treaty negotiations,  
(ii) the spirit and intent of each treaty, and  
(iii) the special relationship between the treaty parties …;  
 
(c) make oral and secondary evidence admissible in the court when they are 
making determinations with respect to historical treaty rights;  
(d) recognizes and affirm the land rights and jurisdiction of Aboriginal nations as 
essential components of treaty processes;  
 
(e) declares the commitment of Parliament and the Government of Canada to the 
implementation and renewal of each treaty in accordance with the spirit and intent 
of the treaty and the relationship embodied in it;  
 
(f) commits the Government of Canada to treaty processes that clarify, implement 
and where the parties agree, amend the terms of treaties to give effect to the spirit 
and intent of each treaty and the relationship embodied in it;  
 
(g) commits the Government of Canada to a process of treaty making with:  
(i) Aboriginal nations that do not yet have a treaty with the Crown and  
(ii) treaty nations whose treaties do not purport to address issues of lands 
and resources;  
(h) commits the Government of Canada to treaty processes based on, and guided 
by, the nation-to-nation structure of the new relationship, implying:  
(i) that all parties demonstrating a spirit of openness, a clear political will, 
and a commitment to fair, balanced and equitable negotiations; and  
… 
(i) authorizes the establishment, in consultation with treaty nations, of the 
institutions this Commission recommends as necessary to fulfill the treaty 
process.463 
 
Constitutional and institutional reform is imperative to propelling Canada into a post-
colonial era and adhering to the rule of law. 
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5.4 CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES AS MODELS OF 
CONSULTATION 
 
Treaty Constitutionalism through Constitutional reform is a structural reform that 
both Treaty First Nations and Canada have to address the manifestation of problems 
created by failed treaty implementation.464 The problems that exist in the relationship 
between Indigenous nations and the Crown are often seen as legal problems when in fact 
they are political constructs. Currently, as in the past, the Canadian Government has 
neither developed a viable or successful process to implement the agreements they made 
in Treaty nor to properly consult when encroaching on the agreements. Federal 
statements, commissions, accords and roundtables on treaty implementation have been 
held without any real success in honouring the Crown’s  obligations.  Examples  of  federal  
initiatives marred in bureaucratic barriers are the additions to reserve policy, specific and 
comprehensive claims processes, self government agreements and Treaty land 
entitlement issues that have proven to take decades to resolve.465 As  well,   the   court’s  
framework on the honour of the Crown has further proven ineffective in protecting the 
Treaty order. The honour of the Crown and the duty to consult is implicit in the Treaty 
order as signed through mutual consent and nation-to-nation agreements.  
 
At present, there is neither Federal nor Provincial policy on implementing Treaty. 
No constitutional consultation on implementation with Treaty Indigenous nations has 
been created. The lack of constitutional consultation on treaty implementation or 
potential alteration to the Treaty agreement is a constitutional failure of Federal and 
Provincial governments. Treaty orders and Treaty rights create a mandatory 
constitutional obligation on the Crown to address and resolve treaty implementation 
violations immediately. The   court’s   jurisprudential   framework   for   infringement   of  
constitutionally protected Treaty rights violates the Treaty agreements and the absence of 
constitutional mechanisms of consultation creates a constitutional crisis and violates the 
rule of law, constitutional supremacy and the honour of the Crown. 
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Infringement of Treaty rights via the common law duty of consultation cannot 
occur in the manner envisioned by the courts. Treaties are constitutionally-protected 
agreements made between nations. Treaty rights are not undefined Aboriginal rights, they 
are existing, concrete rights that require negotiations to reconcile Treaty rights with the 
Canadian legal order. The proper forum for consultation on possible amendment of the 
sacred and inviolable Treaties is in the form of Constitutional conferences.  
 
The provision for Constitutional conferences on Constitutional rights was 
provided in s. 37 Constitution Act 1982466 wherein a minimum of two conferences, within 
five years, were to be held to discuss matters that affect Aboriginal people. The inclusion 
of both s. 35 and s. 37.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, was only the beginning and the 
Constitutional agenda was considered yet unfinished. In the following years there had 
been three First Ministers’ conferences: in 1984, 1985 and 1987. All focused primarily on 
defining a Constitutional basis for Aboriginal self government. The conferences ended 
without any resolutions.467 As well, Treaty implementation was not discussed.468  
 
Constitutional discussions on reform followed the patriation of the Constitution 
by a 1983 Report of the Special Committee of the House of Commons, known as the 
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Penner Report.469 The report recommended the establishment of a new relationship 
between the Crown and Indigenous nations, premised on Indian self government. It 
recommended that First Nations governments were to be established pursuant to a 
Federal Indian Regulations Act and then by Constitutional amendment. The report called 
for a tri-partite federation in Canada. A few years later, Canada signed statutory self 
government arrangements with the Cree and Naskapi in Quebec and Sechelt First Nation 
in B.C., and also introduced a community based self government policy, however none of 
these would have Constitutional status.470 Issues in Quebec then dominated the 
Constitutional agenda with the Meech Lake accord signed shortly after the failed 1987 
First Ministers conference on Aboriginal issues. In 1992, The Charlottetown Accord, now 
a Constitutional convention, had the promise to transform the relationship between the 
Crown and Indigenous people. The accord recognized Aboriginal governments as one of 
the three orders of governments. First Nation laws would replace Federal and Provincial 
laws subject to those "essential to the preservation of peace, order and good government 
in Canada." As well, the accord discussed a commitment to a joint process for Treaty 
implementation.471 In October 1992, the Charlottetown Accord was rejected in a national 
referendum. Then in 2000, the Standing Senate Committee Report on "Forging New 
Relationships; Aboriginal Governments in Canada,"472 recommended significant changes 
but in each case, the recommendations were not followed.473 
 
In  “Empowering  Treaty  Federalism,”  Henderson  notes  that after the inclusion of 
s. 35, Canada's prime ministers refused to implement Aboriginal and treaty rights and 
rejected the new Constitutional vision. Further, Treaty nations were denied standing to 
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speak in the Constitutional processes.474 The Constitutional amendment conferences, the 
Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord processes illustrated that the First 
Ministers of Canada ignored the fundamental context of the Constitutional rights of the 
Aboriginal peoples by assuming unilateral authority to select the delegates for the 
Aboriginal peoples, to fill any gaps in treaty federalism and to determine Aboriginal 
peoples' destiny.475 This selection process denied Aboriginal and treaty rights by refusing 
to seat the 30 distinct nations that signed treaty and instead chose federal funded lobby 
groups.476 Canada’s   selection   of   Aboriginal   delegates   was   on   the   basis   groupings  
according to Canadian law rather than on Constitutional rights. Thus, these Constitutional 
discussions avoided fulfilling treaty federalism, implementing self-determination and 
implementing treaty rights for self-government. Treaty First Nations have always argued 
that any change in their legal relationships with the imperial Crown requires their consent 
and further, any external change would be a violation of their Aboriginal rights, treaty 
rights and, now, their human rights.477 These issues sidetracked the Constitutional 
amendment processes and failed to expose treaty federalism underlying the Constitutional 
provisions or to elaborate the practical meaning of these Constitutional rights in Canadian 
federalism.478 Professor Henderson notes that due to the flawed structure, the conferences 
failed to expose treaty federalism underlying the Constitutional provisions or to elaborate 
the practical meaning of these Constitutional rights in Canadian federalism.479 
 
In 2005 the First Nations-Federal Crown Political Accord on the Recognition and 
Implementation of First Nations Governments480, was developed to make federal policy 
consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court. One of the primary purposes of the 
accord was "to commit parties to work jointly to promote meaningful process for 
                                                 
474 Ibid at 302. 
475 Ibid. 
476 Ibid at 303, the First Ministers endorsed four federally funded lobby groups. 
477 Ibid at 303. 
478 Ibid.  
479 Ibid at 303. 
480 Minister of Northern Development, First Nations - Federal Crown Political Accord on the 
Recognition and Implementation of First Nations Government (Ottawa: Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada, 2005), online: Assembly of First Nations 
<http://afn.ca/cmslib/general/PolAss.pdf>. 
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reconciliation and implementation of s. 35 rights with First Nation governments to 
achieve an improved quality of life ..."481 The reference to treaty within a governance 
orientated political accord is a commitment by the government to develop policy toward 
treaty implementation in Indigenous governance.482  
 
Consultation through Constitutional dialogue between Indigenous and Canadian 
governments is proper and just consultation. The conferences will address the treaty 
agreements between the Treaty Nations and the Crown with each selecting their 
delegates.  The conferences are not based upon the Indian Act model.  Its first task is to 
create a consensual consultation arrangement over the Treaty areas.  Treaties are 
consensual and binding agreements that not only import legal and Constitutional duties, 
but moral obligations on all citizens in Canada. Constitutional reform, treaty federalism 
and Constitutional conferences as models of consultation will fulfill the promise made in 
Treaty and has the promise of transforming the relationship between the Crown and First 
Nation people. It was also bring about the reconciliation demanded by the affirmation of 
Treaty rights in s. 35(1) and s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.   
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Some  will  say   that   the  argument  set   forth   in   this   thesis   is   the  ‘Indian  argument’  
which asserts that the accurate interpretation of Canada's Constitution ought to have 
begun with a proper recognition of Indigenous Constitutional orders by placing them 
within the shared rule as mandated by the sacred and inviolable Treaties. In actuality, the 
argument set forth in this thesis is about the rule of law, Constitutional supremacy and for 
Canada to follow the law and implement the Treaty agreements they signed with the 
Indigenous Nations. The solution of a shared Constitution is not based on racial or ethnic 
standards but on the legal documents that created Canada.  
 
                                                 
481 Ibid. 
482 Henderson,  “Treaty  Federalism”,  supra note 24 at 303. 
 139 
The inclusion of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Canadian Constitution in 1982 
ushered in great possibilities for Indigenous peoples, treaty and Aboriginal governments 
and their Constitutional orders. Its potential is tremendous. It provides and opportunity 
for decolonizing Canada and as pointed out by Henderson, Benson and Findlay,   “The  
spirit   and   the   intent   of   section   35(1),   then,   should   be   interpreted   as   “recognizing   and  
affirming”  Aboriginal   legal   orders,   laws   and   jurisdictions   unfolded through Aboriginal 
and   treaty   rights.   …” What this means is that the Sec. 35 rights are in actuality a 
recognition and affirmation of Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders. This is the 
promise of the Sec. 35. The potential for decolonization is tremendous as the Constitution 
not only protects Indigenous Constitutional orders but it provide recognition through 
Aboriginal and treaty rights into, and reconciliation with, the Canadian Constitutional 
order.483  Treaties did not limit Indigenous legal or Constitutional orders but rather 
supplemented the peaceful coexistence in the relationship. Neither the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty nor the entrenchment of Sec. 35, Constitution Act 1982, replaced or 
extinguished their existence. The jurisprudence and Crown policy have not recognized 
the existence and continuation of Indigenous legal orders and rights. Indigenous legal and 
Constitutional orders include all inherent rights, original title, jurisdiction and sovereignty 
and are entitled to the protection of Canada's Constitution and the rule of law. The courts 
cannot complete this task. It is the Canadian government that has the onus for this 
political undertaking. The lack of political interest has plagued our country and affected 
the ability of Indigenous people to assume their rightful place in society. Lack of political 
will and accountability to Indigenous people is the reason for a lack of change for First 
Nations.  
 
There is nothing precluding the Government of Canada from jointly agreeing to 
the scope and content of Indigenous legal and Constitutional orders entrenched in s. 35. 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People has  stated,  “an  agreed  treaty  process  can  be  
                                                 
483 Henderson, Aboriginal Tenure, supra note 446 at 432-433. 
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the mechanism for implementing virtually all the recommendations in our report, indeed, 
it may  be  the  only  legitimate  way  to  do  so.”484 
 
The fear that recognizing Treaty Constitutionalism would lead to independence, 
separation and endangering the country is irrational. For it was Treaty that reconciled 
foreign sovereign nations together in commitments of mutual co-existence. It is Treaty 
that inextricably links the Crown and Indigenous nations together on a path of sharing, 
mutual respect and mutual accommodation. In restoring Treaty Constitutionalism, 
Canada’s   parliament   is   being   asked   to   do  what   was originally agreed upon in Treaty. 
They are being asked to fully comply with the treaty sovereigns sacred undertakings to 
one another, Kihci-asotamâtowin, of shared rule over a shared territory. They are simply 
being asked to fulfil their part of the bargains as Treaty Indigenous people have kept 
theirs.
                                                 
484 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, People to People, Nation to Nation: Highlights 
from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: The Commission, 
1996) at 51.
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